Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS7714
2006-12-08 09:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
FRANCE PROPOSES INTELLIGENCE-SHARING CONTACT GROUP
how-toVZCZCXYZ0008 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHFR #7714 3420955 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 080955Z DEC 06 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 6467 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 1869 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 6352 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 2009 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0262 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 8117 RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0384 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3646
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007714
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL PGOV KN FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE PROPOSES INTELLIGENCE-SHARING CONTACT GROUP
TO COMBAT PROLIFERATION NETWORKS
REF: A. STATE 193703
B. STATE 150039
C. PARIS 06189
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt
for reasons 1.4 b and d.
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007714
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL PGOV KN FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE PROPOSES INTELLIGENCE-SHARING CONTACT GROUP
TO COMBAT PROLIFERATION NETWORKS
REF: A. STATE 193703
B. STATE 150039
C. PARIS 06189
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt
for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. Summary: (C) According to the MFA non-proliferatio
officer, France shares the U.S.'s conviction that financial
and transportation networks that facilitate North Korea's
proliferation activities must be curbed. To that end, the
GoF believes there is room for more coordination and
intelligence sharing within the context of the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) to identify and map the
ever-changing routes along which financial resources and
sensitive technology and equipment travel. MFA officials note
that the GoF plans to propose a contact group that would meet
four times per year on the margins of the PSI's Operational
Experts Group (OEG) meetings. End Summary.
2. (C) Poloff met December 1 with Arnaud Mentre, desk officer
in the MFA's bureau of Disarmament and Non-proliferation, to
deliver ref A demarche on examples of DPRK proliferation. We
also delivered the demarch to Raul Fernandez, DAS for
International Financial Affairs at the Ministry of Economy
and Finance. Mentre thanked the U.S. for sharing information
on entities known to contribute to North Korea's
proliferation efforts. He added that the GoF was familiar
with these entities' and individuals' reputations as
notorious proliferators. Thanks to the EU's new sanctions
against North Korea announced November 20, all EU nations
should have the legal means to block proliferators' assets
and inspect suspicious cargo, he asserted. Mentre said the
GoF was pleased to learn that the U.S. had delivered a
similar demarche to Switzerland, because it is necessary for
both the UNSC and the EU to encourage active Swiss
involvement in freezing proliferators' assets.
3. (C) Mentre urged the U.S. to reconsider tactics when the
UNSC sanctions committee meets. Following meetings at the
MFA with Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Administration November 30, Mentre had understood that the
U.S. fears that a discussion of specific luxury goods during
committee meetings could degenerate into endless quibbling
over particular items and effectively postpone meaningful
enforcement of sanctions. While the GoF shares the U.S.
frustration with China and Russia's obstruction and
procrastination, Mentre said the GoF perceives that both
nations might remain open to clear guidelines on what type of
goods should be sanctioned, even if they are reluctant to
identify specific products.
4. (C) Mentre said the MFA was pleased that the U.S. shared
its conviction that PSI might provide a forum for regular
intelligence sharing on proliferators shipping routes,
transfer and refueling points, and the names of suspected
companies (Ref B). The MFA is developing a policy paper that
it will soon share with the Department, which will propose
the formation of a contact group composed of all interested
PSI partners, he said. (NOTE: Mentre earlier mentioned a
nascent MFA idea for intelligence-sharing measures under the
aegis of PSI during a September 13 meeting with Poloff (Ref
C)). The group would meet quarterly on the margins of the
OEG meetings to share intelligence on proliferation. He said
the contact group would not emphasize interception of
suspicious cargo, but rather information sharing that the GoF
hopes will "sensitize" some flagging PSI partners to the
ubiquity and complexity of proliferators' shipping networks.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: UPON KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PARM KNNP PREL PGOV KN FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE PROPOSES INTELLIGENCE-SHARING CONTACT GROUP
TO COMBAT PROLIFERATION NETWORKS
REF: A. STATE 193703
B. STATE 150039
C. PARIS 06189
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt
for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. Summary: (C) According to the MFA non-proliferatio
officer, France shares the U.S.'s conviction that financial
and transportation networks that facilitate North Korea's
proliferation activities must be curbed. To that end, the
GoF believes there is room for more coordination and
intelligence sharing within the context of the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) to identify and map the
ever-changing routes along which financial resources and
sensitive technology and equipment travel. MFA officials note
that the GoF plans to propose a contact group that would meet
four times per year on the margins of the PSI's Operational
Experts Group (OEG) meetings. End Summary.
2. (C) Poloff met December 1 with Arnaud Mentre, desk officer
in the MFA's bureau of Disarmament and Non-proliferation, to
deliver ref A demarche on examples of DPRK proliferation. We
also delivered the demarch to Raul Fernandez, DAS for
International Financial Affairs at the Ministry of Economy
and Finance. Mentre thanked the U.S. for sharing information
on entities known to contribute to North Korea's
proliferation efforts. He added that the GoF was familiar
with these entities' and individuals' reputations as
notorious proliferators. Thanks to the EU's new sanctions
against North Korea announced November 20, all EU nations
should have the legal means to block proliferators' assets
and inspect suspicious cargo, he asserted. Mentre said the
GoF was pleased to learn that the U.S. had delivered a
similar demarche to Switzerland, because it is necessary for
both the UNSC and the EU to encourage active Swiss
involvement in freezing proliferators' assets.
3. (C) Mentre urged the U.S. to reconsider tactics when the
UNSC sanctions committee meets. Following meetings at the
MFA with Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export
Administration November 30, Mentre had understood that the
U.S. fears that a discussion of specific luxury goods during
committee meetings could degenerate into endless quibbling
over particular items and effectively postpone meaningful
enforcement of sanctions. While the GoF shares the U.S.
frustration with China and Russia's obstruction and
procrastination, Mentre said the GoF perceives that both
nations might remain open to clear guidelines on what type of
goods should be sanctioned, even if they are reluctant to
identify specific products.
4. (C) Mentre said the MFA was pleased that the U.S. shared
its conviction that PSI might provide a forum for regular
intelligence sharing on proliferators shipping routes,
transfer and refueling points, and the names of suspected
companies (Ref B). The MFA is developing a policy paper that
it will soon share with the Department, which will propose
the formation of a contact group composed of all interested
PSI partners, he said. (NOTE: Mentre earlier mentioned a
nascent MFA idea for intelligence-sharing measures under the
aegis of PSI during a September 13 meeting with Poloff (Ref
C)). The group would meet quarterly on the margins of the
OEG meetings to share intelligence on proliferation. He said
the contact group would not emphasize interception of
suspicious cargo, but rather information sharing that the GoF
hopes will "sensitize" some flagging PSI partners to the
ubiquity and complexity of proliferators' shipping networks.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON