TOGO: GILCHRIST OLYMPIO'S OCTOBER 23 MEETING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 007153

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: GILCHRIST OLYMPIO'S OCTOBER 23 MEETING
WITH AMBASSADOR DUNN


Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: UFC leader Gilchrist Olympio on October 23
told visiting U.S. Ambassador to Togo David Dunn that the UFC
would be willing to participate in Togo's government of
national unity under certain conditions, such as naming a UFC
member to head a notional new ministry charged with oversight
of democratization in Togo, consistent with the August 20
Global Political Agreement ("the Agreement"). Olympio
repeatedly accused the Faure regime of not complying with the
Agreement, most notably in forming a new interim government
unilaterally, and said that it seemed clear that Faure did
not want the UFC to participate in the government. Olympio
and his associates also pressed for consensus-based
decision-making in the CENI electoral commission (to counter
the regime's numerical superiority in that body) and the
rapid formation of the oversight commission ("groupe de
suivi") that was supposed to be formed after the signing of
the Agreement. Noting that they were not now contesting the
Faure regime, they also said that they would accept the
results of the planned June 24, 2007, legislative elections,
so long as these elections were transparent and fair. If
they lost fairly, they would stand down. Gilchrist and
company asked the U.S. to intervene with the Faure government
to obtain its agreement to the UFC's positions and thereby
enable it to participate in the government, and asked for a
significant U.S. presence to observe the legislative
elections. Ambassador Dunn at numerous points reiterated the
USG's continuing intention to promote democratization in Togo
and he encouraged Olympio and the UFC to make a positive
contribution to that effort. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) UFC leader Gilchrist Olympio hosted a meeting
October 23 with U.S. Ambassador to Togo David Dunn (in
transit to Lome). Olympio's associates Eric Amerding and G.
Latevi Lawson were also present, along with Embassy Africa
Watchers. During the four-hour discussion, Olympio reviewed
the twists and turns of Togo's politics and his and the UFC's
policies, centered mainly on the August 20 Global Political
Agreement ("the Agreement"),the period from Eyadema's death
to the present, and the question of whether the UFC would
agree to participate in the interim government the Faure
regime has put in place in conformity with the accords.
Throughout the meeting, Olympio alternately displayed
disdain, anger, frustration, bitterness, bemusement,
resignation, and cautious optimism as he discussed Togo, his
political fortunes, the Gnassingbe clan, and Faure,
underscoring his emotion of the moment by his repeated
references to Faure as "the boy" or "le garcon." During his
discourse, Olympio frequently mentioned such figures as Kofi
Annan and Presidents Obasanjo and Kufuor, among others, with
all of whom he suggested he was on close terms and whose
support and sympathy he believed he enjoyed.

WILLING TO PARTICIPATE BUT OBSTACLES ABOUND


3. (C) Olympio's main point was his willingness to agree to
UFC participation in the interim national unity government
(provided certain conditions were met),although he said that
he personally could hardly accept a position, given the
circumstances. UFC participation so far had been impossible,
for which he blamed the Faure government and its failure, in
his view, to abide by the Agreement. In addition to specific
measures Faure had failed to honor, Faure had not lived up to
certain "unwritten understandings" Olympio claimed the two
sides had undertaken when the Agreement was signed and which
would have provided certain assurances to the opposition on
its role in government. One of these "understandings,"
Olympio asserted, was an agreement that, in return for
ceasing to question Faure's legitimacy, the UFC would be
allowed to propose a Prime Minister for the national unity
government. Olympio said that Faure's refusal to comply with
the Agreement and honor this understanding, along with the
naming of an interim government without sufficient
consultation, was the reason the UFC had not joined the
government. He stressed that Faure's naming of Yawovi
Agboyibo, who heads an opposition party sometimes allied with
the UFC, as Prime Minister, had violated the "understanding"
with the UFC.


4. (C) Olympio said that Faure's claim to be operating
under Article 66 of the Constitution (concerning the
president's power to appoint and dismiss officials) was also
disingenuous, given the provisions of the Agreement, which he
suggested took precedence. Olympio said he had discussed the
matter with Burkina Faso President Compaore, who reportedly
agreed that this was "not normal." Olympio said that neither
he nor Compaore had received a response from the Faure regime

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on this point after recently bringing it to the regime's
attention. In Olympio's view, this was one example of how
Faure was seeking to marginalize Compaore, who had done a
good job under difficult circumstances and had proved his
ability to act independently.


5. (C) Olympio said that the Faure regime should have
established the oversight commission ("groupe de suivi")
before acting to form the new electoral commission (CENI).
The regime was refusing to name an opposition figure as head
of the CENI and preferred that he or she be elected by
commission members. This would only guarantee a regime
victory, Olympio complained, since the CENI was numerically
tilted towards the regime. There was also a question of
provincial election boards -- according to a new law, only
magistrates could head these boards, and the government had
recently appointed about 100 new magistrates. The regime's
manipulation of the CENI and its subsidiaries meant that the
need to reach decisions by consensus (rather than by majority
vote) was greater than ever, Olympio and Amerding stressed.
Lawson said that the opposition favored consensus not as a
means to block action but as a way to encourage creative
thinking to resolve differences.


6. (C) Olympio said that the oversight commission ("groupe
de suivi") would consist of nine people, six representing
Togo's political parties and observers from ECOWAS, the EU,
and Burkina Faso, with President Compaore serving as its
chairman. Olympio described efforts on Compaore's part to
establish the commission, to which the Faure regime had not
responded. Olympio and his associates stressed the need for
the oversight commission to be established soon. Amerding
said that the opposition had proposed that the U.S. be
included in the oversight commission but that had been
rejected.

LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS A KEY


7. (C) Olympio said that despite these problems, the UFC
would continue to press for free and fair legislative
elections in June 2007. (NOTE: The CENI has officially
named June 24 as the date. END NOTE.) These elections, and
how the regime prepared for them, would be an extremely
important indicator of the regime's intentions, Olympio and
his associates emphasized. They said that if the elections
were free and fair, and if Faure's side prevailed, they would
accept the results. But it was crucial that all parties,
including interested non-Togolese, try to ensure the fairness
and transparency of the elections. Olympio requested that
the U.S. send as many election observers as it could.
Ambassador Dunn noted that several U.S.-based groups
routinely send elections observers and he expected that they
would do so in Togo's case, whether funded by the Embassy or
not. He reiterated U.S. support for democratization in Togo
and that it would continue to press for free and fair
legislative elections.

STRONG REQUEST FOR U.S. PRESSURE


8. (C) As the lengthy meeting began drawing to a close,
Olympio and his associates increasingly focused on the role
they hoped the U.S. could and would play in influencing
events in Togo. Along with their requests for a significant
presence as election observers, they asked that the U.S.
intervene directly with the Faure regime, both to insist on
adherence to the Agreement and to press for the regime's
acceptance of the opposition's positions. If the regime
showed flexibility towards the opposition, then the UFC could
agree to participate in the government. Olympio and his
associates referred to the UFC's earlier demand for "two big
and two small ministries" but said that the UFC could accept
a position as "minister of state" in charge of a new GOT
"ministry for implementation of the Agreement" (not well
defined but clearly distinct from the oversight committee
outlined in the Agreement). "Offering us just the Youth
and Sports Ministry, will not be enough to get us back in,"
Olympio scoffed.


9. (C) Ambassador Dunn, while remaining non-committal on
some of Olympio's specific points, repeated that the U.S.
would continue to support a broad-based, inclusive process of
democratization in Togo, and would continue to make this
point in its dealings with the Faure regime, both privately
and in its public diplomacy. He encouraged Olympio, the UFC,
and the rest of the opposition to seek ways to play a
constructive and positive role, reminding them that with
Eyadema's passing and the emergence of Faure, there was now
an opportunity for positive change that had not existed for a

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generation and that all parties should take care not to waste.


10. (C) COMMENT: The meeting was a friendly one, with
Olympio generally alert and incisive, although he often
digressed, showed signs of advancing age (both physically and
mentally),and periodically fixated on the injustices he and
his family had endured for decades. As in our previous
meetings, he displayed both defiance and resignation, and he
seemed to appreciate that his animus towards Faure could
never be the same as his animus towards Eyadema, with whom he
would never be able to settle his family's score. Amerding
and Lawson intervened effectively, but, along with their
leader, they seemed to realize that Faure, fairly or not, had
stepped on the gas while the light was still yellow and that
they were already in danger of being a lap down. END COMMENT.


11. (U) Ambassador Dunn has cleared this message.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON