Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS7483
2006-11-21 14:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

URBAN VIOLENCE TAKES A DOWNTURN; POLICE

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER FR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007483 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER FR
SUBJECT: URBAN VIOLENCE TAKES A DOWNTURN; POLICE
PESSIMISTIC BUT REPORT NO EVIDENCE OF "INTIFADA" IN FRANCE

REF: A. PARIS 7084


B. PARIS POINTS OF OCT 24

PARIS 00007483 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for Reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007483

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER FR
SUBJECT: URBAN VIOLENCE TAKES A DOWNTURN; POLICE
PESSIMISTIC BUT REPORT NO EVIDENCE OF "INTIFADA" IN FRANCE

REF: A. PARIS 7084


B. PARIS POINTS OF OCT 24

PARIS 00007483 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for Reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Violence in France's suburban ghettos,
perpetrated primarily by marginalized and underprivileged
youth (often but not exclusively of Muslim origin),continues
to simmer despite the current calm. A recent downturn in
violence appears attributable to widespread shock and horror
following the near death of a young French-Senegalese woman
who remains in critical condition after being severely burned
in a bus hijacking on October 28. Senior police and
gendarmerie officials told poloff on November 14 that law
enforcement agencies are convinced that any number of events
(though more likely police involvement in the death or
serious injury of a young man),could act as a catalyst for a
resurgence of violence, and that police and gendarmerie
capabilities could only provide temporary relief.


2. (C) Summary Continued: Our police and gendarmerie contacts
were quick to underline that in the five years since Nicolas
Sarkozy was named Minister of Interior, the overall crime
rate has dropped. Law enforcement agencies had taken some
key steps in addressing the rise in urban violence, we were
told, but broader social and economic causal factors need to
be addressed as well. This was particularly true for the
minors who made up 45 percent of those arrested in urban
violence. Our contacts agreed that there is currently no
reason to believe that the violence is organized, and did not
credit assertions hyped in the international media of an
"intifada" in France. Media reports, cell phones, and the
internet, they said, have given youth a quick way to call
others spontaneously to the scene, and give an impetus for
copycat activities. End Summary


3. (C) Despite the current downturn in violence, Luc Presson,
the Senior Counselor for Public Order to the Director General
for the National Police (DGPN) and Colonel Jean-Marie
Charpentier, Senior Gendarmerie Counselor for Mobile Forces,

told poloff on November 14 that law enforcement officials are
convinced that any number of events could serve as a catalyst
for further widespread violence like the suburban unrest of
November 2005 and the much less intense, but still
significant, activity surrounding the one year anniversary in
October/November 2006. Police, he said, are under-equipped
to handle the overall situation. With minors accounting for
45 percent of arrests in "sensitive zones," the police are
not only disturbed by having to arrest boys as young as age
11, but unsure of how to proceed with police action against
such young offenders. "We are not a day care center,"
Presson said, "These kids need some education and discipline
from their families."


4. (C) While readily admitting that urban violence is a
serious problem, Presson and Charpentier noted that French
culture fortunately does not encourage possession and use of
firearms, keeping serious injuries and fatalities of law
enforcement officers and offenders at relatively low levels.
According to press reports, police have been more frequent
targets in the past year; while there have been some serious
injuries, no deaths were reported. The physical destruction
and psychological effects of the violence, Presson stressed,
was clearly taking its toll on police and gendarmes who were
often left "in the line of fire." (Comment: Embassy
officers, in visits to some suburbs, have noted that the
physical destruction has left residents without local
commerce to fulfill basic needs, and left government
institutions as the only local targets for vandalism. Mayors
in affected areas have publicly called on the state to
rebuild community centers and other government backed
institutions that have been vandalized or destroyed in recent

PARIS 00007483 002.2 OF 003


years, and left communities with little in the way of
recreation for local youth. (End Comment)


5. (C) Presson was rather pessimistic about future violence,
saying that while law enforcement agencies could refine their
tactics so as to limit confrontation and increase prevention,
there were clearly larger societal issues that had to be
addressed. Police, he insisted, had taken some important
steps in curbing violence, but could not take credit for the
current downturn. Since last year, they had instituted
indicators which measured the degree and type of violence,
and enabled them to more effectively respond to developing
situations. Additional training was being given to police and
gendarmerie mobile rapid reaction forces, but a lack of
seasoned officers with the appropriate skill set made the
current situation particularly challenging. The Ministry of
Interior, Presson noted, had begun to restrict the amount of
information readily available to journalists when this
information, if revealed, might have the effect of
encouraging further violence. The numbers of cars burned
each day (now somewhere from 5 to 100),for example, are no
longer regularly shared, out of concern that youth would
attempt to beat daily records. (Comment: Presson was
convinced, perhaps naively so, that the upswing of the
November 2005 violence was due in large part to the reporting
of what he termed "irresponsible" journalists. End Comment.)


6. (C) When asked about Michel Thooris, (Secretary General
of the "Action-Police" union) comments about an "intifada"
that were widely reported in English-language media, both
Presson and Charpentier were taken by surprise. They said
they were not aware of the comments or Thooris but they had
vaguely heard of Action-Police and thought it was an extreme
right group (see ref B for additional information on Michel
Thooris, an ardent supporter of the Front National, an
extreme right wing political party, whose "union" currently
counts no members and only a handful of supporters -- he and
a few friends who founded the group). Both Presson and
Charpentier agreed that there was currently no reason to
believe that the violence in the suburbs was organized.
There were certainly no indications that criminal activity
was linked to religious movements. If anything, they said,
irresponsible media reports, cell phones, and the internet
have given youth a quick way to call others spontaneously to
the scene or create the impetus for copycat activities as
evidenced by the October 2006 bus hijackings that spread
across France after a great deal of media attention.
Charpentier added that the last time he was aware of
criminals invoking Islam was at the outset of the invasion of
Afghanistan in 2001.


7. (U) Note: National police are responsible for urban
centers with over 15,000 inhabitants, while both the National
Police and the Gendarmerie maintain mobile crisis response
units. Both agencies cooperate on domestic security under
the auspices the Ministry of Interior; however the
Gendarmerie is a military force technically tied to the
Ministry of Defense and thus not unionized.)


8. (C) Comment: While overall crime rates in France have
reportedly decreased in recent years; violence in the zones
which saw the greatest unrest in November 2005 have not
followed this trend. "Urban violence" in "sensitive zones"
has posed new challenges to law enforcement agencies who
remain under-equipped to effectively contain periodic
manifestations of the simmering discontent in low-income
suburban projects. While the GOF continues to look for ways
to address the deeper societal causes of the violence, law
enforcement agencies will have to improve surveillance and
policing methods. With no prospect of a significant
improvement in living conditions anytime soon, GOF officials
will continue monitoring the situation for any evidence that
Islamic extremists may attempt to exploit the general malaise

PARIS 00007483 003.2 OF 003


among youth of Muslim origin. End Comment.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON