EMBASSY PARIS SUBMISSION TO THE 2005/2006 REPORT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 PARIS 000718

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR PM/SNA, EUR/WE; OSD FOR OSD/PA&E, OASD/ISA/EUR,
OASD/ISA/NP, OASD/ISA/AP, OASD/ISA/NESA AND OASD/ISA/BTF

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MARR MCAP FR
SUBJECT: EMBASSY PARIS SUBMISSION TO THE 2005/2006 REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON ALLIED CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON DEFENSE

REF: A. STATE 223383

B. PARIS 000005


This message is sensitive but unclassified. Not for
Internet dissemination.


Due to its length, this is part one of a three part message


1. (U) Summary: This telegram constitutes Embassy Paris's
country submission for the 2005/2006 Report to Congress on
Allied Contributions to the Common Defense (requested Ref
A). We report on developments that took place during
calendar years 2004 and 2005 and offer cost sharing
information for U.S. fiscal years 2004 and 2005. Embassy's
contributions to the Report to Congress are keyed to
paragraphs in Ref A where specific information is
requested. End Summary.

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Ref A Para 8: General Assessment
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Overview
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2. (U) France bears a significant share of the burden of
defending international security and stability. It is
firmly committed to conflict resolution, non- and
counterproliferation, as well as to maintaining adequate
conventional and nuclear capabilities. Only a few nations
have the military capability to project power to a distant
theater and sustain operations. France is one of these
nations. It has the military personnel, equipment, and
command capabilities as well as the will to employ them
throughout the world. It is this total operational
capability, and the resolve to act on the international
stage, which allows the French military to participate and
lead in an international framework, including through the
European Union and NATO. Africa comprises the heaviest
French military commitment abroad. However, France is also
a significant contributor to international military
operations in Central--Southwest Asia and the Balkans. By
helping to stabilize sensitive areas in Central Asia, the
Balkans, or in Sub-Saharan Africa, overseas operations led
by the French Armed Forces have helped to prevent those
areas from becoming safe-havens for terrorist activity.
Throughout 2004 and 2005, France has been a major
contributor in the fight against terrorism as part of the
international coalition in Afghanistan. As such, France
volunteered to participate under the command of the United
States in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Moreover,
security, stabilization and training operations led by the
French Armed Forces within the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) is helping Afghanistan in its
transition from a terrorist sanctuary to a growing
democracy.


3. (U) France maintains the largest active duty military
force in the European Union and the second largest active
duty military force in NATO, with an active force of
approximately 355,000. Furthermore, France sustains a
large percentage of this active duty force deployed in
operations in overseas French territories or in sovereign
territories around the world. The average number of
deployed forces outside of France was 35,000 in 2004, and
32,500 in 2005. Over 13,500 of those deployed are actively
engaged in international mandates supporting counter-
terrorist operations, humanitarian operations, peacekeeping
operations, stability operations, and capacity building.
To support this level of external international mandate
operations, France spends approximately USD 790 million per
year from a defense budget of 52 billion dollars.


France's Global Reach: Peace Support Operations Worldwide
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4. (U) France eagerly participates in international peace
support operations and is a leading force contributor to
stabilization operations in the Balkans and in Africa. In
Cote d'Ivoire, France's most significant overseas
operation, French troops enforce a tenuous cease-fire and
are providing the backbone to the United Nations operation
as a quick reaction force. French troops have been
actively engaged since the summer of 2004 in preventing the
Darfur crisis from expanding into Chad. In the Balkans,
French troops are present in every military mission across
Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia: SFOR/EUFOR, KFOR, UNMIBH,
UNMIK, EUMM, and ALTHEA. During "Operation Secure
Tomorrow," to stabilize Haiti, France deployed the second
largest contingent alongside the United States.
Contributing troops under international mandate is a point
of principle in Paris. The UN, where France has a veto as
a permanent member of the Security Council, is its
preferred forum for crisis resolution. France has
observers currently participating in UN missions in the
Balkans, Georgia, Lebanon, Israel, Ethiopia/Eritrea,
Burundi, DROC, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Western Sahara, and
Haiti. It also participates in the multinational force in
the Sinai.


France and the War in Iraq
--------------


5. (U) The French government has forbidden its military
from contributing troops to the NATO training mission
inside Iraq (NTM-1). One French officer is working on the
training mission staff at SHAPE Headquarters in Belgium,
and the GoF pledged 660,000 euros in February 2005 to help
finance NTM-1. In 2005, the GoF took initial steps to
contribute to the development of Iraqi defense and security
capabilities. Under the European Union's EUJUSTLEX
program, France has pledged to train 200 Iraqi police
officials and judges in rule of law training in France,
making France the top EU contributor to this program.
Approximately 40 Iraqi police officials (non-military)
completed month-long training at the Ecole Nationale
Superieure des Officiers de Police and the Ecole Nationale
de Police in 2005. A third course started at the end of
2005 for judicial instruction at the Ecole Nationale de la
Magistrature. At the same time, a French offer to train up
to 1,500 Iraqi paramilitary police (gendarmes) outside Iraq
remains unimplemented, although an Iraqi Ministry of
Interior delegation visited France in July 2005 to further
discuss the proposal. Currently there is a single Gendarme
Officer in Iraq, responsible for provision of security for
French embassy staff in Baghdad.


France and the War on Terrorism
--------------


6. (U) France is currently the third-largest contributor
to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan, and one of the few nations other
than the U.S. to have had troops engaged in Operation
Enduring Freedom, ISAF and training programs for the Afghan
army since these efforts began. French Mirage-2000
fighters have flown with USAF fighters to assist American
and Afghan ground troops. French deployments to the Horn
of Africa remain focused on counterterrorism; the French
assisted in the establishment of USCJTF Horn of Africa, and
otherwise continue to allow the U.S. to share their base in
Djibouti in connection with operations in the Indian Ocean,
Red Sea and Persian Gulf. France is a part of Task Force
150, a multinational naval force that patrols the Red Sea
and the Persian Gulf to interdict the movement of suspected
terrorists from Afghanistan to the Arabian Peninsula.


7. (U) France participates in Operation Active Endeavor in
the Eastern Mediterranean. France is also actively
involved with the Proliferation Security Initiative. It is
also a party to all 12 existing international terrorism
conventions and is active in the UN and G8 counterterrorism
committees.


8. (U) In 2005, France continued to discover and dismantle
terror networks present on its soil, including several that
recruited jihadists to Iraq. Following the July 2005
bombings in London, French officials worked closely with
their British counterparts. They also identified a number
of deficiencies in their counterterrorism capabilities, and
proposed legislation to remedy these deficiencies. This
fast-tracked legislation became law in late January, 2006.
The French government is also expected to issue in February
2006 a "white book" on terrorism that will underscore their
belief that terrorism is a primary strategic threat to
France, and that dealing with it is consequentially a
central priority. France consults extensively with the
U.S. on terrorism, at the tactical and strategic level.

Africa
--------------


9. (U) The French military has shown an increasing
interest to cooperate with others, particularly with the
U.S., in Africa. In the past three years, there have been
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) executed in three
African countries, NEO planning for four other potential
crises, as well as U.S. and French multilateral programs,
such as GPOI - ACOTA, RECAMP, and joint financial and
logistical support for ECOWAS, ECCAS, and the African
Union. In the Gulf of Guinea and Trans-Sahel region,
France has expressed interest in the U.S. effort to improve
the posture of African countries in the fight against
terrorism. Both the U.S. and France continue to broadly
support capacity building for African militaries. (See
paragraphs 12, 32 40, 42-43, 46, 59, 72, 82-86, 89 and 94
for more on French involvement in Africa.)


France, NATO and ESDP
--------------


10. (SBU) Despite its singular stance on alliance
membership (France is not a member of NATO's integrated
military command),France has continued to demonstrate
willingness to engage in NATO responses to common
challenges. France has been a major contributor to
operations in the Balkans (SFOR, now EUFOR, and KFOR) and
in NATO's operations in Afghanistan (International Security
Assistance Force). In KFOR in Kosovo, French troops are the
second-largest national contingent, significantly
outnumbering U.S. units. In Afghanistan, France has some
900 troops, which will increase to approximately 1400 in
August 2006, when France assumes command of the Kabul
region of ISAF. During December 2004-August 2005, France
held the rotating command of ISAF. France also contributed
to NATO Humanitarian Relief Operations in Bagh, Pakistan.


11. (SBU) The French have consistently expressed their
support for NATO's transformation, and are contributing
substantial resources to the NATO Response Force: the
French military has identified forces that at initial
stages will amount to 40 per cent of ground units, 30 per
cent of air assets, and 20 per cent of naval capabilities,
and has proposed contributing EUROCORPS to the NRF at a
later stage. France has restructured some of its own
forces with land, air and sea High Readiness Response force
fully compatible with the NATO Response Force. It has
offered headquarter slots in Lille for fellow NATO members.


12. (SBU) Interest in being part of NATO transformation
has not diminished the deep commitment of the GoF to
fostering European security and defense arrangements. Many
in the GoF envision that transatlantic security relations
of the future will increasingly include bilateral U.S.-EU
cooperation. Throughout 2004 and 2005, the French
vigorously pursued their goal of establishing independent
European defense structures and supporting increased EU
missions. France supported an EU assistance mission to
Darfur in the Sudan, to support the African Union's
intervention. France continues to push its EU partners for
completion of a separate EU planning headquarters, a small
but independent EU operational planning unit, as well as an
EU cell at SHAPE. EU operations may also continue to be
planned at national headquarters. Additionally, France has
been a key player in setting up and funding the European
Defense procurement agency (EDA),designed to coordinate
defense procurement among EU allies, and which became
operational in 2005 with a small staff numbering some 80
persons and a budget of 20 million euros.


13. (U) In January 2006, the European gendarmerie force
was formally inaugurated in Vicenza, Italy. The concept
dates back to October 2003, when French Defense Minister
Michele Alliot-Marie proposed the creation of the European
gendarmerie consisting of some 800 gendarmes from Spain,
Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands to take on police
training and other police functions as part of the EU's
response to crises.

French Training and Participation in Joint Exercises
-------------- --------------


14. (U) In the European AOR, in cooperation with the US
Commander Naval Forces Europe, the French Navy participated
in 3 Non-NATO exercises and 6 NATO exercises in 2004
including a Proliferation Security Initiative exercise, a
NATO anti-submarine exercise, a Multi-lateral Livex, PFP
exercise BALTOPS 04, and a NATO Joint fleet training
exercise (a major NRF event sponsored by NATO).


15. (U) In 2005, France participated in 6 Non-NATO
exercises and 13 NATO exercises. The French Navy
participated in RECAMP IV, JMC 05-1 and 05-2, a
multilateral FTX helping qualify the Italian maritime High
Readiness Force (HRF),two multilateral anti-submarine
exercises, Trident D'Or (the exercise to qualify the French
maritime HRF, a LIVEX Mine Warfare Exercise in the North
Sea, FRUKUS (CPX/FTX with French, Russian, U.S., and U.K.
navy participation, Sorbet Royale (a LIVEX Submarine Rescue
Exercise),Bright Star (a multi-national, multi-warfare
LIVEX executing in Egypt),Loyal Midas (a multilateral FTX
to qualify a stand-by Maritime Component Commander for a
future NRF rotation.


16. (U) Overall objectives for Navy training in 2005 were:
100 days at sea per ship, 13 exercises, four of which were
Amphibious exercises, three of which were mine warfare
exercises, two deployments of the Charles de Gaulle CVBG,
participation in one major NATO exercise, participation in
one major EU exercise and five Joint exercises.


17. (U) The French air force continues to seek
opportunities to exercise and train with the US. During
2005, the French air force participated in Exercise Bright
Star in Egypt, and Exercise Air Warrior in the US. France
also continues to offer the US opportunities to use their
training ranges and training airspace associated with
Corsica in the Mediterranean Sea.


French Support for Space Launch Activities
--------------


18. (U) France supported multiple space launch activities
from their facilities in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and
the south of France. The French government approved a US
request to use the islands of Reunion and Nuka Hiva for
telemetry tracking missions supporting NASA space launches.
Additionally, the French support US space shuttle launches
with access to the French Air Base in Istres France as an
alternate shuttle landing site.


Defense Trade and Industrial Cooperation
--------------


19. (U) Source priorities in order of importance for
French defense acquisition remain France, EU, and all
others (to include the U.S.). National pride and limited
budgets govern this order. The French defense industry
continues to provide the greatest depth and breadth of any
western European country. While its technology is
sometimes peer-level with the U.S., it is actually superior
in specific niche areas (e.g., thermal imaging and optics).
The single most limiting factor is defense spending.


20. (U) In the past year, the French Ministry of Defense
continued its pursuit of revitalization of forces. Despite
competing government interests, the budget of the Defense
Ministry remained untouched (the Interior was the only
other ministry spared from budget cuts). Highlights for
2005-2006 spending include: a second aircraft carrier;
introduction of the Rafale fighter aircraft; the European
Multi-Mission Frigate (FREMM); Network-Centric command and
control systems; Tigre and NH-90 helicopters; transport
aircraft; third and fourth strategic missile submarines;
and cruise missile development. Only minor increases in
research and development, as compared to previous years,
were approved.

21. (U) Foreign Military Sales from the US increased from
FY03 to FY04 (USD 45.6M to USD 66.9M),while direct
commercial sales decreased (USD 18.9M to USD 12.7M.)
Pending US sales include the Aircraft Launch and Recovery
Equipment (ALRE) for the second French aircraft carrier,
and a cruise missile simulator. FMS training funds were
expended as in previous years, with the majority centered
on carrier aviation training and support.


22. (U) Service-specific Data Exchange Agreements (DEAs)
remained essentially stable, yet significantly,
renegotiation of four Navy DEAs was concluded, extending
their expiration dates to 2010. Discussions continue
regarding remaining DEAs and four newly proposed
agreements. Foreign Comparative Testing programs continue
to show interest in French technologies, with recent focus
on underwater GPS, perimeter defense, shipboard self-
defense, and bomb casing design. Benchmarking studies have
been conducted on ship design and manpower reduction.


23. (U) U.S. defense acquisition and sales interests in
France are significant and include (by service): for the
Air Force, C-130J, KC-130J, C-17 sales and French AWACS
upgrade; for the Army and USMC, Sophie, 120mm rifled
mortars, Active Protection System armor for ground
vehicles, and hybrid electric vehicles; for the Navy, ALRE
sale, unmanned submerged/underwater vehicles, and maritime
domain awareness, and network-centric enabled operations.
All services are focused on any technology that can assist
in the efforts of the IED Task Force.


24. (U) Privatization of the defense sector has continued,
albeit at a slow pace. Although the GoF still maintains
so-called "golden shares" in several firms, globalization
has eroded their total control in this arena. For example,
the recently privatized shipbuilding firm DCN has again
partnered with Thales in planning the second French
aircraft carrier, and was recently awarded a contract by
the French Navy for total lifetime maintenance support for
their fleet warships and major combat systems.


25. (U) The anticipated absorption of OCCAR (the
Organization for Joint Armament Cooperation) into the
European Defense Agency has stalled, although OCCAR did
play a role in guiding the French and Italian defense
ministries to select the General Electric engines for the
European Multi-Mission Frigate (FREMM) in late 2005.


26. (U) The EU's European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP)
goal is to coordinate financing processes and to get
European defense industry involved in identifying and
filling gaps. There is also a recent effort to engage
university research labs through funding made available
from private industries. Further privatization and
increased competitiveness of the French defense sector
should support these trends.


27. (U) Tangential but significant issues to defense
cooperation include continued pursuit of a Declaration of
Principles (DoP) on armaments and end-use controls required
by the U.S. on jointly produced systems, which prevent
French sales to third parties without USG approval (viewed
with concern by French government and private industry
alike though France requires similar guarantees from their
customers for French products). On the other hand, U.S.
Presidential intervention in rejecting the so-called "buy
American" provisions in the recent U.S. defense bill was
well received.


28. (U) Recent overtures on the part of both the U.S. and
French governments have led to an increase in official
bilateral defense discussions and activity. The impending
change of government in 2007 will have a significant impact
on whether or not this trend continues. While France's
2005 vote against the EU referendum was seen as a setback
to both the French government and to the EU's future, its
full effect remains to be seen. As noted above, there are
signs of consolidation of efforts among EU institutions,
specifically in the defense arena. Economic realities and
collective resolve should eventually determine whether
these trends continue.

The Future of French Defense Spending
--------------

29. (U) Future French Defense budgets must conform to a
new inter-governmental finance law known by the acronym
LOLF (Organic Law of the Finance Law). In this new
framework, the funding made available to the Ministry of
Defense abandons the traditional budget distributions by
'Titles' and instead is presented as 'missions and
programs'. The most significant of these is the mission to
'Put into action the National Defense Policy'. Two of its
supporting programs are 'Prepare the Force' and 'Equip the
Force'. In all, the Defense Ministry budget will be
organized around four missions and nine supporting
programs. In an effort to improve the coherence of the
defense budget, the LOLF ties budgetary allocations to
performance. Also, for the first budget cycle under this
new system, the Chiefs of Staff of the services have less
influence on service budgets. Their role is now to assure
the coherence of the budget rather than the direction of
it. In a May 21, 2005 Presidential decree, the Chiefs of
the Armed Services are now subordinate to the Chief of
Defense (CHOD). The CHOD now controls all budgets and
procurement financing. Service budgets now must pass
through the CHOD before they go to the Minister's office
for approval. (For more information on defense spending and
the LOLF see paragraphs 111-113.)


30. (U) The 2006 defense budget represents a 2.2% increase
over the 2005 fiscal year. In spite of the Defense
Minister's ability to protect the defense budget from cuts,
there continue to be difficulties for the French military
in the future. These difficulties stem primarily from
three areas: first, the inflationary pressures of the
price of energy; second, cost overruns/delays in
procurement; and third, increased maintenance costs. Most
of the planning for the current five-year budget requests
was predicated on the cost of a barrel of oil at half the
current price. This increase will translate into fewer
flying hours, fewer training days, and fewer days at sea in
the next few years. Procurement of several current
military systems is behind the original schedule or
experiencing technical problems. These delays include the
Tigre helicopter, Rafale fighter aircraft, A-400M transport
aircraft, and the new command ship (BPC). The final
expense increase will be the result of maintaining the
older systems in the French military until sufficient
numbers can replace them.


Transforming Military Capabilities
--------------


31. (U) In spite of not being part of the integrated
military command structure of NATO, in January, 2004 France
received two general officer billets within the command:
one at Atlantic Command Operations (SHAPE) and one at
Atlantic Command Transformation (Norfolk). The French have
assigned 110 military personnel to the two headquarters,
representing 2.04% of overall NATO staff posts. The French
have also agreed to increase their contribution to Alliance
military budgets from 4.9% to 7.4%. Nonetheless, despite
disclaimers to the contrary, the French have given mixed
signals over the past two years on their vision of the
future NATO. These views have ranged from a desire for
closer integration with NATO to generally limiting the
scope of NATO's operations or in favor of an EU defense
force.


32. (U) France has been a leading proponent to advance a
"battle-group" concept to create rotational 1500-man size
forces for use in Chapter VII mandates by the European
Union. Based on the EU Operation ARTEMIS model (the French
led deployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in
2003) the force would be capable of responding to a crisis
within 15 days and be sustainable for 30 days minimum, 120
days maximum. Full operational capability is scheduled for

2007. The French insist that these battle groups would be
compatible with NATO NRF rotations, with either taking the
lead on the basis of a mutually-agreed decision. Africa
has been mentioned as a primary venue for the battle-
groups.

33. (U) The French Army is investing in UAVs, the Improved
Infantry Armored Vehicle (VBCI),advanced communications
equipment, counter-fire radars, and lighter equipment for
armored units. They are beginning the process of
digitization of the Army's battlefield systems and
purchasing an individual soldier system - the Felin, the
French Army's equivalent to the U.S. Army's Land Warrior
system. These initiatives will enhance French abilities to
interoperate with US forces and systems.


34. (U) The French Navy has stood up and qualified the HRF
(M) headquarters staff, the naval component headquarters of
France's NRF, in Toulon in 2004 and 2005. This force will
deploy to the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean in 2006.
Additionally, the Admiral, Naval Action Force (ALFAN) in
Toulon has continued to develop over 2004 and 2005. This
command is now roughly equivalent to the U.S. Fleet Forces
Command and has responsibilities for training, certifying,
and equipping French naval forces. In an effort to improve
intelligence support to the French Navy, the French stood
up a French intelligence command called Centre de
Renseignment Martime (CRMar).


35. (U) In the context of trying to become more efficient
and capable of joint and international operations, the
French Air Force is in the process of a major
reorganization. In November 2003, a project team of senior
staff officers, outgoing base commanders and civilian
consultants was created and given the mission to develop a
plan to create a better Air Force. The project team started
its work in September 2004 and unveiled the plan in October

2005. The ideas will be progressively implemented
beginning in 2006. This ambitious reorganization project,
named Air 2010, aims in particular at removing duplication
and creating synergy. It will serve to optimize the air
base network while preserving existing capabilities. In
summary, the Air Force will replace the twelve current
commands with four large functional 'poles.' The
Operations Pole will be in charge of current operations in
France and abroad. The Forces pole will be charged with
leading the preparation and training of the whole of the
combat forces. The Support Pole will bring together within
the same staff all the maintenance, logistics, and life
support. The Personnel Pole will join together all the
personnel training and staff management functions.


36. (U) The French military is actively exploring ways to
increase interoperability with the U.S. with respect to the
global information grid and uses of information on the
modern battlefield. As of late 2005, the French MOD has
directed increased contact between French military
officials and U.S. military officials in an effort to
ensure the French capability to interoperate with the U.S.
is maintained and improved. This French initiative is
aimed at keeping up with the U.S. lead in information
technology, particularly targeting data and friendly force
tracking. The French desperately want to preserve the
ability to conduct combat operations with the U.S. in every
domain - air, land, and sea.


Recent Contingency Operations, Military Assistance,
Humanitarian Relief Operations, Peacekeeping, Capacity
Building, Counterproliferation and Nuclear Threat
Reduction.
-------------- --------------


37. (U) The French continue to show their support for
operations in Afghanistan. In 2006, they are planning to
augment their forces to support the increased
responsibilities of the Kabul regional command in addition
to the military assets already in place in support of ISAF
and OEF (see paragraphs 53-56 for more detail).
Furthermore, the French continue to be actively involved in
the fight against terrorism through the OEF Task Force 150
and in the US Counter-Drug effort (see paragraphs 59-60 for
more detail.)


38. (U) The French Army has been training the Afghan
National Army within the overall U.S.-led program since its
inception and the French have consistently expressed a
desire to be part of NATO's transformation and
interoperability initiatives as evidenced by their
significant national contributions to the NATO Response
Force (NRF) (see paragraphs 66-67 for more detail).

39. (U) In the Balkans, French forces remain among the
largest contributors to operations in Kosovo and French
participation in the former NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia
continued under the EU Force, Operation Althea. The French
continue to maintain a small French military presence in
Macedonia. They also provide a small presence force in
Georgia. (See paragraphs 70-71 for more detail).