Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS7668
2006-12-05 10:33:00
SECRET
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH MFA EVER MORE PESSIMISTIC ON LEBANON

Tags:  FR LE PGOV PREL SY 
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VZCZCXRO6504
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #7668/01 3391033
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 051033Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1044
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3567
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007668 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS: FR LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA EVER MORE PESSIMISTIC ON LEBANON

REF: PARIS 7211

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007668

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2016
TAGS: FR LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA EVER MORE PESSIMISTIC ON LEBANON

REF: PARIS 7211

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: Damien Loras, Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy's
cabinet advisor for the Middle East, told us December 4 that
he was "quite pessimistic" about Lebanon's future and
doubtful that PM Siniora's government would survive.
Nevertheless, he said the MFA was not inclined at present to
favor the creation of an international tribunal under the
UNSC's Chapter VII authority. Expressing his personal view,
Loras questioned whether UNIFIL could be sustained if
Hizballah were to win new parliamentary elections. For the
moment, the French remain focused on the increasingly
difficult task of isolating Syria (FM Douste-Blazy phoned
German FM Steinmeier on December 3 and warned him that
President Chirac would cancel a December 5 meeting with
Chancellor Merkel if Steinmeier did not scrub a planned visit
to Damascus on December 4). In addition, the Quai is
considering inviting PM Siniora to a mid-December meeting of
the European Council in order to demonstrate international
support for his government. Finally, the Quai has drafted a
PRST ("deliberately low-key on disarming Hizballah") in
response to SYG Annan's letter on UNSCR 1701 implementation,
which they are sharing with USUN today. End summary.

Hizballah Holding Cards; Syrians Need to Pay a Price
-------------- --------------


2. (S) In what has become a familiar refrain from French
officials, Damien Loras, Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy's
cabinet advisor for the Middle East, told us December 4 that
he was "quite pessimistic" about Lebanon's future. While the
Quai continues to bank on the survival of PM Siniora's
government, Loras assessed that the Hizballah-Amal-Aoun axis
had more cards to play (e.g., sit-ins, violent protests, mass
resignation from parliament) at the moment than did Siniora.
The one politician who might be able to broker a compromise,
Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, was justifiably afraid for
his life and sounded increasingly like a Hizballah spokesman.
Moreover, Loras saw little prospect for compromise from the
Hizballah/Aounist camp inasmuch as Tehran and Damascus were

calling the shots. "The problem is that the Syrians think
they can act with impunity -- they haven't had to pay a price
for this summer's war or for Pierre Gemayel's assassination,"
said Loras.

Chapter VII
--------------


3. (S) Loras noted that Ambassador (to Lebanon) Emie is a
strong advocate of alleviating the pressure on the March 14
coalition by establishing an international criminal tribunal
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thereby obviating the
need for Lebanese parliamentary approval. The Quai, however,
remains unpersuaded by this argument. Loras said it was
unlikely such an attempt would succeed in the UNSC, and even
if it did, it would certainly not have unanimous support.
Moreover, the optic of the international community imposing a
tribunal on Lebanon would play into the Syria-Hizballah
strategy of depicting PM Siniora as a western stooge, making
the prospects for the tribunal's successful operation even
dimmer. Finally, Loras noted that the Quai's lawyers had
serious misgivings about the legal basis for going the
Chapter VII route.

Future of UNIFIL
--------------


4. (S) Stressing that he was sharing a personal opinion that
does not reflect official MFA policy, Loras questioned
whether the Siniora government could long survive in its
current form. He hypothesized that if new parliamentary
elections were held from which the Hizballah-Amal-Aounist
alliance emerged further strengthened, then there would be no
prospect for implementing UNSCR 1701 in the foreseeable
future. He speculated that, under those circumstances,
French participation in UNIFIL (and indeed, UNIFIL's
continued operation) might become untenable.

Enough Angst: What the French Are Doing
--------------


5. (S) Loras indicated that for the moment, the French remain
focused on the increasingly difficult task of keeping the
Syrian regime isolated. In that regard, FM Douste-Blazy
phoned German FM Steinmeier on December 3 and warned him that
President Chirac would cancel a December 5 meeting with
Chancellor Merkel if Steinmeier did not scrub a planned visit
to Damascus on December 4. (Loras admitted that he did not

PARIS 00007668 002 OF 002


know whether Steinmeier heeded Douste-Blazy's warning, or
whether President Chirac would actually follow through on his
threat if Steinmeier did not.) Loras noted that the French
were dismayed to learn, during a stop in Paris on November 27
by Russian DFM Saltanov, that Syrian President Bashar al-Asad
would be received in Moscow later this month. (Note: We were
told separately by other Quai officials that Saltanov, who
was en route to Moscow following a visit to Lebanon and Syria
that included a meeting with Asad, gave the French a blunt
warning. "Bashar is not his father," said Saltanov, who
suggested that the new Syrian leader was less calculating --
and, consequently, perhaps more dangerous -- than the late
Hafez al-Asad. Saltanov said that efforts to put the Syrian
regime "under siege" -- a reference to the establishment of
an international tribunal for the Rafik Hariri assassination
-- risked sparking a backlash against French interests both
inside and outside of Lebanon. "Don't sacrifice Lebanon to
get Bashar," was the essence of Saltanov's message. The
French were surprised by Saltanov's bluntness, but unswayed.
End note.)


6. (S) In addition, the French may invite PM Siniora to
attend a mid-December meeting of the European Council in
order to demonstrate international support for him and his
government. "We know it's not much, but it might help a
little," said Loras.


7. (S) Finally, Loras said that the French found UN
Secretary-General Kofi Annan's letter on UNSCR 1701

SIPDIS
implementation to be "very disappointing -- we were told we
would be disappointed, and we were." Nonetheless, the French
had prepared a PRST which the French UN delegation planned to
share December 4 with USUN.


8. (S) Somewhat paradoxically in light of his criticism of
the SYG's letter, Loras said that the French objective with
the PRST was "not to increase the pressure" on the Siniora
government by making demands on UNSCR 1701 implementation
that might further provoke Hizballah. Consequently, the
French draft was "very low-key" on the question of Hizballah
disarmament. In fact, Loras admitted there was no explicit
reference to disarmament at all, only an implict one. Poloff
cautioned Loras that USUN would likely have difficulty
supporting a text, however well-intentioned, that appeared to
give Hizballah a pass on disarmament -- especially if that
same text contained an unhelpful fixation on Israeli
overflights and the status of Sheba Farms.











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