ASMARA FACILITATION IS A NON-STARTER, SLM LEADER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007523

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR ER SU FR
SUBJECT: ASMARA FACILITATION IS A NON-STARTER, SLM LEADER
TELLS SUDAN ENVOY

REF: 11/22 D'ELIA-STEINFELD E-MAIL

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas
ons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: Special Envoy Andrew Natsios met SLM
Abdulwahid El-Nur on October 18. Nur said he and the SLM
felt shunted aside by the U.S. and appealed for a strategic
alliance to end the genocide in Darfur. SE Natsios
emphasized the need to unify Darfur rebel factions and bring
DPA non-signatories into the fold. Nur enumerated SLM
conditions for joining the DPA, including a program and
timetable for disarmament, and a process for wealth-sharing,
accountability and individual compensation for victims of the
genocidal violence. He claimed the SLM rebel movement was
essentially united, apart from fissures produced by fiscal
pressures. SE Natsios called for the SLM to prepare
realistic estimates on compensation and to recall that
compromise was part and parcel of negotiation. Nur claimed
that the Sudanese Air Force had deliberately targeted the
locations where the SLM had been planning to convene a
conference of field commanders. Nur rejected Eritrean
efforts to bring together the JEM and SLM under the umbrella
of the NRF. He also rejected Eritrea as a peace process
facilitator. Nur said he would not return to Eritrea, and
later relayed to Embassy Africa Watcher that he would remain
temporarily in the Netherlands. End Summary.


2. (C) Special Envoy Andrew Natsios met SLM Abdulwahid El-Nur
on October 18. Joining the meeting were SLM representatives
Mohammed Salal Risgalla from the Netherlands, Gaafar Monro
from France, and Ahmed M. Abdalla, who purported to be a
university professor in Canada. SE COS Andrew Steinfeld and
Embassy Paris Africa Watcher also participated.


3. (C) SLM Abdulwahid El-Nur appealed for a strategic
alliance to end the genocide in Darfur. Nur, who is a
leading non-signatory to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),
complained at being shunted aside by the U.S. He claimed
that Former Deputy Secretary Zoellick had dismissed Nur after
Abuja with the words, "I'll see you next at the ICC." The
USG had sought to strong-arm Nur rather than consider his SLM
proposals. Nur said he would not participate in any further
negotiations where the method of choice was intimidation.
Nur discounted rival SLM leader and DPA signatory Minni
Minawi as a creation of Abuja, who lacked a real Darfur
constituency.


4. (C) SE Natsios stated that it was crucial to unify Darfur
rebel factions, if only to thwart Khartoum's manipulations
and exploitation of divisions. The DPA non-signatories had
to be brought into the fold. SE Natsios asked Nur to clarify
what Nur needed to come aboard the DPA. Nur said he had
already communicated SLM needs in a letter he claimed to have
had delivered directly on May 5 to the White House. Nur
subsequently claimed that the SLM rebel movement SLM rebel
movement was essentially united, apart from fissures produced
by fiscal pressures.


5. (C) Nur enumerated the following conditions for joining
the DPA: a) a program for disarmament of militia, meaning
the Janjaweed; b) a timeframe for disarmament and the
establish of a coordinating body; c) a framework that would
facilitate SLM operations alongside GoS military; d) a
program for wealth-sharing, reconstruction and development;
and, most importantly, a process for accountability for
damages and individual compensation. Adviser Abdalla
explained the SLM sought provisions for both corrective and
distributive justice. Corrective justice related to the
Darfur genocide, he said, and should encompass both
accountability and individual compensation; distributive
justice referred to transferring national revenues to the
Darfur region.


6. (C) In response to Nur's request for a USG presence in
Darfur, SE Natsios stated there would be no U.S. troops. The
UN was the appropriate mechanism, particularly with regard to
facilitating disarmament. In terms of financial needs, SE
Natsios appealed for Nur to provide realistic estimates and
to recall that compromise was part and parcel of negotiation.
He underscored the need to deal separately with compensation
and development. Nur was insistent that compensation should
be made by Sudanese authorities drawing on national revenues.


7. (C) Nur claimed that the Sudanese Air Force had
deliberately targeted the locations where the SLM had been
planning to convene a conference of field commanders,
bombarding the villages of Bil Maza and An Siro. Bombings,
coordinated with Janjaweed attacks, had caused over 100
deaths near Kotum. The tribes under attack included the

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Mima, Zaghawa, Tundjer, and Khai in Tina, he said. Asked by
SE Natsios whether Fur settlements were also being targeted,
Abdalla responded indirectly that the SLM were striving to
respect the ceasefire. He commented that the SLM could not
foster unity among commanders if GoS bombings continued.


8. (C) SE Natsios asked Nur what were the goals for JEM
leader and DPA rejectionist Khalil Ibrahim. Nur criticized
Ibrahim, who, he said, continued to follow the lead of
Turabi, especially on compromising with Khartoum. SE Natsios
asked whether Ibrahim sought to establish a Zaghawa state,
provoking a debate among Nur's colleagues. Nur stated that
Eritrea had sought to cement a union between the JEM and the
SLM through the creation of the NRF. Nur said there were
major differences between the JEM and the SLM, with the
latter, for instance, a secular movement hewing to separation
of church and state. Eritrea had employed coercive methods,
including his own physical abduction and detention at one
point. Nur said he would not return to Eritrea, for fear of
assassination.


9. (C) Nur vehemently rejected proposals for an
Asmara-centered Darfur peace process. He equally rejected
N'djamena and Tripoli as facilitators for a meeting of DPA
non-signatories. Abdalla said the AU had failed in its
facilitation of the peace process. (Note: French MFA told
Africa Watcher that Nur and company in an November 17 meeting
had vehemently rejected both a role for Asmara and the return
of AU Chief Mediator Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim.) Abdalla
insisted the SLM was ready to negotiate, adding that land
distribution was a crucial subject. Abdalla also said only a
UN force, only "blue hats," could bring peace to the region.
Nur maintained an international force would meet with a
"massive welcome" in Darfur. Khartoum's efforts to draw
parallels between Darfur and Iraq were fallacious. Darfur,
Nur claimed, would be more likely to resemble an operation in
Afghanistan, with a humanitarian premise.

10, (C) SE Natsios worried that the prospects for the
Darfur-Darfur dialogue were receding due to the massive
killings of local Masalit chiefs in West Darfur in 2004. The
U.S. understood some 5,000 chieftains had been murdered and
replaced with GoS designees. Nur responded that there
continued to be legitimate leadership within Darfur, with
successors to the murdered chieftains selected from within
IDP and refugee camps.


11. (C/NF) At the meeting's close, Nur asked for a one-on-one
discussion with SE Natsios in which he requested the USG
provide one million dollars in financing. SE Natsios said it
was unlikely we would approve this funding. Ahmed Abdalla
asked for training and capacity building in mediation,
negotiating, and leadership for their people in the camps.
Natsios said he would work on this through the U.S. Institute
for Peace.


12. (C) Nur telephoned Embassy Africa Watcher on 11/21 and
stated he would remain in the Netherlands for the time being
(ref). Nur cast aspersions on the 11/22 Tripoli mini-summit
on Darfur and related efforts at mediation by Egypt. He
described Tripoli as a dilatory measure that sought to
complicate divisions on Darfur and further delay an
accommodation with the UN on engagement and deployment.


13. (U) Special Envoy Natsios cleared this message.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON