DOD U/S FOR POLICY EDELMAN'S PARIS CONSULTATIONS:

S E C R E T PARIS 007699

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

USDP FOR DAS DAN FATA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR ECPS NATO MNUC AF FR
SUBJECT: DOD U/S FOR POLICY EDELMAN'S PARIS CONSULTATIONS:
MAKING PROGRESS ON AFGHANISTAN


Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann, Reason 1.4 B/D


1. (C) Summary: Senior French officials agreed with U/S of
Defense for Policy Eric Edelman that significant progress had
been made on Afghanistan at the NATO Riga Summit. The GOF
highlighted its recent decisions to ensure that its
Tajikistan-based planes continue to support ISAF and OEF
through 2007, to increase the number of French trainers of
the Afghan army, and to authorize the temporary deployment of
French forces outside the Kabul zone to assist fellow allies,
although only on "a case by case basis." France explained
that its proposal for a Contact Group for Afghanistan is
essentially an effort to ensure more effective coordination
and delivery of international assistance and reconstruction
efforts, and welcomed U.S. suggestions. The question of
whether to include Iran in the contact group was left open.


2. (S) French officials were cautiously receptive to U/S
Edelman's proposal that France join the U.S. and the UK in a
counter-insurgency conference to share past experiences and
lessons learned. The MOD confirmed French and European
interest in exploring potential military uses for the Galileo
satellite network, with U/S Edelman strongly warning against
violating the agreement not to overlay the GPS signal and the
dangers of technology transfer to China; both sides agreed
that further discussions were warranted. France conveyed its
intention to avoid a trainwreck on Turkey's EU accession
negotiations at the EU's 14 December Council meeting. End
Summary.

Afghanistan: French open to suggestions
--------------


3. (C) On December 1, Department of Defense Under Secretary
for Policy Eric Edelman met with MFA Political Director
Gerard Araud, MFA Strategic Affairs Director Philippe Carre,
MOD Strategic Affairs Director Jean de Ponton d'Amecourt, and
Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Maurice Gourdault-Montagne.
U/S Edelman and his French interlocutors expressed general
satisfaction with the outcome of the NATO Riga Summit,
focusing on Afghanistan and next steps for the international
community. U/S Edelman concurred with an assessment
presented at Riga by Defense Minister Alliot-Marie that the
challenge in Afghanistan was greater than had been
anticipated, especially with reference to the reconstruction
needs. U/S Edelman accordingly stressed that NATO will need
to better coordinate reconstruction efforts, and ensure that
commanders have the required flexibility on deciding how to
use NATO forces on the ground.


4. (C) MFA Political Director Araud agreed, noting that
France had taken on board Washington's message that Alliance
members needed to do more in Afghanistan. He reviewed the
major steps France had decided to undertake in support of
ISAF, including keeping French planes in Dushanbe through
2007 for ISAF and OEF missions and allowing French forces in
Kabul to support Allies in other Afghan regions on a "case by
case basis." French Director for Strategic Affairs Philippe
Carre emphasized the "case by case" nature of these potential
temporary deployments, but without providing any further
clarification on modalities. (Comment: In a subsequent
discussion with Carre's deputy, we were told that the GOF had
not worked out how the "case by case" decisions would be
made, but more than likely these would be handled through
French military channels, as opposed to requiring commanders
to seek a political decision on potential troop deployments.
End comment.)

Contact Group for Afghanistan
--------------


5. (C) Carre stated that France had concluded that ISAF was
the only successful institution operating in Afghanistan.
Coordination and reconstruction efforts by the UN,
G8-coordinator, and the EU, among others, were not
satisfactory or up to the standards, he added. It is
therefore important for "shareholders" to drive the
reconstruction process, hence the French proposal for a

"Contact Group." The intent behind the creation of a contact
group was not to manage technical assistance, but to provide
political and intellectual guidance for reconstruction
efforts, he concluded. Araud volunteered that France would
share further elaboration of this proposal with the U.S. and
the UK, and also welcomed our suggestions. He added that it
was important to develop a pragmatic process of coordination
for reconstruction efforts; that it was important that the UN
maintain a highly visible profile, and at the same time, that
the international community provide the moral and political
authority to persuade NGOs, warlords and others to work
together in Afghanistan. U/S Edelman replied that the U.S.
did not favor one particular institution over another for
reconstruction, so long as the economic reconstruction and
military efforts were coordinated.


6. (C) Ponton d'Amecourt, expanding on the contact group
idea, said the aim was to demonstrate that the international
community had a political strategy for Afghanistan and that
it was not just "about bombs and destruction." Ponton
d'Amecourt also highlighted the new French initiatives for
Afghanistan, including the addition of 50 military personnel
to train the Afghan army. He was particularly pleased that
France was able to do more, noting that he had been made
aware in meetings with his Canadian counterparts how much the
Canadians had felt betrayed by the lack of Allied support for
its troops in southern Afghanistan.


7. (C) Presidential Diplomatic advisor (NSA-equivalent)
Gourdault-Montagne reiterated his colleagues' assessments
that the international community needed to be more engaged on
the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Referring to France's
proposal for a contact group, Gourdault-Montagne suggested
the inclusion of regional partners, such as Pakistan and
Tajikistan. Gourdault-Montagne said excluding Iran from the
contact group would be "regrettable," although he conceded
that it might be necessary to find some other channel for
engaging the Iranians on Afghanistan. U/S Edelman pushed
back by noting that not all Iranian behavior in Afghanistan
had been as constructive as MGM seemed to believe. It was
important that the international community not reward Iran
for bad behavior. MGM suggested it might be possible to
include Iran in discussions on countering Afghanistan's drug
production problem. He noted that Iran had previously sought
French assistance (e.g., night-vision systems) in developing
its border monitoring capabilities (ostensibly for
counter-narcotics purposes). Further, with respect to the
formation of a contact group, U/S Edelman stressed that it
was essential that the contact group not be viewed as
"running Afghanistan," and undercutting President Karzai's
efforts to extend Kabul's authority.

GOF cautious on counter-insurgency conference idea
-------------- --------------


8. (C) U/S Edelman explained that with the expansion of ISAF
to other regions, NATO had taken on the formal responsibility
for counter-insurgency. In support of these Allied efforts,
U/S Edelman proposed to Araud and Ponton d'Amecourt a NATO
counter-insurgency conference with French, British and U.S.
participants to draw on their respective and painful
counter-insurgency experiences in Algeria, Vietnam, Malaya
and in other areas. U/S Edelman also shared with the French
a compilation of articles edited by General Petraeus on the
lessons learned from various counter-terrorism and
counter-insurgency operations.


9. (C) Araud, although receptive in principle to the idea of
a conference, cautioned that it should not be a public event,
as the "memories of Algeria were still very sensitive in
France." Ponton d'Amecourt echoed this view, observing that
Algeria remained a delicate topic because of the role the
French armed forces played, and which had almost resulted in
a coup attempt. Relations with Algeria remain difficult, he
added, hence it was important that the conference be properly
packaged. (Comment: On the margins of Araud's meeting, his
special assistant informed us that in the minds of many in
the French public, the military role in Algeria is closely

identified with the practice of torture. He suggested that
for France it might be useful if the conference had a broader
mandate than counter-insurgency. End comment.) U/S Edelman,
seeking to address French concerns, suggested that the
conference could be held at the NATO college in Rome or at
Oberammergau and that it include commanders, colonels, and
maybe some civilians. All agreed to follow up discussions on
the concept of a conference.

Missile Defense; looking for a third site
--------------


10. (S) U/S Edelman confirmed to Araud and Ponton d'Amecourt
that the U.S. was considering a third missile defense site to
be located in Europe. In order to allay Russian concerns,
U/S Edelman and Missile Defense Agency's General Obering had
briefed the NATO-Russia Council on U.S. intentions and
capabilities, noting that U.S. interceptors could not
realistically intercept Russian ICBMs from a site in Central
Europe. "We think the Russians understood our message," U/S
Edelman observed. Araud responded that the Russians had
conveyed their political concerns to France. Russia is
interested in venting its resentment at having interceptors
based in former Warsaw Pact territory, he added. Carre
stated that the Russians had expressed greater concern over
the interceptors than with the accompanying radars.

Galileo
--------------


11. (S) In response to U/S Edelman's query about reported
French interest in using Galileo for military purposes, Araud
agreed to look into the issue, as he had no immediate
information on French planning. Ponton d'Amecourt said many
EU members were interested in the potential military uses of
Galileo, hence the French decision to raise it at a technical
level at NATO. France and others are keen on having a secure
European signal for such activities as police operations,
fire fighting and sea rescue operations. It is an encryption
issue for the police and the military services, Ponton
d'Amecourt added, explaining further why France had presented
it at NATO as a means to provide extra security. U/S Edelman
strongly conveyed U.S. concerns that the Europeans adhere to
their agreement to maintain the separation of GPS and
Galileo. There is a danger of overlay onto the GPS signal,
he stressed. There is also a danger of transfer of
technology to China. Ponton d'Amecourt agreed about the
danger with China and ventured that this concern would be
factored into the discussions. (Comment: Ponton d'Amecourt
explained that questions on Galileo policy were the
responsibility of the Prime Minister's office, which may
explain why the MFA had not had an immediate response. End
comment.) U/S Edelman and Ponton d'Amecourt agreed that the
Embassy would follow up on U.S. concerns.

Other Issues -- Turkey
--------------


12. (C) Araud volunteered that in an effort to avoid a train
wreck, France would seek to find a way forward on Turkey's EU
candidacy at the 14 December EU Council meeting. It was
essential not to close the door on Turkey, he stated. France
believes that Turkish PM Erdogan had been surprised by the
adverse conclusions in the Commission's recent report on
Turkey, and he hoped that Erdogan would take stronger action
to reinforce Turkey's candidacy. Araud observed that French
President Chirac had two main issues of concern: EU
membership is seen as "a machine to provide European norms"
to applicant countries; it was therefore unfortunate that
Turkey was not subscribing fully by the accession criteria.
His second concern was to maintain GOF support for Turkey in
the face of a French public which does not favor Turkey's EU
candidacy.


13. (U) This message was approved by U/S Edelman.



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