Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS7182
2006-11-03 07:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

TOGO: FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR'S OCTOBER 26

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR TO FR 
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DE RUEHFR #7182/01 3070721
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 030721Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2798
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHPC/AMEMBASSY LOME 0911
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 6415
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 1791
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0965
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007182 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR'S OCTOBER 26
MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DUNN


Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007182

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TOGO'>TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR'S OCTOBER 26
MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR DUNN


Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Presidential Africa Advisor Michel de
Bonnecorse on October 26 said that the recently announced
TOGOlese government was a "reasonable formula," in a meeting
with transiting Ambassador David Dunn. He characterized
Gilchrist Olympio, his UFC associates, and other
non-participants in the new government as "extreme," and
expressed his belief that the UFC could split into "moderate"
and "extremist" factions. Ambassador Dunn cautioned that
Olympio and the UFC remained important factors and that he
saw no evidence yet of a split. Bonnecorse viewed Faure
favorably, and said that he could be a good president for a
long time. Both Ambassador Dunn and the French agreed that
the June 2007 elections and how they would be held would be
important indicators of the direction TOGO would take.
Moving forward on elections would help facilitate the
resumption of EU assistance. Participation in elections
monitoring by the U.S., the EU, and other outsiders would be
important. Equally important would be post-election reform
of the army, which should return to military duties and leave
internal security to enhanced civilian or gendarme-like
institutions. END SUMMARY.

"REASONABLE FORMULA"


2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to TOGO David Dunn and Embassy
Africa Watchers met on October 26 with Presidential Africa
Advisor Michel de Bonnecorse and his deputy, Jacques
Champagne de Labriolle. Bonnecorse began by noting that 18
months after the post-Eyadema elections in TOGO, the Faure
regime had presented a "reasonable formula" that included
most political actors, with the exception of the "most
extreme," including Gilchrist Olympio, his UFC allies, and
other non-participants whom Bonnecorse believed fell in that
category.


3. (C) Bonnecorse expressed the view that the UFC could
split into "moderate" and "extremist" factions, with the
former more willing to cooperate with the Faure regime and
the latter (the Olympio camp) continuing to withhold
cooperation. Bonnecorse believed that the June 2007

legislative elections would be a key indicator of TOGO's
direction, and the UFC split might take place in anticipation
of the elections. The June elections would be important in
terms of how they would be conducted and their results.
Would they be free and fair, and risk the end of RPT
dominance? Or would they be "controlled," with the RPT
remaining in power regardless of the will of the electorate?


4. (C) Ambassador Dunn said that he was not aware of a
split within the UFC, but Bonnecorse said that it appeared
likely. Labriolle noted generational changes in TOGO, with
Olympio viewed as an "old chief." Ambassador Dunn said that
the UFC seemed the strongest opposition element but evidence
was admittedly anecdotal, in the absence of any legitimate
elections in recent memory. The legislative elections would
help determine its true strength. Olympio retained a certain
cachet, which was important. However, it was quite possible
that some of Olympio's fire had gone out with Eyadema's
death. His key associates appeared loyal both inside and
outside TOGO. Ambassador Dunn commented on Eric Amerding's
closeness to Olympio and the confidence Olympio placed in
him. Bonnecorse observed that Amerding, like Olympio, was
"not really TOGOlese either." If Olympio ever became
president, Bonnecorse predicted that Amerding would be his
foreign minister.

"A GOOD PRESIDENT FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS"


5. (C) Bonnecorse said that TOGO had been moving in a "more
or less" favorable direction, with the Faure regime
marginalizing "extremists," cooperating with Burkina Faso
President Compaore's efforts, and responding to outside
pressure, including that of the U.S. Faure had also
demonstrated that he was a more enlightened leader than his
father. Relatively well educated and exposed to the outside
world, Faure was aware of good governance, Bonnecorse noted.
Faure could be "a good president for a number of years, with
the TOGOlese people viewing him as a balancer," Bonnecorse
observed.

OLYMPIO, UFC STILL IMPORTANT FACTORS


6. (C) Ambassador Dunn acknowledged that developments over
the past 18 months were more substantially positive than one
might have expected after Eyadema's death. However, things
could sour, and the June legislative elections would, as

PARIS 00007182 002 OF 003


Bonnecorse noted, be an important step. The challenge was to
keep TOGO on track regarding democratization. Gilchrist
Olympio and the UFC remained important factors, if only for
the financial resources they could provide, and should not be
discounted, he advised. The UFC continued to develop a
following among the young and was viewed by the GOT as the
most serious opposition element.


7. (C) Discussion turned to Olympio, with Ambassador Dunn
pointing out his continuing influence and Bonnecorse noting
his equivocation and his more European than TOGOlese outlook
and background. Olympio would always seek legal and
constitutional changes that would allow him to run, even if
he did not intend to do so, Bonnecorse believed. This would
allow him to claim a moral victory over the Gnassingbes and
keep the door open. Returning to the issue of an "out of
touch" Olympio, Bonnecorse noted his relatively opulent
lifestyle and uncertainty about his sources of income.

DATE FOR ELECTIONS FACILITATES EU AND IFI ENGAGEMENT


8. (C) Ambassador Dunn provided documentation indicating
that legislative elections would take place on June 24, 2007,
news that pleased Bonnecorse. An official date for
elections, he indicated, would facilitate a resumption of EU
engagement and financial assistance. He mentioned in passing
that the Germans now seemed willing to move forward.
Ambassador Dunn noted progress TOGO has made with the IMF and
the possibility of debt relief if the GOT maintained its
forward momentum. These developments augured well for TOGO's
still very fragile economy. Bonnecorse said that giving a
date for the elections would likely have a calming effect.
He said that the U.S., France, and other partners would have
to watch the elections process closely to avoid slippage. He
and Ambassador noted good cooperation between the U.S. and
French missions in Lome and both agreed it should continue.
More broadly, Labriolle stressed the need to end TOGO's
isolation and to support its economy. He noted the risk of
TOGO's becoming a criminalized state, with drug trafficking,
which had not existed previously, on the rise.


9. (C) In response to Labriolle's hope that the U.S. would
be involved in elections monitoring, Ambassador Dunn said
that the U.S. was likely to play a role. He noted the role
of a number of NGOs (e.g., Carter Center, NDI, IRI) in
elections monitoring and preparations and their likely
interest in TOGO. Labriolle stressed the importance of early
involvement and not waiting until the weeks just before the
vote. Ambassador Dunn hoped that the EU would send a robust
monitoring team to TOGO, and he noted the EU's positive role
in previous elections in Africa. Bonnecorse said that France
would raise TOGO's elections in discussions at the EU in
Brussels.

TOGO'S ARMY AND THE NEED FOR REFORM


10. (C) Bonnecorse emphasized the need to reform TOGO's
army, which he said should be a post-election priority.
Faure had agreed on the need for a more balanced army in
terms of ethnic representation, but problems existed. One
challenge would be to help develop a civilian security
capability, which would allow the army to focus on military
tasks and not on police or internal security tasks, which
might best be performed by the gendarmerie. Bonnecorse
thought that an ethnically balanced, 2,500 member gendarmerie
or internal security force could be sufficient. Ambassador
Dunn noted that U.S. laws made it easier to assist in
military reform than engage in internal security training.
He said that member of the TOGOlese defense establishment had
raised with him the subject of recruiting more southerners
into the army, to counterbalance the dominance of northern
ethnicities. Bonnecorse repeated the need to limit the army
to military tasks -- "we don't want them running the ports,
customs services, or out in the streets" -- a view Ambassador
Dunn shared. Ambassador Dunn remarked that ethnic relations
in TOGO were better than in a number of other countries.
There was less bitterness and hatred directed at the army
than in some countries, and refugees were returning.


11. (C) COMMENT: Bonnecorse's assessment that the UFC will
split and fade from the political scene may be attributable
to wishful thinking, given the rocky relationship that has
existed for years between the UFC and GOF. This view carries
implicit risks. One of the biggest threats to smooth (and
fair) elections next year will be lack of agreement and
public bickering between the UFC and TOGOlese government
concerning the electoral process, and ignoring the problem
will not make it go away. END COMMENT.

PARIS 00007182 003 OF 003




12. (C) Ambassador Dunn has cleared this message.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
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