Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS7716
2006-12-08 13:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

NEA DAS GORDON GRAY'S DECEMBER 5 MEETING WITH MFA

Tags:  FR KDEM PGOV PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHFR #7716/01 3421316
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081316Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3649
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1052
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007716 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: FR KDEM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: NEA DAS GORDON GRAY'S DECEMBER 5 MEETING WITH MFA
COUNTERPART FRANCK GELLET

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007716

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: FR KDEM PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: NEA DAS GORDON GRAY'S DECEMBER 5 MEETING WITH MFA
COUNTERPART FRANCK GELLET

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a December 5 meeting with NEA DAS Gordon
Gray, Franck Gellet, the MFA DAS-equivalent for the Persian
Gulf, observed that the Gulf states were privately alarmed by
Iran's nuclear ambitions, although their public discourse was
not particularly helpful. He asked whether the U.S. had any
binding bilateral agreements with the Gulf states that, in
the event of an Iranian attack, would produce an American
military riposte. He also noted a paradoxical attitude from
the Gulf states vis-a-vis the Sunni insurgency in Iraq: On
the one hand, the Gulf states feared the day when the
jihadists would come home to roost; on the other hand, their
antipathy toward the Shi'ites prevented them from taking a
more vigorous stance against the insurgency. Gellet summed
up the French approach to democratization in the Gulf as "let
them go at their own pace." End summary.

Much Concern About Iran
--------------


2. (C) In a December 5 meeting with NEA DAS Gordon Gray,
Franck Gellet, the MFA DAS-equivalent for the Persian Gulf,
said that there was a dichotomous discourse from the Gulf
states with respect to the threat posed by the Iranian
nuclear program. In private, the Gulf states were generally
quite candid with the French about the threat they perceived
from a nuclear-armed Iran, whereas their public statements
tended -- unhelpfully -- to downplay the threat. "They're
completely terrified of Iran," said Gellet, who added that
the Gulf states feared not only Iranian adventurism, but the
prospect of Iranian retaliation in the aftermath of a strike
on Iran's nuclear program. Gellet said the one exception to
the above pattern was Kuwait. The Kuwaitis told the French
that they were more concerned about the risks to the
environment of a civilian nuclear accident in Iran than they
were by the prospect of nuclear-armed Iran flexing its
military muscle (in large part because the Kuwaitis assessed
that they were already hopelessly disadvantaged in terms of
conventional military strength in comparison to Iran).

Gellet said he thought the Kuwaiti analysis was wrong, and
that while the ecological risks of a civilian accident were
real, the dangers posed by a nuclear-armed Iran were just as
real.


3. (C) Gellet evinced notable curiosity about U.S. defense
commitments in the region, asking whether the U.S. had any
binding bilateral commitments that would obligate Washington
to respond militarily in the event of an Iranian attack on a
Gulf state. Gray pointed out that the U.S. has for decades
considered the Gulf to be a vital strategic interest, and
said that in light of our extensive security cooperation in
the region, our Gulf allies felt little need to press for
legalistic assurances. Gellet noted France's defense
cooperation agreements with Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE,
adding: "If something happened, we'd be involved too."

Iraq
--------------


4. (C) Gellet assessed that at the moment, the Gulf states
were even more concerned about Iraq than about Iran and were
waiting for Iraq to split along ethnic lines, with
deleterious consequences for the entire region. In
particular, he noted that the Saudis and others were
concerned by the prospect of jihadists coming home to roost.
Gellet found it paradoxical that, notwithstanding these
concerns, the Gulf countries were not doing much to help the
situation. "They could be doing more on controlling
financing and deterring their own nationals from joining the
fighting," he said.


5. (C) The real problem, in Gellet's opinion, is that the
Gulf states have little affinity for an Iraqi government
which they see, first and foremost, as a Shia government. He
ascribed the lack of Gulf involvement in the International
Compact for Iraq, as well as the failure to act more
decisively against those supporting the Sunni insurgency, to
Sunni-Shia antipathy. Gellet believed that the Saudis, in
particular, had no interest in talking to Iraq's Shia
leadership (although he hastened to add that Iraqi Shi'ites
had done precious little to cultivate the Saudis, and had --
in his opinion -- no intention of sharing power with Iraq's
Sunni minority). However, Gellet thought it would be very
helpful if the Saudis agreed to host the Iraq Compact signing
ceremony. Looking beyond the signing ceremony, he concluded:
"If we want to involve them (the Gulf states) in supporting
the Iraqi government, then we need a new power structure."
Gray questioned Gellet's analysis, pointing out that the

PARIS 00007716 002 OF 002


demographic realities of Iraq suggested that the Gulf states
would need to reconcile themselves to the new political
reality.

Democracy in the Gulf: Don't Push
--------------


6. (C) Gellet described the recent elections in Bahrain as "a
step in the right direction," and said that the presidential
election in Yemen had been "ok" from a French perspective
(although President Saleh's re-election had never been in
doubt). He stressed, however, that France's approach was to
let the Gulf states "go at their own pace" with respect to
democratization. "In order to avoid the appearance of
interfering in their internal affairs, we probably shouldn't
push the Gulf States on this," said Gellet. DAS Gray pushed
back against the "don't push" argument, noting our support
for democratization had led to encouraging progress from a
number of Gulf States over the past year. With remarkable
candor, Gellet admitted that due to the relatively high
standard of living in most Gulf States, there was
comparatively little pressure from the French public for the
Quai d'Orsay to take a harder line on promoting democracy.
"We're not driven by French public opinion on this question,"
said Gellet, who acknowledged that the U.S. took a different
approach.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
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