CHIRAC ADVISER HINTS AT SOFTENING IN FRENCH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007787

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DORAN/MARCHESE; NEA/FO FOR DANIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016
TAGS: FR KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: CHIRAC ADVISER HINTS AT SOFTENING IN FRENCH
POSITION ON TRIBUNAL

REF: A. PARIS 7723 (NOTAL)


B. PARIS 7727

C. PARIS 7770

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: In a December 12 meeting, Dominique Boche
(President Chirac's Middle East adviser) hinted at a possible
softening in France's position on establishing an
international tribunal for Lebanon. Boche said that France
would support whatever position the Government of Lebanon
(GOL) took with respect to the tribunal, implying clearly
that France is open to delaying the tribunal's establishment
if that would alleviate pressure on the Siniora government.
Boche dismissed the idea of a joint U.S.-French presidential
statement on Lebanon, saying that such a statement might
embarrass Siniora, who was already under attack from
Hizballah for being too closely aligned with Washington.
Boche also saw little scope for encouraging more active
Vatican diplomacy on Lebanon. On a more positive note, Boche
assessed that Arab League SYG Amr Moussa's efforts to
negotiate an accord might find traction with Hizballah, given
that Narallah had reached the limits of what could be
achieved through legal, peaceable protest. He confirmed that
President Chirac pressed Israeli FM Livni to take a harder
line on Syria. End summary.

Hints of Slippage on Tribunal
--------------


2. (S) PolMC and NEA Watcher met December 12 with Dominique
Boche, President Chirac's Middle East adviser. They pressed
Boche to clarify a comment made during a December 11 meeting
at the MFA (septel follows) suggesting that France was open
to delaying the establishment of an international tribunal
for the Rafik Hariri assassination in the hope that such a
delay would alleviate pressure on PM Siniora's government.
Boche initially dodged the question, saying that the leaders
of the March 14 coalition understood they would lose all
political credibility if the tribunal were not established.
France, he added, was not prepared to "sacrifice" the
tribunal. In response to further questioning, however, Boche
avoided spelling out France's position on the tribunal's
timing, saying only that France wanted a "peaceful solution"
and would support whatever stance the GOL took on the
question. (Comment: We interpreted Boche's elliptical answer
as confirmation that the French are indeed prepared to
consider a delay in the tribunal's establishment, probably in
response to what they are hearing from one or more sources in
Lebanon. End comment.)

Reticent on Presidential Statement
--------------


3. (C) Boche questioned the utility of a joint U.S.-French
presidential statement to express support for the Siniora
government (as proposed by A/S Fried to PolDir Araud on
December 7, ref C),suggesting that such a statement might
embarrass PM Siniora, who was already under fire from the
Lebanese opposition for being too tightly aligned with
Washington. Given those reservations, Boche suggested it
might be better for the two heads of state to stake out their
positions individually. (Note: Boche seemed less troubled by
the prospect of a joint EU declaration, and said that France
had submitted a draft statement which it hoped would be
promulgated by the EU Council of Ministers on December 15.
He noted that the French had not yet received any comment on
their draft. End note.) Boche said he saw little scope for
increased Vatican diplomacy vis-a-vis Lebanon.

Hopeful on Amr Moussa
--------------


4. (C) Boche assessed that the situation in Lebanon was
slightly better than it had appeared just 48 hours earlier.
Though the size of Hizballah's December 10 demonstration was
worrisome, he expressed relief that Sheikh Nasrallah's
followers had not crossed the line between peaceful protest
and civil disobedience (e.g., blockading the airport,
occupying government buildings). He was therefore cautiously
upbeat about Arab League SYG Amr Moussa's attempt to

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negotiate a compromise between the March 14 coalition and the
Hizaballah-Amal-Aoun axis. Boche assessed that both sides
needed a negotiated solution, since Hizballah had already run
up against the limits of what legal, peaceful protest could
accomplish, whereas PM Siniora's government could not
continue to function under the status quo. "They need each
other," Boche summarized.


5. (C) Boche was also encouraged by the broad terms of
Moussa's proposed deal. "It has something for everyone:
Hizballah gets a stronger position in the government, Aoun
gets electoral reform, the Christians get a new president,
and March 14 gets the international tribunal," said Boche.
Asked whether he believed Hizballah was prepared to cross the
Asad regime on the tribunal's establishment, Boche agreed
that the question was pivotal. "The key question is whether
Hizballah has freedom of action. Is Hizballah totally
dependent on Syria, or does Hassan Nasrallah have some room
for maneuver? We'll see," said Boche, who added that Iran
seemed to have less to fear from the tribunal than did Syria.
While he conceded that Hizballah might, at some point down
the road, try to use its enhanced cabinet position to
paralyze the GOL's cooperation with the international
tribunal, Boche said the greater danger would be the failure
to reach a political accord.

Livni Visit
--------------


6. (S) Boche's readout of Israeli FM Livni's December 6
meeting with President Chirac tracked with post's previous
reporting (refs A and B). Livni reportedly told Chirac that
Israel was extending tacit support to Siniora, but made clear
that the GOI was not prepared to take steps on overflights or
on Sheba Farms in the interest of helping the embattled
Lebanese Prime Minister. "She left no hope of Israeli
concessions," Boche said ruefully.


7. (S) Boche confirmed that Chirac and Livni did not discuss
the status of the "security package" that France had hoped
would dissuade the GOI from continuing its overflights of
Lebanon. Boche claimed that France was still working on the
content of the package, but offered no insight as to when the
package would be presented to the GOI.

Israel Soft on Syria?
--------------


8. (S) Boche said that President Chirac, who deplored the
"impunity" which the Syrian regime seemed to enjoy at the
moment, pushed Livni to explain why Israel was so indulgent
of Damascus. "It's clear that there is a tacit entente
between Tel Aviv and Damascus," said Boche, who intimated
that Israeli leaders, uncomfortable with the turbulent
political scene in Lebanon, harbored a secret nostalgia for
the days when Syria occupied Lebanon and Damascus was the
address for all questions Lebanese. "We understand the
reasons why Israel does not want to see the fall of the
Syrian regime. But the Israelis do not understand that you
can only get results from Syria via pressure," said Boche.
He continued: "We told the Israelis, if you want to do
overflights, it would be better to do them over Syria than
Lebanon."


9. (S) In a related aside, Boche took a jab at the U.S. by
reading from a cable from the French embassy in Damascus.
The cable described the recommendations of the Iraq Study
Group as "a blast of oxygen" for the Asad regime, adding that
the ISG report had only reinforced the regime's conviction
that the West badly needed Syria's assistance.

Giving Up the Right of Return?
--------------


10. (S) During a lengthy discussion of Israeli-Palestinian
affairs, Livni encouraged Chirac to "help the Palestinians
understand" that Palestinian refugees enjoyed no "right of
return" to Israel, which was and would remain a national
homeland for the Jews. Any right of return would have to be
exercised in the context of a future Palestinian state that
would serve as a national homeland for the Palestinians.
Though Boche discounted the possibility of Chirac making a

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public statement to that effect (as Livni seemed to hope),he
said that the French were well aware of the role this
question played in the collapse of the Camp David II talks.
He suggested it could most usefully be addressed in a future
international conference on the Middle East (as advocated by
President Chirac),in which the international community could
extend guarantees to both parties on this and other subjects.


Chirac-Mubarak Exchange on Muslim Brotherhood
--------------


11. (S) Turning to Chirac's December 8 meeting with Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak, Boche said Chirac used the meeting
to explore Mubarak's views on Syria. In Chirac's analysis,
there were two schools of thought in the Arab world on
dealing with the Bashar al-Asad regime: The Saudi approach
(i.e., opposing Asad) and the "more prudent" Egyptian
approach, which tried to ameliorate the regime's behavior
without jeopardizing its survival (for fear that Syria's
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) would prove the most likely
alternative to the current Alawite regime). Chirac
questioned this logic, asking whether Mubarak found the
Syrian MB as objectionable as its Egyptian counterpart.
Mubarak's unambiguous answer was "yes." The Syrian MB was no
better than its affiliates, he argued, adding that all MB
chapters shared the same characteristics.



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