S/CRS DELEGATION FINDS FRENCH IN LISTENING MODE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000738

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2015
TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL UNGA CT FR
SUBJECT: S/CRS DELEGATION FINDS FRENCH IN LISTENING MODE


Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas
ons 1.4b,d


1. (SBU) Summary and Comment: French interlocutors were in
active listening mode during 24-25 January briefings by
Acting Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS) Marcia Wong and NSC Director for Stabilization Clint
Williamson. Wong and Williamson invited feedback on the
non-paper "Creating a Global Response Network for
Stabilization and Reconstruction" which was distributed in
meetings at the MFA with S/P A/S-Equivalent Philippe Carre,
Acting AF A/S-Equivalent Elisabeth Barbier, and IO
A/S-Equivalent Sylvie Bermann, and also to Secretariat
General for National Defense (SGDN) Director Eric Lebedel and
to High Representative for Security and Conflict Prevention
Pierre-Andre Wiltzer. The proposal calls for closer
international coordination on crisis prevention and response.
The French lack of an S/CRS equivalent showed in
discussions, with each interlocutor reacting according to his
or her individual equities. Bermann sought a tie-in to the
UN Peacebuilding Commission. Barbier lobbied for a
Francophone test-case, such as the Central African Republic.
Wiltzer sought affirmation for the efforts of his own small
shop at interministerial coordination. Lebedel thought in
terms of conflict prevention. And Carre and his PDAS focused
on French efforts at delimitation of NATO doctrine. End
Summary and Comment.

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Building around the PBC?
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2. (C) Sylvie Bermann, IO A/S-Equivalent, lauded the S/CRS
initiative, observing that crisis response required more than
military resources and governments should reorganize to apply
appropriate civilian resources toward crisis prevention and
response. Bermann noted her previous experience at the EU
Political and Security Committee (PSC) where the EU was
tackling similar challenges to S/CRS. Perhaps, she mused, it
would be easier for a young institution like the EU to stand
up its effort than for larger and more deep-rooted government
bureaucracies.


3. (C) Bermann asked how S/CRS would interact with the UN
Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). For example, would S/CRS
participate directly in PBC deliberations in New York?
Bermann saw establishment of the PBC as a crucial
breakthrough in UN reform. There was a need to learn lessons
from misfired stabilization efforts like in Haiti, she said.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, Burundi represented an
early success, however the international community should
take care not to prematurely reduce its engagements. Some
were advancing DRC as a possible test case for the PBC,
however Bermann agreed with the view of French Permrep de La
Sabliere that the DRC was too vast and complex a challenge
for a first attempt.


4. (C) Bermann stated the French MFA was considering forming
a kind of "Crisis Cell," loosely similar to S/CRS, which
could include military and other agency detailees, to assist
MFA regional offices in organizing their response. The MFA
was also considering how better to coordinate support for the
African Union, bolstering AU crisis management capacity and
looking at other areas for assistance, such as the judiciary.
Bermann remarked there was a lively internal debate on how
best to disburse aid or channel assistance for crisis
response, whether through multilateral organizations or
bilaterally. She judged the latter approach less efficient,
yet offering other unstated advantages. Decisions would be
taken ad hoc, she suspected.

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Central African Republic: A Lab in Waiting?
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5. (C) Acting A/S-Equivalent for African Affairs Elisabeth
Barbier acknowledged French MFA interest in developing
capacities similar to the S/CRS initiative, yet she said the
exigencies of day-to-day crisis management made it hard for
policy-makers to step back and take a strategic overview.
She saw the Central African Republic (CAR) as an example of a
situation that would derive immediate benefit from
internationally coordinated stabilization efforts in order to
sustain its fragile emergence from prolonged crisis and its
transition to democratic rule. The CAR was in a "grey zone,"
unable to attract donor support because it had not yet worked
out agreements with Bretton Woods institutions. With peace
dividends delayed, the pressures of near-term challenges,
like payment of civil servant salaries, were accumulating.
Barbier asked how the S/CRS initiative, and the goal of
internationalizing a cooperative network, would complement
the UN Peacebuilding Commission.

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Aiming to mimic S/CRS (on a small scale)
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6. (U) High Representative for Security and Conflict
Prevention Pierre-Andre Wiltzer, who was Junior Minister for
Cooperation and Development from 2002-2004, a position in
which he was often the official French face to Africa, said
his current duties entailed developing a recommendation for
the establishment of a French-style S/CRS-type
interministerial organism. Wiltzer said he currently oversaw
a 5-person team, including two MFA detailees and 2 military
officers. He described the RECAMP initiative (Reinforcement
of African Peacekeeping Capabilities) as a signature French
contribution to our common stabilization efforts, akin to
GPOI. France now sought to further energize RECAMP by giving
it an increasingly international cast, notably through EU
participation, in support of the African Union Standby Force
and regional African organizations.


7. (C) Wiltzer underscored the risk of relapse into violence
for states emerging from conflict; Haiti and Liberia in the
1990s were egregious examples. He suggested the
international community and international financial
institutions (IFI) in particular, should revisit their
approach to such states. A key mistake was to require full
ownership of the post-conflict process on the part of such
fragile states before the release of funding. All too often,
the World Bank made available large credit lines that went
untapped, however, for want of local projects to meet proper
financing criteria. He suggested precedence should be given
to security sector reform in future.

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SGDN Focused on Prevention
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8. (C) Eric Lebedel, Director of international and strategic
affairs at the Secretariat General for National Defense
(SGDN),observed that French thinking on stabilization,
reconstruction and conflict prevention was still in its early
stages. (Note: the SGDN is a small coordinating body under
the Prime Minister's office tasked with covering sensitive
security issues.) No specific French government body has
been tasked along the lines of S/CRS, he noted, but the
French approach will be based on pragmatism. Additionally,
he stated that French thinking is much less ambitious than
the U.S. approach, in part, due to limited French resources.


9. (C) Lebedel stated that the SGDN is studying how best to
deal with conflict prevention, with the expectation that the
MFA and MOD are working on the other aspects of
reconstruction and stabilization. He said France is taking a
coordinated approach by working with academia and the
European Union. Wong described the U.S. framework for early
warning and detection, including the National Intelligence
Council's watch list of countries at risk of instability, and
hopes for better interaction with the EU on early warning and
crisis response. SGDN goals are modest, according to
Lebedel. Building on lessons learned in handling the Balkans
crisis of the 1990's, the SGDN aims to ensure that once a
warning of a country in crisis is made, that all relevant
French political actors are fully informed. Lebedel
concluded with the observation that the question remains as
to what the SGDN should seek to accomplish beyond providing
an early warning service. In the meantime, as part of the
SGDN's research into the issue, but without providing any
details, Lebedel informed the U.S. delegation that France was
looking to host a conference in May to share views on
conflict prevention

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Is Harsh Reality in Afghanistan Driving New Doctrine?
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10. (C) MFA Director of Strategic Affairs, Philippe Carre,
who was flanked by desk officers Alexis Morel and Xavier
Chatel, commented that he was glad to hear about Department
of Defense Directive 3000, and to hear that the USG viewed
combat and stability operations as complementary, not
contradictory, in nature. He said that the French recognized
that the U.S. was trying to develop a comprehensive approach,
elaborating that the French felt that the thrust of this
approach was evident in how the U.S. envisioned NATO
operations in Afghanistan after the failure of the
lead-nation model. When representatives from S/CRS pointed
out that S/CRS did not have primary responsibility for Iraq
or Afghanistan Carre warned, "reality creates doctrine also."
Carre asked that S/CRS pay attention to how the Pentagon
presents issues of reconstruction and stabilization in the
context of NATO in Afghanistan, saying that U.S. actions on
the ground are not necessarily "in synch" with what S/CRS
presented. He conceded, however, that perhaps the French
were only seeing "part of the picture."


11. (C) Carre said that the GoF had interpreted the U.S.
perspective as an expansion from traditional military roles
for the military; while there were "traces of intellectual
debate about doctrine, U.S. ideas were still essentially
being hatched in a military context." In contrast, Carre
said the French were well aware of the limitations of their
more financially constrained military and were therefore
reluctant to create new functional demands for them. He
lamented that the French military was overstretched overseas
and that, while new missions always come up, "the old ones
never seem to go away." Given these constraints, he said,
coupled with political and public aversion to involving the
military in conflict situations, the GoF would prefer to
develop the capabilities of other actors, or "relays," such
as the AU for conflict related activities. For natural
disaster humanitarian action, however, he said there has been
an increased counterpush to increase the military's
capabilities to respond quickly.


12. (SBU) Carre added that he will be in Washington on
February 7 to have meetings with EUR A/S Dan Fried and A/S
for Defense for International Security Policy Peter Flory.
He said that he would be happy to meet again with
representatives from S/CRS while he is there.

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MFA Sensitivities re Civilian/Military Relationship
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13. (C) On January 25, Clint Williamson from the NSC called
on Nicolas Niemtchinow, MFA DAS-equivalent director for
NATO/ESDP issues, to follow up on the earlier discussions
with Strategic Director Philippe Carre. Niemtchinow and NATO
desk officer Xavier Chatel emphasized that France is keen to
delineate military intervention from civilian reconstruction
tasks. Additionally, France does not want to see
civilian/humanitarian efforts under military leadership.
These French redlines are driven, in part, by the French
military's reluctance to get involved directly in civilian
reconstruction, given existing resource demands on the
military. That said, the French military would be interested
in joint planning to ensure that civilians take over this
function as quickly as possible following a conflict scenario.


14. (C) In terms of coordination of civilian/military relief
efforts, the French would like to see the UN and relevant
local authorities in the field take the lead. The French
also noted that with respect to such planning at NATO,
Pentagon thinking emphasizes the integration of civilians
under a military chain of command. Williamson observed while
much of this has fallen to the military by default for lack
of civilian capability, the U.S. is committed to enhancing
civilian planning and response capabilities. S/CRS is
looking at many operational models to work hand in hand with
the military and with international and multilateral
partners. Niemtchinow agreed, but stated that given the
financial constraints of European governments, they are not
keen to spend military resources on civilian tasks. To
illustrate further French concerns, Chatel pointed to NATO
operations in Afghanistan. NATO has a legitimate
responsibility to protect civilian workers, he stated, but it
remains unclear whether NATO should have a role in generating
police force contributions.





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