Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS7177
2006-11-02 14:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRANCE SEES POST-DEBY CHAD APPROACHING

Tags:  PREL PHUM PINR KPKO SU CD FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHFR #7177/01 3061456
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021456Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2789
INFO RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 1097
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0962
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 1301
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007177 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR KPKO SU CD FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE SEES POST-DEBY CHAD APPROACHING

REF: A. PARIS 6845 B. PARIS 4448 C. PARIS 846 D.

PARIS 2067 E. PARIS 7992 (2005)

Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reasons 1.4b,d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007177

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR KPKO SU CD FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE SEES POST-DEBY CHAD APPROACHING

REF: A. PARIS 6845 B. PARIS 4448 C. PARIS 846 D.

PARIS 2067 E. PARIS 7992 (2005)

Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reasons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: President Chirac's African Affairs
Counselor Michel de Bonnecorse admitted to visiting U.S.
Ambassador to Chad Marc Wall in an October 20 meeting that
Deby's Presidency could be nearing its close, with
assassination a growing possibility. The manner and place of
Deby's demise -- by assassination, sickness or accident, at
home or abroad -- would determine both the French response
and Deby's succession. Bonnecorse said that French President
Chirac had admonished Deby about reported recruitment of
child soldiers within the Chadian military, warning Chad
risked a review of French military cooperation if the charges
proved true. Regarding Darfur and the risk to refugees in
Chad, Bonnecorse commented on Deby's ambivalent view of UNSCR
1706 and the possible deployment of UN elements on Chadian
territory. Bonnecorse speculated on options for some form of
an interpositionary force in Chad and pledged French
logistical support. Comment: Official French discussions of
Chad are beginning to envision the inevitability, even
imminence, of a post-Deby Chad. End Comment and Summary.

Deby's Demise on the Horizon
--------------


2. (C) Michel de Bonnecorse, President Chirac's African
Affairs Counselor, admitted in an October 20 meeting with
Marc Wall, U.S. Ambassador to Chad, and Embassy Africa
Watcher that President Idriss Deby could be gone from power
sooner rather than later. The manner and place of his demise
-- most likely by assassination or an accident, whether at
home or abroad -- would determine both the French response
and Deby's succession, Bonnecorse said. Fealty to Deby among
the military had weakened and officers were being transferred
more frequently, he said. Nonetheless, Deby was brimming
with self-confidence, following the defeat of rebel forces in
April, his self-perceived triumph over the World Bank, his
replenished personal treasury, and satisfaction at his

electoral victory and investiture. Bonnecorse suggested
Deby's assassin would likely take control in Chad, though
death through an accident, illness, or while abroad, could
sow confusion and prompt half-brother Daoussa Deby to attempt
to grab power. Any successor would likely emerge from Deby's
own clan; however, Chad would not be the better for Deby's
demise, Bonnecorse asserted.

Limits of French Military Engagement in Chad
--------------


3. (C) Bonnecorse related that French President Chirac had
recently admonished Deby about a UN report alleging
recruitment of child soldiers within the Chadian military.
Deby protested ignorance of the charge. Chirac nonetheless
warned that such a development, if verified, could trigger a
review of French military cooperation with Chad. Bonnecorse
recalled that the role of French military forces in Chad was
restricted to protection against foreign aggression. He
explained that, as a rule, French forces would not open fire
on Chadians. He remarked that French forces could still play
a dissuasive role, short of engagement, with respect to
Chadian rebels. When Deby asked for French military
intervention during the April battles in Chad, Bonnecorse had
declined and had underscored to Deby that the rebel columns
were at least 70 percent Chadian in composition. AlthoQh
French forces had fired warning shots, the French response
fell far short of the robust intervention sought by several
African heads of state, according to Bonnecorse.

Options for International Forces in Chad
--------------


4. (C) Turning to UNSCR 1706, which mandates transition to
UN forces in Darfur as well as a UN presence along the Darfur
border in Chad and Central African Republic, Bonnecorse
remarked on Deby's ambivalence in contrast to CAR President
Bozize's clear support. Bonnecorse suggested however that
the Security Council ought to spell out whether the UN
elements in Chad would have a humanitarian mission or provide
border security. In any event, Bonnecorse pledged the
logistical support of French forces in Chad, though these
would maintain their bilateral mission and would not serve
under a UN flag. He believed Chad could make available about
2,000 personnel and C.A.R. a further 500 forces. France
could potentially dispatch some gendarmes. Bonnecorse noted

PARIS 00007177 002 OF 003


the option of making such a deployment the first phase of the
larger UN operation foreseen in UNSCR 1706, he said, with a
focus on securing humanitarian corridors. However, he
reiterated previous reservations (Ref A) to the effect that
such an international force could indirectly abet the ethnic
cleansing of Darfur by spurring a further exodus of refugees
into secure Chadian territory.


5. (C) For now, Bonnecorse saw no imminent risk to the
refugee camps in Chad apart from possible violence at the
hands of local Chadians who were envious of the camps
perceived advantages, like potable water and childbirth
assistance, and irritated that camp refugees continued to
forage outside camp perimeters for firewood that was already
in short supply. Humanitarian convoys had already been
pillaged, he noted. Bonnecorse avowed he continued to mull
over the option of supplementing camp security through
deployment of a modest African gendarme force, 200-250 in
size (Ref B). France could play a pivotal role, he offered,
both in recruitment of personnel from francophone African
states like Senegal, but also in securing EU funding.
Ambassador Wall confirmed strong USG interest in the
possibility of an internationally supported gendarme
protection force.

Political Dialogue a Pipedream
--------------


6. (C) Ambassador Wall asked Bonnecorse about prospects for
international mediation within Chad. Bonnecorse was
dismissive, recalling the abortive efforts and pessimistic
assessment of the Austrian EU presidency. Reforming the
electoral framework might be feasible, but wider
reconciliation was unlikely, he judged, noting that the EU
had managed to instigate some reform in Togo by conditioning
its assistance to progress on electoral rules. Chadian
opposition however would continue to boycott the political
process in any event, he predicted. Bonnecorse derided the
notion of political dialogue in Chad as an oxymoron,
referring to his experience after multiple trips to Chad and
meetings with Deby in Paris over four years. Asked by
Ambassador Wall whether France had contact with the Chadian
opposition in Paris, Bonnecorse responded that he only met
with Chadians affiliated with official democratic parties.
He noted he had rebuffed a meeting request from an Erdimi
brother.

French Attempts to Make Deby a Good Citizen
--------------


7. (C) In addition to Chirac's recent rebuke to Deby about
the possible presence of child soldiers in the Chadian
military, Bonnecorse claimed a series of interventions by
France to shape Deby's behavior. Harkening back to Deby's
tussle with the World Bank, Bonnecorse claimed that Chirac
had repeatedly urged Deby to enter into dialogue with Bank
President Wolfowitz. France moreover has consistently told
Deby to use his petrol dollars on behalf of the population,
instead of arms purchases, which were well beyond the needs
of Chad, according to Bonnecorse. Another essential message
from France has been to respect the February 2006 Tripoli
Accord and to cease abetting rebels in Sudan. Bonnecorse
noted he had intervened strongly, if unsuccessfully, with
Deby on behalf of the Guatemalan candidacy for UNSC election,
arguing Chadian interests would not be served by the election
of "that imbecile" from Venezuela.

Comment: France Starting to Think About Chad After Deby
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Chad, for Bonnecorse, represents a fragile territory
disguised as a state. Its leadership consists of warlords
who project control but do not govern. A Southerner ought to
rule Chad by rights, given the imbalances in population, in
his view. Deby was more and more vulnerable, despite an
almost willful euphoria since he repulsed the April rebel
offensive. Deby could perish soon, even very soon,
Bonnecorse volunteered, in a rare acknowledgment. France
would adapt, as required. It was startling to hear
Bonnecorse describe the inquiries of Deputy Secretary
Zoellick (Refs C, D) about French thinking on succession as,
in his view, an American invitation, with diplomatic
sugarcoating, for a team effort to shunt Deby aside. At that
point, our French interlocutors persisted in categorizing
Deby as indispensable (Ref E). Now they are starting to
envision a Deby-less Chad as inevitable, possibly even
imminent, but they still would rather not dwell on what may

PARIS 00007177 003 OF 003


follow, except to evoke a presentiment of nostalgia for the
passing era of Idriss Deby.


9. (U) Ambassador Marc Wall cleared this report.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON