FORMER SUDANESE FM ISMAIL ASSURES SUDAN ENVOY THAT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007493

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2011
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKO FR SU
SUBJECT: FORMER SUDANESE FM ISMAIL ASSURES SUDAN ENVOY THAT
KHARTOUM STANDS BY ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas
ons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios met
with Bashir presidential advisor and former Sudanese FM
Mustafa Osman Ismail in Paris on November 18. Natsios, who
arrived from the Addis Ababa consultations on Darfur, sought
an unambiguous public statement of GoS support for the Addis
Ababa declaration, including the principle of a AU-UN hybrid
force. He delivered a warning that the GoS must immediately
end military involvement in recent atrocities in Darfur and
Chad. Ismail had traveled from London to Paris for meetings
on AU-UN efforts in Darfur with Special Adviser to the
Secretary General Lakhdar Brahimi, DPKO U/SYG Jean-Marie

SIPDIS
Guehenno, and DPKO A/SYG Hedi Annabi. While Ismail stated
his satisfaction with the Addis Ababa declaration, Natsios
pointed out to him that Sudan's comments on the agreement
since the meeting in Addis Ababa had not been positive;
Ismail promised to work to improve those statements. Ismail
hoped for swift progress after Addis Ababa to move beyond the
deadlock over UNSCR 1706 and the mutual recriminations caused
by the Security Council call for UN rehatting of AMIS.
Ismail voiced support for Eritrean efforts to relaunch Darfur
negotiations in Asmara, claiming only Eritrea appeared able
to deliver all key rebel parties. He said the GoS was urging
Eritrea to incorporate the international community in any
talks. End Summary.


2. (C) Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios met on November
18 with former Sudanese FM Mustafa Osman Ismail, the putative
lead for President Bashir on Darfur; AF/SE COS Andrew
Steinfeld and Embassy Paris Africa Watcher (notetaker) also
took part. Ismail assured SE Natsios of his overall
satisfaction with the Addis Ababa consultations. The
Government of Sudan (GoS) was "happy with all the articles"
of the Addis Ababa agreement, Ismail declared. Asked by SE
Natsios for a clear public GoS endorsement of the Addis Ababa
agreement, Ismail claimed that he had given a positive
statement to the English-language version of Al Jazeera. He
promised to be in touch with Khartoum about a more formal GoS
statement. Regarding reports that the GoS was backing off
the agreement on a three-phased AU-UN hybrid operation,
Ismail criticized SYG Annan for trumpeting the Addis Ababa
agreement and Khartoum's supposed acquiescence before
Khartoum itself had had an opportunity to make its own
statement. In any event, he underscored GoS concurrence with
the UN on the need for a preponderance of Africans in any
Darfur force and on the need for broad UN assistance to the
AU, including on logistics, finances, and civilian and
political expertise. Ismail said there was a need to move
rapidly to build on the outcome of Addis Ababa. Notably,
however, Ismail also said that, given the tough anti-UN
position that the GoS had taken, it would be impossible to
change that stance overnight.


3. (C) Asked about conflicting signals from the GoS regarding
total force numbers, Ismail discounted the issue. More
important than force size was maintaining a preponderance of
Africans in the force composition. SE Natsios asked about
the possible deployment of non-African troops in a support
role, specifically a joint Norwegian-Swiss battalion of
engineers. Ismail suggested a AU-UN-GoS trilateral
commission should review such considerations. He called
attention to the guidelines set forth in a 11/5 letter of GoS
President Bashir. Non-African expertise was welcome, Ismail
emphasized, so long as there were no compromises on the
African character of the force. Such questions, he insisted,
should be tackled quietly, away from the spotlight of
television reporting.


4. (C) Ismail welcomed what he perceived as a shift to
practical deliberations. He lamented the emphasis on SCR
1706 and UN rehatting as an apparent be all and end all.
Ismail complained that he had met twice with A/S Frazer to
appeal to no avail for delays in the push for SCR 1706; the
first time to propose an alternative 6-month security plan
encompassing expansion of the AU force and then later in
order to request a one-week postponement before the adoption
of SCR 1706. The Addis Ababa agreement and the visit by SE
Natsios represented a chance to turn the page, an opportunity
to restore trust within certain quarters of the GoS, Ismail
added.


5. (C) Sudan needed the UN and the U.S., "whether in the
South, whether in Darfur, for helping on security, but also

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for rehabilitation and reconstruction." Sudan needed UN and
U.S. help moreover in order to achieve a peaceful transition
from military to civilian government. It was essential to
take a fresh look at the U.S.-Sudan bilateral relationship.
Lack of headway on the bilateral front would confirm
Khartoum's suspicions about the U.S. President Bashir was
upset that the signing of the CPA had only brought dividends
for the SPLM. The signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in
Abuja had similarly brought few benefits, Ismail claimed, and
the U.S. had kept silent when non-signatories, notably Khalil
Ibrahim, had forged coalitions to attack the GoS. SE Natsios
replied that we were prepared to initiate sanctions against
the JEM. Ismail commented on Khalil Ibrahim's ties to Libya,
including fundraising from sympathizers. Zaghawa in Libya
were providing USD one million each month, Ismail claimed.
Asked by Natsios whether Ghadaffi were being helpful, Ismail
replied that Libya could not be excluded from the negotiating
process, if only because of its many Zaghawa migrants and the
long shared border with Darfur.


6. (C) Ismail endorsed Eritrean efforts to organize
comprehensive negotiations on Darfur. In Ismail's view, only
the Eritreans claimed to be able to deliver attendance by all
key rebel parties. (Note: SLM leader Abdulwahid El-Nur told
SE Natsios later on November 18 that he would not attend
meetings in Eritrea. He accused Eritrean authorities of
attempted kidnapping and coercion. End Note.) AF/SE
Steinfeld remarked that, in contrast to the Eritrean project,
the Addis Ababa declaration foresaw continued AU stewardship
of the peace process, in contrast to the Eritrean notion. SE
Natsios observed that Eritrean President Isaias had multiple
agendas, rejected USG involvement, and had taken the
unprecedented step of ousting USAID from Eritrean territory.
Ismail stated that Eritrea could not mediate successfully on
Darfur without allowing for the participation of the
international community. He said the GoS was trying to
persuade the Eritreans to incorporate the USG, UN and AU. He
appealed for Envoy Natsios to participate if Asmara meetings
took place, pleading that we give Eritrea a chance to be
helpful.


7. (C) Ismail summarized his vision of a roadmap for progress
on Darfur: 1) Agreement on the modalities of an AU-UN force;
2) Get DPA non-signatories back to the negotiating table
through the signature of an additional protocol, seizing the
opportunity of Asmara and approaching SLM Fur leader
Abdulwahid El-Nur through dialogue not pressure; 3) Persuade
Chad that its only hope for sustainable domestic peace was
through a peaceful settlement in Darfur, and vice versa; 4)
Galvanize the peace process in order to make headway in
advance of the next election cycle in the U.S.


8. (C) SE Natsios repeatedly warned Ismail that the U.S. had
evidence the GoS military had been involved in recent
atrocities against non-combatants in Darfur and in Chad. If
the GoS were reactivating Arab militia and intentionally
targeting civilians, especially women and children, there
would be grave repercussions. Ismail said he would convey
the message to GoS President Bashir and that he would look
into allegations of military involvement in the spree of
renewed atrocities.


9. (U) AF/SE COS Steinfeld has cleared this report.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
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