APPROACHING FRANCE ON TURKEY-EU

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007508

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL FR EUN NATO TU CY UNO
SUBJECT: APPROACHING FRANCE ON TURKEY-EU

REF: A. PARIS 7102


B. PARIS 6946

C. PARIS POINTS OF 11/14

D. STATE 189542 (NOTAL)

Classified By: DCM Karl Hofmann for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) SUMMARY AND ACTION RECOMMENDATION: Widespread public
opposition to Turkish EU membership in the run-up to France's
presidential elections severely limits the GOF's flexibility
in dealing with the Turkey-Cyprus issue, notwithstanding
Chirac's foreign policy prerogatives and his long-standing
pro-Turkish sentiments. While France could accept even
temporary solutions to push the issue past France's May
elections, failure to achieve anything by the time of the EU
Summit could compel the GOF to support and perhaps even take
the lead in pushing for a hard-line response. Even if Turkey
fails "on the merits," we believe it may still be possible to
leverage Chirac's interest in Lebanon and the Middle East, as
well as his desire to avoid a "clash of civilizations," to
persuade him of the need to reduce the consequences for any
such failure vis-a-vis the EU to an absolute minimum. Given
that Chirac himself will need to be convinced, the President
may have to engage him at the Riga Summit, followed by A/S
Fried and U/S Burns with French Political Director Araud and
NSA Hadley with Presidential Diplomatic Advisor
Gourdault-Montagne. End summary and action recommendation.

French Room for Maneuver
(and Political Courage) Limited
--------------

2. (C) Per ref A meeting between Interior Minister Sarkozy's
diplomatic advisor and EUR DAS Matt Bryza, the leading French
presidential candidates and their parties -- as the National
Assembly's recent majority vote in favor of criminalizing
denial of the so-called Armenian "genocide" aptly
demonstrated -- will probably not be in a position to take a
more positive view of Turkey at least until after the end of
the Chirac presidency. Likely center-right presidential
candidate Nicolas Sarkozy is on record as opposing Turkish EU
membership (and FM Douste-Blazy has an interest in pleasing
Sarkozy as a means of being retained in the Cabinet if
Sarkozy is elected president). The recently designated
Socialist Party candidate, Segolene Royal, has not gone
beyond acknowledging that any decision on Turkish membership
would be subject to popular referendum -- as now mandated by
the constitutional amendment that Chirac pushed through
before the May 2005 referendum in an attempt to deflect, at
least in part, popular opposition to the EU constitutional
treaty. Thus, even if Chirac's prerogatives in foreign
policy remain largely intact even as his presidency draws to
a close and his influence begins to wane, as a practical
matter his room for maneuver for dealing with Turkey has been
significantly reduced as a result of growing public sentiment
against not only Turkish accession, but enlargement in
general. Moreover, his decision during his visit to Yerevan
to call on Turkey to recognize the Armenian "genocide" has
itself been largely perceived as having opened wider the gate
to anti-Turkish sentiment.

France Needs a Fig Leaf
--------------

3. (C) Per ref B meeting with MFA A/S-equivalent for Europe
Gilles Briatta, France has supported Finnish Presidency
efforts to find a solution to the current impasse and would
also find a way to live with any kind of temporary
arrangement -- ideally one that would enable the GOF to push
any further decisions down the road until after the early May
final round of the presidential elections. If no exit is
found, however, Briatta also made clear that France would not
fail to react to Turkey's failure to implement the Ankara
Protocol -- even if Briatta stopped short of specifying what
that reaction might entail. Per ref C, Minister-Delegate for
Europe Catherine Colonna warned the Turks following the last
meeting of EU foreign ministers that such a Turkish failure
would not allow accession negotiations to proceed "as if
nothing had happened," adding that it would be incumbent on
the Council to "draw conclusions" from Turkish obduracy.
Although she was careful to say that "no one" had asked for a
complete suspension of accession negotiations in the event of
no progress, she suggested that anything was possible short
of total suspension (which no one wanted) and complete
inaction (which France rejected). To prepare effectively for
the December 14-15 EU Summit, she called on the Finnish
presidency to circulate its recommendations "well before"
that date, or by December 6 at the latest.

Avoiding the Worst
By Leveraging Middle East Issues
--------------

4. (C) It may be possible to leverage Chirac's personal

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stake in supporting Lebanese sovereignty, his interest in
improving the situation in the Middle East, and his
self-defined role in preventing a "clash of civilizations" to
encourage the GOF privately to support a course of action
toward Turkey that, at a minimum, "does the least possible
harm." Our sense is that it would not be overly difficult to
convince Chirac, and the GOF more broadly, that it is not in
France's or Europe's interest to alienate Turkey, the only
successful Muslim democracy, at a moment when its support is
critical for UNIFIL/Lebanon, the Middle East, and
Afghanistan. Nor would Chirac want the "loss of Turkey" to
be part of his legacy. Our message would have to be that we
are not asking France to ignore Turkey's omissions in
fulfilling its commitments to the EU, but rather to seek to
push a confrontation down the road in the name of a larger
strategic interest.

Approaching the French
--------------

5. (C) On tactics for France in responding to ref D, Post
will continue to approach French officials as before, but the
President should consider approaching Chirac directly on the
margins of the NATO Summit in Riga. Ideally, we get the
Germans on board with such an approach, so that the French
position can be depicted also as showing a willingness by
France and Germany to work together responsibly in the
pursuit of Europe's larger interests. Finally, U/S Burns and
A/S Fried should follow up with French Political Director
Gerard Araud during his visit to Paris December 5-6. France
presumably would have knowledge of the Finnish proposals by
that time, and A/S Fried could engage directly with Araud on
French thinking for the end game, with follow-up by U/S Burns
(with Araud) and NSA Hadley (with Chirac's Diplomatic Advisor
Gourdault-Montagne) as required.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON