Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS7803
2006-12-15 05:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
HARIRI ALLY SEES MARCH 14 IN STRONG POSITION
how-toVZCZCXRO5890 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHFR #7803 3490509 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 150509Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3801 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1063
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007803
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR DORAN/MARCHESE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: FR LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: HARIRI ALLY SEES MARCH 14 IN STRONG POSITION
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007803
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR DORAN/MARCHESE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: FR LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: HARIRI ALLY SEES MARCH 14 IN STRONG POSITION
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Basile Yared, Sa'ad Hariri's representative in Paris,
told Poloff on December 14 that Arab League SYG Amr Moussa
had a "difficult" meeting with Hizballah and Amal officials
late December 13. According to Yared, Hizballah stunned
Moussa by insisting not only that it obtain a blocking
minority in the government in exchange for supporting the
international tribunal, but also that it be able to
re-approve the tribunal once the blocking minority was in
place (thereby ensuring that Hizballah would have an
opportunity to reverse the Siniora cabinet's decision).
Yared stressed that neither Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt nor
Sa'ad Hariri would agree to such a concession. Both were
adamant about establishing the tribunal as soon as possible
in order to put maximum pressure on Damascus. (Note: Yared
confirmed a rumor we heard from Lebanese A/DCM Ghady
El-Khoury that Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah was also
holding out for an assurance that he would not be summoned to
appear before the tribunal, either as a suspect or as a
witness. Yared added that by the same token, the Syrian
regime was trying to get assurances that any Syrian suspects
would not be allowed to implicate higher-ups in Damascus and
also to limit the tribunal's scope to the Rafik Hariri
assassination. End note.)
2. (C) Yared was nonetheless upbeat about the strength of the
March 14 coalition. Nasrallah, he said, was being "squeezed"
by March 14, UNIFIL, and Syria/Iran, and could not resort to
violence without becoming anathema in the Arab world and
losing the support of many of his Shi'ite followers. As for
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (who Yared saw as clever but
paralyzed),the Siniora Cabinet had "put him in the corner"
by approving the international tribunal agreement. If Berri
refused to convene the parliament, Yared predicted that the
GOL would seek third-party (e.g., Saudi) financing for the
tribunal in order to bypass the constitutional requirement
for parliamentary approval. Moreover, he said that March 14
MPs might threaten to impeach Berri. Even if they failed to
muster enough votes to do so, the attempt would leave Berri
weakened and on the defensive.
3. (C) Yared saw Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun
as a lost cause: "He listens to no one. He trusts no one.
He thinks he knows it all. And he's losing support." Aoun,
he continued, would not abandon his quest for Lebanon's
presidency but was the last thing that Lebanon needed at time
like this. "His military background did not prepare him very
well for leading in a democracy," Yared said with polite
contempt.
4. (C) Yared, who made no secret of his access to President
Chirac, denied that Chirac was feeling pessimistic about the
situation in Lebanon. To the contrary, said Yared, the
"French MFA types" had overestimated Hizballah's strength in
the early days of the current political crisis, but March 14
had proven them wrong in Chirac's eyes. Yared predicted that
the end of the Chirac presidency would produce a change "in
priority, but not in policy" (i.e., France would continue to
support Lebanon, but Chirac's successor would probably not
invest the same amount of energy in managing that policy).
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NSC FOR DORAN/MARCHESE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2016
TAGS: FR LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: HARIRI ALLY SEES MARCH 14 IN STRONG POSITION
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Basile Yared, Sa'ad Hariri's representative in Paris,
told Poloff on December 14 that Arab League SYG Amr Moussa
had a "difficult" meeting with Hizballah and Amal officials
late December 13. According to Yared, Hizballah stunned
Moussa by insisting not only that it obtain a blocking
minority in the government in exchange for supporting the
international tribunal, but also that it be able to
re-approve the tribunal once the blocking minority was in
place (thereby ensuring that Hizballah would have an
opportunity to reverse the Siniora cabinet's decision).
Yared stressed that neither Druze Leader Walid Jumblatt nor
Sa'ad Hariri would agree to such a concession. Both were
adamant about establishing the tribunal as soon as possible
in order to put maximum pressure on Damascus. (Note: Yared
confirmed a rumor we heard from Lebanese A/DCM Ghady
El-Khoury that Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah was also
holding out for an assurance that he would not be summoned to
appear before the tribunal, either as a suspect or as a
witness. Yared added that by the same token, the Syrian
regime was trying to get assurances that any Syrian suspects
would not be allowed to implicate higher-ups in Damascus and
also to limit the tribunal's scope to the Rafik Hariri
assassination. End note.)
2. (C) Yared was nonetheless upbeat about the strength of the
March 14 coalition. Nasrallah, he said, was being "squeezed"
by March 14, UNIFIL, and Syria/Iran, and could not resort to
violence without becoming anathema in the Arab world and
losing the support of many of his Shi'ite followers. As for
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (who Yared saw as clever but
paralyzed),the Siniora Cabinet had "put him in the corner"
by approving the international tribunal agreement. If Berri
refused to convene the parliament, Yared predicted that the
GOL would seek third-party (e.g., Saudi) financing for the
tribunal in order to bypass the constitutional requirement
for parliamentary approval. Moreover, he said that March 14
MPs might threaten to impeach Berri. Even if they failed to
muster enough votes to do so, the attempt would leave Berri
weakened and on the defensive.
3. (C) Yared saw Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun
as a lost cause: "He listens to no one. He trusts no one.
He thinks he knows it all. And he's losing support." Aoun,
he continued, would not abandon his quest for Lebanon's
presidency but was the last thing that Lebanon needed at time
like this. "His military background did not prepare him very
well for leading in a democracy," Yared said with polite
contempt.
4. (C) Yared, who made no secret of his access to President
Chirac, denied that Chirac was feeling pessimistic about the
situation in Lebanon. To the contrary, said Yared, the
"French MFA types" had overestimated Hizballah's strength in
the early days of the current political crisis, but March 14
had proven them wrong in Chirac's eyes. Yared predicted that
the end of the Chirac presidency would produce a change "in
priority, but not in policy" (i.e., France would continue to
support Lebanon, but Chirac's successor would probably not
invest the same amount of energy in managing that policy).
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON