AMBASSADOR GODEC'S DECEMBER 7 MEETINGS IN PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007756

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: FR KDEM PGOV PREL TS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR GODEC'S DECEMBER 7 MEETINGS IN PARIS


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Robert Godec held
bilateral meetings on December 7 with Christian Testo, MFA
DAS-equivalent for North Africa, and Jean-Pierre Filiu,
Associate Professor at Sciences Po and former French DCM in
Tunis. Testo and Filiu each described their Tunisian
interlocutors as proud, prickly, and prone to resist any
overt pressure on questions of human rights or
democratization. Both expressed concern that the
government's refusal to open the political system was
ultimately counterproductive, and fed Islamic extremism.
Testo noted, however, that France is extremely reluctant to
apply pressure which might destabilize the regime. "We need
the Tunisians," he said. End summary.


2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Robert Godec met on
December 7 with Christian Testo, MFA DAS-equivalent for North
Africa. Testo said that French-Tunisian relations, though
correct, "lacked a certain warmth," especially when compared
to France's relations with Algeria and Morocco. He ascribed
the comparative coolness both to Ben Ali's personal style (he
rarely travels and seldom visits Paris) as well as to French
unease with the Tunisian president's brand of genteel
totalitarianism.

A Relationship Defined by "Little Problems"
--------------


3. (C) Though he said relations between France and Tunisia
were not marred by any major problems, Testo identified a
number of "little problems" that plagued the relationship.
Foremost of these were disputes over personal status cases
(i.e., divorces and child custody issues). In addition,
Testo noted perennial problems related to French citizens
acquiring or disposing of Tunisian real estate. Last but not
least, he pointed to Tunisia's lack of cooperation in
facilitating the repatriation of Tunisian nationals picked up
by the French authorities for illegal immigration. He noted
that the Tunisian Embassy consistently refused to issue such
nationals a laissez-passer, making their repatriation a legal
and bureaucratic nightmare.

Concern Over Drift
--------------


4. (C) Turning to Tunisia's internal politics, Testo assessed
that President Ben Ali's failure to open the political system
was a major error which ultimately fueled Islamic extremism.
He expressed concern about the drift of Tunisian society,
which he said was becoming increasingly less secular. In
that regard, he questioned the wisdom of the concessions that
President Ben Ali had made to Tunisian Islamists in recent
years.


5. (C) Testo expressed concern about the state of Ben Ali's
health and speculated that the Tunisian leader suffered from
one or more chronic ailments, although he had no precise
information about his medical condition. He admitted that
the French had little insight into the question of
presidential succession due to the opaque nature of the
regime. Not only was President Ben Ali carefully insulated
by a small clique of his wife's relatives, but the Tunisian
political class was paralyzed by the fear of omnipresent
informers and thus studiously committed to rehearsing
carefully scripted positions. Testo was particularly
critical of FM Abdallah, who had elevated giving only the
official line into a high art form.

But No Stomach for Confrontation
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador Godec raised the possibility of pressing
the GOT to increase political freedoms, but Testo made it
clear that France saw little to be gained by applying overt
pressure to the regime. Tunisia, whatever its faults, was
one of the few states to play a consistently moderating role
within the Arab League. Moreover, it boasted a solid middle
class and was comparatively advanced in terms of women's
rights. Consequently, the Quai was skeptical of any approach
that might jeopardize Tunisia's stability. In addition, the
Tunisians "detested" international pressure and bristled at
the notion of conditionality. Testo noted that when the EU,
in order to protest an incident in which the Tunisians spiked
a German attempt to hold a meeting on human rights in Tunis,
attempted to convoke the Tunisian ambassador to Brussels, the
ambassador refused to attend.


7. (C) "We need the Tunisians," said Testo, who added that
the French envisioned political reform in Tunisia as being

PARIS 00007756 002 OF 002


driven by carrots rather than sticks. Testo conceded,
however, that the problem with that approach was that the
regime appeared increasingly insular and all too willing to
perpetuate the status quo -- even at the cost of foregoing
incentives for political change proffered by the EU and
others.

The Islamist Threat
--------------


8. (C) Jean-Pierre Filiu, a career diplomat on loan to
Sciences Po who was formerly the French DCM in Tunis, offered
a similar analysis in a separate meeting later that day.
When asked by Ambassador Godec about encouraging political
progress in Tunisia, Filiu observed that the Tunisians were
constantly attempting to play the French and Americans off
each other, although Filiu added that, to his knowledge, that
tactic had never succeeded thanks to close cooperation
between the U.S. and French missions. Filiu assessed that
the Tunisians were deeply worried by the Freedom Agenda,
which they saw as a direct threat to their stability. He
noted that the Tunisian strategy was to pay lip service to
democracy while avoiding any meaningful reform, as
illustrated by the government's willingness to host a MEPI
regional office in Tunis while simultaneously preventing
Tunisian NGOs from interacting with MEPI.


9. (C) Filiu opined that the status quo in Tunisia could
continue indefinitely so long as the Tunisian economy
continued to grow at 5-6% per year. A cooling of the economy
would, however, mean increased migratory pressure and
political pressure. With respect to the latter, Filiu
expressed concern that the regime's suppression of political
Islam was merely feeding Islamic extremism. Satellite
television broadcasts from the Arabian peninsula, especially
Saudi-sponsored "Iqra", were also feeding the trend by
propagating Wahhabist values. Noting that the Tunisian
regime was "not very good" at detecting and apprehending
Islamic extremists, Filiu estimated that a significant number
of Tunisian jihadists left the country each week to join the
insurgency in Iraq. Moreover, Filiu claimed that a Japanese
investigation had determined that a webmaster for the late
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had been operating out of suburb north
of Tunis.


10. (C) That revelation, said Filiu, raised a disquieting
question: Did the authorities know about the webmaster's
activities and quietly permit him to operate, or were they
unaware of his presence? Filiu assumed the authorities were
unaware, just as they had no prior inclination that the April
2002 Djerba synagogue bomber had been recruited by an
al-Qaeda cell until after he had carried out his attack.
Small wonder, he reasoned, that the Tunisian leadership was
"fundamentally afraid" of its own population and of the
future.


11. (U) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Robert
Godec.




Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON