S/P KRASNER'S DISCUSSION WITH LEADING FRENCH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007847

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL FR IR
SUBJECT: S/P KRASNER'S DISCUSSION WITH LEADING FRENCH
STRATEGISTS ON IRAN

Classified By: CDA Karl Hofmann for reasons 1.4 b and d.


1. (SBU) Summary: During a December 13 lunch with Policy
Planning Director Stephen Krasner, three of France's leading
strategic thinkers worried that, absent tough talk from the
U.S., Iran would continue to develop a nuclear weapons
program and scorn the IAEA with total impunity. They urged
the U.S. to disabuse Iran of its dangerous misconceptions
while remaining open to a face-saving "Libya option" that
could bring Iran back into the NPT tent. Otherwise, they
warned, the U.S. would soon also have to contend with the
imminent nuclear ambitions of moderate Gulf States that fear
Iran as an irresponsible rival. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Dr. Stephen Krasner, director of Policy Planning at
the State Department, met over lunch December 13 with three
of France's leading strategic thinkers: Therese Delpech,
director of strategic affairs, Atomic Energy Agency; Bruno
Tertrais, head of research, Foundation for Strategic Affairs
(FRS); and Francois Heisbourg, special advisor, FRS. Krasner
was joined by DCM, Matthew Waxman, Principal Deputy Director
of Policy Planning, and Todd Deatherage, Special Assistant.
While all three participants had served in the past as
advisors to the GoF, their views were strictly their own and
did not necessarily reflect thinking within the French
government.


3. (C) All three analysts offered a grim portrait of an
intransigent Iran run by a secretive cabal of mullahs
deliberately blind to international realities and a president
who views opposition to the United States as the basis of his
popular support. The Iranian leadership -- including the
Guardian Council and President Ahmadinejad -- has lost any
sense of limits, and their certainty that they need not fear
a U.S. military strike could give rise to a major
miscalculation, they added. Delpech and Heisbourg warned
that a poor showing by Ahmadinejad's hardline party in the
December 15 local elections might paradoxically embolden the
president, spurring him to push the nuclear program as hard
and as fast as he could. (Note: Partial results announced
December 18 indicated that moderate conservatives were
winning key seats throughout the country, beating
Ahmadinejad's party in what was being viewed as a referendum
on his unyielding nuclear policy. End Note.)


4. (C) The analysts implored the U.S. to articulate in no
uncertain terms that the military option remains on the
table, arguing that failure to do so would fuel Iranian
underestimations of American strength. "We are feeding their
misperception of who we are. They haven't paid one cent for
their misdeeds," warned Delpech. Heibourg proposed -- with
only partial levity -- that the U.S. engage in red flag
exercises in Nevada using 10-ton bunker busters, and then
"make sure there is a four-page spread in AdWeek...All
unrelated to Iran, of course."


5. (C) Tertrais posited the "Libya option" as a possible way
forward, under which Iran would agree to voluntarily abandon
its weapons of mass destruction program in exchange for the
lifting of sanctions and further aid with its civil nuclear
program. Although Tertrais was skeptical that "a regime that
lives off opposition to the U.S." would accept such a quid
pro quo, he thought it would nonetheless be useful to convey
to the Iranians that it could be an option. Heisbourg
agreed, but cautioned that the question of U.S.-Iranian
dialogue cannot be seen through the lens of Iraq -- as he
interpreted the Iraq Study Group report to suggest -- and
that the U.S. must be clear that a dialogue with Iran cannot
be about exchanging Iran's cooperation in Iraq for U.S.
agreement to an Iranian WMD program. That Iran possesses a
relatively pluralistic system is both the good and the bad
news, according to Delpech: unlike Libya, it is not ruled by
a single personality, so a combination of pressures and
incentives could soften Iranian resistance to negotiation
with the U.S. On the other hand, that same pluralism
precludes the decisiveness that would be necessary to chart a
new policy course.


6. (C) All agreed that the U.S. and France must each develop
policies that address the likelihood of Gulf States'
defensive nuclear ambitions. The same states that viewed
Israel's longstanding presumed nuclear capability as "only
existential" are now terrified by Iran's nuclear posturing,
Delpech suggested. "Israel is only an enemy, while Iran is a
rival," Heisbourg rejoined. Tertrais predicted that moderate
Arab states might broach the subject of what security
guarantees the U.S. or NATO could provide, and could be
willing to enter more explicit defense alliances with the
U.S. and other nuclear powers. The difficulty, Heisbourg
added, will be in finding balanced defense alliances with
both Israel and other Middle Eastern countries, an

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equilibrium he called "not at all straightforward."


7. (C) There was no agreement on how far Iran had proceeded
technologically in its pursuit of uranium enrichment.
Delpech said that when visiting Iran in April, she had the
impression that progress had slowed considerably, but she now
believes Iran will meet its stated goal of 3,000 centrifuges
by spring. Ahmadinejad had promised to announce a major step
forward in March to coincide with the Persian New Year;
Delpech predicted that he might reveal that Iran has
succeeded in developing laser enrichment, which could be
undetected by IAEA inspectors. Heisbourg agreed, saying that
the Natanz facility had clearly become a "Potemkin village,"
and illicit research was being done elsewhere. Tertrais,
however, demurred, saying he did not expect any major
announcements within the next two years that would indicate
Iran was "rushing to get the bomb."


8. (C) Ultimately, all three concluded that their own lack of
consensus is emblematic of the fundamental problem: the
inscrutability of the Iranian regime. "The extent of our
ignorance is monumental," Heisbourg said, referring to the
U.S., France and Western intelligence networks. Heisbourg
criticized the U.S. for being particularly out of touch with
the on-the-ground reality, adding that in meetings with
senior U.S. officials, he had the impression that U.S.
policymakers had the mental image of Iran as the Soviet
Union. He stridently asserted that the Swiss Ambassador in
Tehran is a "very imperfect lens" through which to view
Iranian society, although he would not elaborate. Delpech
chided him for being too severe, saying that even countries
and individuals with strong ties to, and assets in, find it
hard to assess the political environment. She related the
story of her meeting with an Iranian-French political
analyst, who spends half his time in Iran, but still told her
it would be impossible for him to offer interesting analysis
of the upcoming elections because "power there is more a
conspiracy than a government."


9. (U) S/P Director Krasner has cleared this message.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
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HOFMANN