Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS7151
2006-10-31 17:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
FRANCE SUPPORTS STRONG ENFORCEMENT OF UNSCR 1718
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007151
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL PHSA EWWT EAIR PBTS FR KN
SUBJECT: FRANCE SUPPORTS STRONG ENFORCEMENT OF UNSCR 1718
REF: STATE 179472
Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 b and d.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 007151
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL PHSA EWWT EAIR PBTS FR KN
SUBJECT: FRANCE SUPPORTS STRONG ENFORCEMENT OF UNSCR 1718
REF: STATE 179472
Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) Poloff delivered Under Secretary's letter (reftel)
October 30 to Benoit Guidee, IO office director-equivalent at
the MFA. Guidee reiterated France's "total solidarity" with
the U.S. and agreed that the U.N. Security Council must
maintain a firm stance on the North Korean nuclear tests. The
GoF views Resolutions 1695 and 1718 together as a clear
statement of international condemnation of North Korea's
nuclear tests, while judging that the resolutions by
themselves will have a limited impact in deterring North
Korea's weapons program. Guidee restated the GoF position
that the U.S. and France must continue to pursue dialogue
with less avid partners, such as China and South Korea, who
remain reluctant to implement what they perceive to be harsh
sanctions regimes. Guidee was pleased to see that U/S
Joseph's letter deliberately did not characterize the
inspection regime as a blockade, which the South Koreans and
even France would oppose on humanitarian grounds.
2. (C) Guidee said France continues to support PSI
interception exercises and has no objection to using PSI as a
mechanism to ensure adherence to UNSC 1718 and to prevent
North Korea from receiving materials and technology that
could be used in their weapons program. His one
qualification was that France wants to avoid tensions with
China or an overstepping of international law. Guidee added
that North Korean vessels rarely enter French waters or dock
at French ports, so it is unlikely that France will need to
inspect questionable shipments.
3. (C) Guidee said France is in discussions with the European
Union to introduce harsher measures than those contained in
UNSC 1718. For example, France has introduced a proposal to
ban all travel to the E.U. by official North Koreans, not
PARIS 00007151 002 OF 002
simply those in charge of the weapons program, as stipulated
in Resolution 1718.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL PHSA EWWT EAIR PBTS FR KN
SUBJECT: FRANCE SUPPORTS STRONG ENFORCEMENT OF UNSCR 1718
REF: STATE 179472
Classified By: Acting DCM Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) Poloff delivered Under Secretary's letter (reftel)
October 30 to Benoit Guidee, IO office director-equivalent at
the MFA. Guidee reiterated France's "total solidarity" with
the U.S. and agreed that the U.N. Security Council must
maintain a firm stance on the North Korean nuclear tests. The
GoF views Resolutions 1695 and 1718 together as a clear
statement of international condemnation of North Korea's
nuclear tests, while judging that the resolutions by
themselves will have a limited impact in deterring North
Korea's weapons program. Guidee restated the GoF position
that the U.S. and France must continue to pursue dialogue
with less avid partners, such as China and South Korea, who
remain reluctant to implement what they perceive to be harsh
sanctions regimes. Guidee was pleased to see that U/S
Joseph's letter deliberately did not characterize the
inspection regime as a blockade, which the South Koreans and
even France would oppose on humanitarian grounds.
2. (C) Guidee said France continues to support PSI
interception exercises and has no objection to using PSI as a
mechanism to ensure adherence to UNSC 1718 and to prevent
North Korea from receiving materials and technology that
could be used in their weapons program. His one
qualification was that France wants to avoid tensions with
China or an overstepping of international law. Guidee added
that North Korean vessels rarely enter French waters or dock
at French ports, so it is unlikely that France will need to
inspect questionable shipments.
3. (C) Guidee said France is in discussions with the European
Union to introduce harsher measures than those contained in
UNSC 1718. For example, France has introduced a proposal to
ban all travel to the E.U. by official North Koreans, not
PARIS 00007151 002 OF 002
simply those in charge of the weapons program, as stipulated
in Resolution 1718.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON