Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS7139
2006-10-31 14:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
MINISTER CONVOKES AMBASSADOR OVER COTE D'IVOIRE
how-toVZCZCXRO5325 OO RUEHPA DE RUEHFR #7139 3041420 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 311420Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2724 INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 1026 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0956 RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007139
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKOUNSC UNSC IV FR
SUBJECT: MINISTER CONVOKES AMBASSADOR OVER COTE D'IVOIRE
UNSC NEGOTIATIONS
REF: STATE 179974
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton. Reasons 1.4b,d
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007139
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKOUNSC UNSC IV FR
SUBJECT: MINISTER CONVOKES AMBASSADOR OVER COTE D'IVOIRE
UNSC NEGOTIATIONS
REF: STATE 179974
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton. Reasons 1.4b,d
1. (C) Summary: Cabinet Minister Girardin convoked the
Ambassador October 31 to urge U.S. support for the French
draft Security Council resolution on Cote d'Ivoire, pleading
that France was in a very difficult situation. After taking
into account core U.S. objections, the draft now represented
the "bare minimum" for France, although Girardin was prepared
to authorize a final concession in Op 4 in order to preclude
any interpretation of juridical overreach. A split vote in
the Security Council could sink the Ivoirian peace process
and provoke renewed civil war. Girardin asked the U.S. not
to abandon France. With elections coming up in France,
Girardin voiced concern that the French public could grow
critical of the costly and arguably ineffectual deployment of
Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire and call for withdrawal of
French troops. Comment: This was the first time that the
French Government formally convoked the Ambassador since his
arrival in 2005. End Comment and Summary.
2. (C) Brigitte Girardin, Minister-Delegate for Cooperation,
Development and Francophonie, convoked the U.S. and UK
ambassadors separately on October 31 to urge support for the
draft Security Council resolution on Cote d'Ivoire. Girardin
underlined that France was in a very difficult situation.
The draft, as submitted "in blue," took into account the core
objections of the U.S. and UK delegations, she said. The
draft now represented only a very slight improvement over SCR
1633 (2005) and was the "bare minimum" as far as France was
concerned. If adopted, President Gbagbo would perceive the
draft's lack of substance, but France, through the media,
would nonetheless play up the SC resolution to the hilt in
order to bolster PM Konan Banny's efforts to advance the
electoral calendar.
3. (C) France feared abstentions by the U.S., UK, Russia and
China. A split vote in the Security Council could have dire
consequences, she warned, effectively sinking the credibility
of the Ivoirian peace process. Gbagbo would proclaim his
victory over the Security Council. Opposition elements and
rebel elements would give up on the road map for an electoral
transition. Renewed civil war could be the direct result.
Girardin asked that the U.S. not leave France in the lurch.
She stressed French support for U.S. policies in Liberia and
Sudan.
4. (C) Girardin stated she was prepared, on her own
authority, to make a final concession to preclude any
interpretation of juridical overreach, namely to substitute
the verb "to declare" for "to decide" in Operative Paragraph
4 with reference to the invocation by any Ivoirian, e.g.
President Gbagbo, of any unspecified legal provision in order
to impede the political process. The UK Ambassador, convoked
immediately beforehand, had suggested the amendment to
Girardin, and indicated that the UK could then support the
draft. Girardin said the UK did not want an open break with
France in the UNSC over Cote d'Ivoire.
5. (C) Should the Ivoirian peace process falter for want of
UNSC backing, France would be driven to face hard choices,
Girardin observed, particularly with regard to the 4,000 or
so French soldiers deployed in Cote d'Ivoire under Operation
Licorne. France was entering its own election season, which
would be in full swing by January 2007. Faced by civil war
in Cote d'Ivoire, the French public would inevitably
scrutinize Operation Licorne, criticize it as ineffectual,
and question its 250 million euro annual budget given other
military commitments, notably in Lebanon. Withdrawal of
Operation Licorne would be a real possibility, she feared,
and UNOCI would be unable to pick up the slack.
6. (C) Comment: This was the first time the Ambassador has
been formally convoked by the French Government during his
tenure in France.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM KPKOUNSC UNSC IV FR
SUBJECT: MINISTER CONVOKES AMBASSADOR OVER COTE D'IVOIRE
UNSC NEGOTIATIONS
REF: STATE 179974
Classified By: Ambassador Craig R. Stapleton. Reasons 1.4b,d
1. (C) Summary: Cabinet Minister Girardin convoked the
Ambassador October 31 to urge U.S. support for the French
draft Security Council resolution on Cote d'Ivoire, pleading
that France was in a very difficult situation. After taking
into account core U.S. objections, the draft now represented
the "bare minimum" for France, although Girardin was prepared
to authorize a final concession in Op 4 in order to preclude
any interpretation of juridical overreach. A split vote in
the Security Council could sink the Ivoirian peace process
and provoke renewed civil war. Girardin asked the U.S. not
to abandon France. With elections coming up in France,
Girardin voiced concern that the French public could grow
critical of the costly and arguably ineffectual deployment of
Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire and call for withdrawal of
French troops. Comment: This was the first time that the
French Government formally convoked the Ambassador since his
arrival in 2005. End Comment and Summary.
2. (C) Brigitte Girardin, Minister-Delegate for Cooperation,
Development and Francophonie, convoked the U.S. and UK
ambassadors separately on October 31 to urge support for the
draft Security Council resolution on Cote d'Ivoire. Girardin
underlined that France was in a very difficult situation.
The draft, as submitted "in blue," took into account the core
objections of the U.S. and UK delegations, she said. The
draft now represented only a very slight improvement over SCR
1633 (2005) and was the "bare minimum" as far as France was
concerned. If adopted, President Gbagbo would perceive the
draft's lack of substance, but France, through the media,
would nonetheless play up the SC resolution to the hilt in
order to bolster PM Konan Banny's efforts to advance the
electoral calendar.
3. (C) France feared abstentions by the U.S., UK, Russia and
China. A split vote in the Security Council could have dire
consequences, she warned, effectively sinking the credibility
of the Ivoirian peace process. Gbagbo would proclaim his
victory over the Security Council. Opposition elements and
rebel elements would give up on the road map for an electoral
transition. Renewed civil war could be the direct result.
Girardin asked that the U.S. not leave France in the lurch.
She stressed French support for U.S. policies in Liberia and
Sudan.
4. (C) Girardin stated she was prepared, on her own
authority, to make a final concession to preclude any
interpretation of juridical overreach, namely to substitute
the verb "to declare" for "to decide" in Operative Paragraph
4 with reference to the invocation by any Ivoirian, e.g.
President Gbagbo, of any unspecified legal provision in order
to impede the political process. The UK Ambassador, convoked
immediately beforehand, had suggested the amendment to
Girardin, and indicated that the UK could then support the
draft. Girardin said the UK did not want an open break with
France in the UNSC over Cote d'Ivoire.
5. (C) Should the Ivoirian peace process falter for want of
UNSC backing, France would be driven to face hard choices,
Girardin observed, particularly with regard to the 4,000 or
so French soldiers deployed in Cote d'Ivoire under Operation
Licorne. France was entering its own election season, which
would be in full swing by January 2007. Faced by civil war
in Cote d'Ivoire, the French public would inevitably
scrutinize Operation Licorne, criticize it as ineffectual,
and question its 250 million euro annual budget given other
military commitments, notably in Lebanon. Withdrawal of
Operation Licorne would be a real possibility, she feared,
and UNOCI would be unable to pick up the slack.
6. (C) Comment: This was the first time the Ambassador has
been formally convoked by the French Government during his
tenure in France.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON