Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS7228
2006-11-06 13:48:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

CHINA AND CHINESE TAIPEI AT THE OECD: RAISING THE BAR?

Tags:  ECON PREL SENV EU CH TW OECD FR 
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Lucia A Keegan 11/07/2006 03:01:01 PM From DB/Inbox: Lucia A Keegan

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
UNCLAS SENSITIVE PARIS 07228

SIPDIS
cxparis:
 ACTION: ECON
 INFO: POL UNESCO AMBO DCM AGR OECD ECSO ECNO SCI PAO
 LABO AMB FCS ENGO TRDO

DISSEMINATION: ECONIN
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCFRO957
PP RUEHFR
DE RUEHFR #7228/01 3101348
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 061348Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2860
INFO RUEHFR/OECD COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1357
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 1327
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0196
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007228 

SIPDIS

FROM USOECD PARIS

STATE FOR EUR/ERA, EB, IO/S AND E

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON PREL SENV EU CH TW OECD FR
SUBJECT: CHINA AND CHINESE TAIPEI AT THE OECD: RAISING THE BAR?

REF: (A) PARIS 2868

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007228

SIPDIS

FROM USOECD PARIS

STATE FOR EUR/ERA, EB, IO/S AND E

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON PREL SENV EU CH TW OECD FR
SUBJECT: CHINA AND CHINESE TAIPEI AT THE OECD: RAISING THE BAR?

REF: (A) PARIS 2868


1. (SBU) Summary and action request: China and Taiwan (Chinese
Taipei) continue to spar over Taiwan's participation, as a
non-member, in the work of the OECD -- work for which statehood is
not a requirement. In recent developments, Chinese Taipei has
applied to participate in the activities of the Group on Health,
while its application to join the Committee on Science and
Technology Policy (CSTP) as an observer remains on hold. Beijing
has made clear its objections to Taipei's joining the CSTP -- where
China is already an observer; China is neither a member of nor an
applicant to the Group on Health.


2. Action request (see also para. 7): we recommend that the US
continue its policy of supporting Chinese Taipei's applications on
the merits at the committee or working group level, notwithstanding
possible PRC objections. To do otherwise would allow Beijing to
unilaterally raise the bar for Chinese Taipei activities at the
OECD, and encourage Beijing to make further demands concerning
Taiwan both at the OECD and at other international organizations.
In maintaining this policy, we acknowledge that the result could be
a severe curtailment -- by Beijing -- of the current very active
program of OECD-China cooperation. End Summary and action request.




3. (SBU) China and Chinese Taipei continue to spar over
participation in the work of the OECD (reftel). The OECD accords
priority to China, as a key world economy and one of the "BRICS,"
the five important economies not now members of the OECD (Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa). China is also the focus of
the OECD's largest "country program," (featuring extensive
OECD-China consultations and resultant policy recommendations from
the OECD) and a likely candidate for the OECD's new "enhanced
engagement" program now under discussion, with eventual OECD
membership in view, though in the distant future. At the same time,
under OECD commitments made to Beijing by then OECD
Secretary-General Paye a decade ago, Chinese Taipei participates,


SIPDIS
without symbols of sovereignty, in activities for which statehood is
not a requirement -- as an observer in several OECD committees, and
as an invited guest (economic officials only, and below the level of
minister) at Global Forums and other OECD events. Membership is not
in the cards for Chinese Taipei, nor is Chinese Taipei a likely
candidate for enhanced engagement. However, "regular outreach" to
nonmembers, including committee observerships, remains open to
Chinese Taipei.

Taipei and Beijing raise the stakes


4. (SBU) Over the past year and a half, Chinese Taipei has ramped
up its efforts to participate in OECD work, with applications to be
observers in six different committees and working groups. It has
also on occasion hinted that it might press to be an OECD member
(under a stretched interpretation of the OECD Convention; the OECD
legal office disagrees that this would be possible). In reaction,
China, no longer content with the previous OECD commitments
regarding Taiwan, has moved to raise the bar, objecting to Chinese
Taipei's participation as committee observers in general, and
threatening -- and in at least one case, acting -- to freeze
cooperation with the OECD in order to pressure the organization to
keep Chinese Taipei from joining committees as observers.

US Policy



5. (SBU) US policy to date has been to defer to the judgment of
OECD committees on Chinese Taipei's applications to be observers.
The US, of course, is represented on those committees. The
committees have examined applications on technical and non-political
criteria, looking at factors such as whether applicants are "major
players" in the subject matter handled by the committee (e.g.,
trade, science and technology, health),and whether there would be
"mutual benefit" to both the committee and the applicant from an
observership. Following examination by subject-matter committees,
the External Relations Committee (ERC) then examines and generally
endorses the substantive committees' recommendations (for or
against),which are then passed to the OECD Council for final
approval as an "a" point (i.e., without discussion).

Committee on Science and Technology Policy: China objects


6. (SBU) China joined the Committee for Science & Technology
Policy (CSTP) as an observer in 2001. Chinese Taipei applied last
year for the same status, and the CSTP, with US backing, approved
the application. China, however, made known its opposition to
inclusion of Chinese Taipei, asserting that Chinese Taipei's
application was part of a world-wide campaign to solicit recognition
of Taiwan as a state. China also withheld cooperation with the OECD
on an innovation policy study of China, pending assurances that
Chinese Taipei would not participate in the CSTP's meeting in March
2006 (in any event, Chinese Taipei's participation as an observer
was not possible, since the ERC and Council had not yet approved the
application). The External Relations Committee finally addressed
Chinese Taipei's application, in June, 2006, and referred the matter
back to the CSTP for another look -- effectively kicking the can
down the road in order to give newly-installed OECD Secretary
General Gurria time to get his feet on the ground on this and other
issues facing the OECD.
Latest application: Group on Health


7. (SBU) Now push has come to shove: on the one hand, Chinese
Taipei's application to join the CSTP remains on hold. At the same
time, Chinese Taipei has recently applied to "participate in the
activities" of the OECD's Group on Health. China is not a member of
the Group on Health, nor has it applied for any kind of status
there. We believe that the US should continue on the same policy
course as before: deferring to OECD committees, and, in those
committees, supporting Chinese Taipei's applications when they meet
the criteria of the committees. We acknowledge the paramount
importance of the China program to the OECD, compared with Taiwan --
and we should of course make this point in our discussions with
Beijing. We acknowledge also that Chinese Taipei's sudden storm of
applications clearly has political as well as economic motivations
-- and we expect that committees would weed out any applications
lacking a firm economic or technical foundation. From an OECD point
of view, however, to allow China -- as a non-member -- to enforce
its views on another non-member's qualifications finds no support in
OECD rules, could result in rejection of a qualified applicant
(particularly to committees such as CSTP, an area where Taiwan is
clearly a major player),and sets a bad precedent with respect to
other non-members who may wish to do likewise on other matters
(Cyprus issues come to mind). From a US point of view (at least as
seen from OECD-Paris),granting China an effective veto on Chinese
Taipei's participation would not only likely lead to further demands
from China at the OECD (such as renewed pressure to oust Chinese
Taipei from Committees on which Taiwan is already an observer -- a
request put forward by China's Ambassador to France last January,
reftel) but would presumably also result in increased Chinese
pressure in other international organizations to raise the bar in a
similar fashion.


8. (SBU) Action Request: we recommend that the US make it clear --
in the Group on Health, at the CSTP, and in other OECD bodies and
activities where statehood is not a requirement -- that its policy
with respect to Chinese Taipei remains as before: to consider
observership and other applications and invitations "on the merits,"
in the light of the usual OECD criteria such as major player and
mutual benefit, irrespective of Beijing's views. The US should also
make clear to the OECD Secretariat that the OECD should be prepared
to accept the possible consequences of this policy, such as
withdrawal by Beijing of cooperation with the OECD in one or (worst
case) all areas of current cooperation. In this context, we and the
OECD should of course continue to emphasize to Beijing the paramount
importance of China, as evidenced by the China country program, and
by China's likely inclusion in the new "enhanced engagement" process
and possible future consideration as a member (all in contrast to
the treatment of Chinese Taipei),and reiterate our support for the
OECD's previous commitments with respect to Taiwan, including use of
the term "Chinese Taipei" and avoidance of all symbols of
sovereignty.

STONE