Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS7727
2006-12-08 15:57:00
SECRET
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

ISRAELI FM LIVNI'S DECEMBER 5-6 VISIT TO PARIS

Tags:  FR IS LE PGOV PREL SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0531
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #7727/01 3421557
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081557Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3663
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1054
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007727 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: FR IS LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ISRAELI FM LIVNI'S DECEMBER 5-6 VISIT TO PARIS

REF: A. PARIS 7684


B. WALLER-DANIN E-MAIL OF DECEMBER 7

Classified By: CDA Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007727

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: FR IS LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: ISRAELI FM LIVNI'S DECEMBER 5-6 VISIT TO PARIS

REF: A. PARIS 7684


B. WALLER-DANIN E-MAIL OF DECEMBER 7

Classified By: CDA Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Israeli FM Livni had a fairly terse exchange
with FM Douste-Blazy on the status of the Sheba Farms and the
need for the Palestinians to explicitly accept the Quartet
principles. Douste-Blazy, to the surprise of his MFA
underlings, asked Livni to consider entering into secret
talks with the Siniora government regarding Sheba Farms. In
turn, Livni asked President Chirac to consider enunciating a
French position on the "right of return" that might encourage
greater realism in the Arab world. End summary.


2. (C) On December 8, Israeli PolCouns Ella Aphek (protect)
provided us a readout of FM Tzipi Livni's visit to Paris on
December 5-6. Aphek characterized the visit as having been
even "more substantive" than the Israelis had hoped, and
noted with pride her own role in salvaging a meeting between
FM Livni and President Chirac after Israeli Ambassador Shek
and presidential foreign policy advisor Maurice
Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) had concluded that the meeting would
have to be dropped due to scheduling conflicts. (Aphek
turned to Dominique Boche, Chirac's advisor for the Middle
East, who helped to identify a time-slot on the morning of
December 6. Aphek said Boche, who previously served in
Israel, understood the importance of "investing in Livni" as
one of the few major Israeli political figures committed to
reviving the peace process.)

Security Package Missing in Action
--------------


3. (S) Before seeing Chirac, Livni met with Israeli Foreign
Minister Douste-Blazy. To her surprise, Douste-Blazy did not
broach the question of Israeli overflights of southern
Lebanon. (Although Chirac subsequently raised the issue,
Aphek said he did so in a fairly pro-forma manner.) Even
more surprisingly, neither Douste-Blazy nor Chirac made any
reference to the long-awaited "security package" that they
had promised to share with the Israelis in the hope of
reducing the need for continued overflights. Although Livni

did not press the French on the status of the package, the
Israelis were puzzled by the French silence on this issue.
(Comment: We note that, as per Ref A, MGM conspicuously
failed to mention the status of the French security package
during his December 1 meeting with U/S Edelman, even after
Edelman volunteered that the U.S. was still actively
considering possibilities for increased information-sharing
with the GOI in order to address the overflights issue. As
per Ref B, we continue to assess that the French decided --
prior to Livni's visit -- to suspend movement on the package
for fear it would be seen as a provocation by
Hizballah/Syria. End comment.)

A Divergence on Sheba Farms . . .
--------------


4. (C) Livni and Douste-Blazy did, however, have a polite but
pointed argument over the Sheba Farms. Douste-Blazy led off
with the standard French talking points, claiming it was
essential that Israel strengthen PM Siniora in the eyes of
the Lebanese public by signaling a willingness, at some
future date, to negotiate the status of the Sheba Farms with
the GOL. Livni pushed back, noting that the ultimate status
of the Sheba Farms would be resolved in the context of
comprehensive peace negotiations, adding that Israel had
insisted that UNSCR 1701 contain a reference to UNSCR 242 for
that very reason.


5. (C) Douste-Blazy then suggested that Israel consider
opening secret talks on Sheba Farms with representatives of
PM Siniora. Livni gave an equivocal response. Following the
meeting, MFA DAS-equivalent for the Levant Herve Besancenot
told Aphek that he was surprised by Douste-Blazy's
suggestion, which he suggested must have occurred to the
French Foreign Minister on the spur of the moment. "How
secret could the talks be considering that the Minister made

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the suggestion in front of twenty-five people?" an
incredulous Besancenot asked Aphek. Aphek, while not
discounting the possibility that the idea had simply popped
into Douste-Blazy's head during the course of the
conversation, wondered whether Chirac had instructed
Douste-Blazy to float the suggestion as a trial balloon.
Aphek noted that she would probe this idea further during a
December 9 meeting with Boche.


PARIS 00007727 002 OF 002


. . . And on Quartet Principles
--------------


6. (C) Turning to Israeli-Palestinian relations, in Aphek's
account, Livni and Douste-Blazy proceeded to have a "frank
exchange of views." (The MFA's desk officer for Israel,
Pascal Lemaire, used the same characterization.)
Douste-Blazy argued that it was a mistake for PA President
Mahmoud Abbas to abandon efforts to form a national unity
government (NUG),adding that Abbas' apparent decision to
focus his energies on strengthening Fatah was a recipe for
civil war. Douste-Blazy also took issue with Israel's
insistence that a NUG explicitly accept the three Quartet
principles, arguing that an implicit acceptance should
suffice. Livni pushed back, saying that Abbas had told the
GOI that European back-tracking on this point had seriously
undermined his negotiating position vis-a-vis Hamas. "It was
quite an argument," Aphek summarized.


7. (C) In contrast, during Livni's subsequent meeting with
Chirac, the French President remained in listening mode while
Livni shared her analysis of Israeli-Palestinian affairs.
Livni then asked Chirac to consider nudging the Arab states
to a more realistic position on the question of the "right of
return" for Palestinian refugees by asserting that France
foresaw the eventual creation of a Palestinian state as a
homeland for the Palestinians, whereas Israel would remain a
homeland for the Jews. Aphek said Chirac appeared intrigued
by this idea and indicated a willingness to discuss it
further with Livni, even asking whether she could extend her
stay -- prompting his advisers to object that his schedule
would not permit an additional meeting in the immediate
future.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON