FRANCE CONFIRMS TO S/CRS HERBST THAT IT HAS NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 007101

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR S/CRS OSCAR DE SOTO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MOPS FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE CONFIRMS TO S/CRS HERBST THAT IT HAS NO
EQUIVALENT ORGANIZATION


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1
.4 B/D


1. (C) Summary: October 19, visiting S/CRS Ambassador John
Herbst met with both working and senior-level French
counterparts to share the USG experience in establishing a
central coordinating office for reconstruction and
stabilization activities and to encourage creation of a
similar structure within the French bureaucracy. While the
French appreciated a frank discussion of the process of
establishing such an office and defining its role, most noted
that their own internal discussions on military-civilian

cooperation were still far from achieving consensus.
Ambassador Herbst was accompanied by OSD DAS for Stability
Operations Jeffrey Nadaner for the first meeting with MFA IO
Director Sylvia Bermann, during which Bermann asserted that
France did not need such coordination capability, adding that
France relies primarily on EU capabilities for dealing with
countries in post-conflict situations, although France has
created bilateral stabilization and reconstruction projects
in Africa (DRC and elsewhere) via the French RECAMP program
and more recently in Lebanon (police training.) Other areas
of concern for France include how best to handle Darfur,
possibly with AU and Arab countries' intervention with
Sudanese President Bashir, the DRC (the EU's ESDP mission in
support of elections) and Haiti. End summary.


2. (C) On October 19, S/CRS Ambassador John Herbst,
accompanied by S/CRS Office Director Oscar de Soto, S/CRS
Diplomatic Strategy Advisor Martha Patterson, and DAS Nadaner
met with MFA IO Director Sylvie Bermann and representatives
from other MFA offices (see para 7). Ambassador Herbst began
with an informal overview of the USG's experience in
establishing the State Department Office of Stabilization and
Reconstruction. He noted that initial interagency
disagreements had slowed the start-up of the office, but that
he now had a staff of 68 people, soon to grow to 80 and
representing a variety of government agencies, which is
working on training, crisis management planning and
implementing projects in the field. Ambassador Herbst noted
that S/CRS does not have its own budget from Congress, but
that the Department of Defense had received Congressional
authority in both FY 2006 and 2007 to transfer to S/CRS up to
100 million USD per year in funds to them for special
projects.

France Favors the EU Approach
--------------


3. (C/NF) Bermann observed that France does not have a
separate organization akin to S/CRS, but relied on
coordination among the French military, the MFA Office of
Cooperation and Development (AID-equivalent),the MFA EU
Directorate, her own International Organizations bureau and
the office of Ambassador Wiltzer, High Representative for
Security and the Prevention of Conflicts. (Note: C/NF: an
MFA contact in the Political Director's office described
Wiltzer's position as a sinecure, with sufficient perquisites
to ease him out of his previous post as Minister-Delegate for
Cooperation, Development and Francophonie, and to dissuade
him from seeking a Senate seat in his home district of
L'Essonne that the UMP party had reserved for Serge Dassault.
End Note) Bermann stated that France often prefers that the
EU assist countries in a post-conflict situation, although
there are occasional differences in priorities between the
Commission and European Security and Defense Policy organs.
At the national level, French stabilization efforts are
handled ad-hoc by various ministries, depending on response
needs and competencies, with the military normally taking the
initial lead.


4. (C) Bermann related that the GOF maintained a data base
of retired military and other specialists working in the
private sector, who can be mobilized to handle emergencies,
such as disaster relief. Their employers, often in public
sector industries, have no problem letting these individuals
go for the duration of a crisis. She also commented that her
IO office often has the lead on crisis management and
stabilization, given that many relief and assistance efforts
fall under a UN mandate. The MFA is keen on improving the
current response system, and has looked into the idea of
forming a situation center, but wishes to avoid the creation
of a new bureaucracy. (Comment: the MFA had previously
flagged to us that an inability to fund new positions was a
key reason for MFA wariness of USG calls to establish an
S/CRS counterpart. End Comment)

French interest in Africa: DRC, Darfur
--------------


5. (C) Bermann briefly described the work of France's RECAMP
program (Reinforcement of African Peace-keeping Capacities),
a joint MFA and MOD program originally designed to develop
the military capacity of African armed forces, but which now
includes a stabilization component, as well as exercises.
She explained that in addition to focusing many of its
bilateral training efforts for African nations through
RECAMP, France seeks to convince its EU partners to channel
EU training assistance through the RECAMP program. With
regard to other efforts in the region, Bermann and Ambassador
Herbst agreed that the UN Peacebuilding Commission would face
problems similar to those encountered by France and the U.S.
Bermann suggested that the Peacebuilding Commission would
have a difficult time based on the small budget allocated to
deal with problems in Burundi and Sierra Leone, two countries
also chosen as recipients for EU aid. Looking ahead, she
told Ambassador Herbst that the DRC and Haiti are two fragile
states that are in need of reconstruction assistance. She
added that, more recently, France had undertaken to provide
police training assistance in Lebanon.


6. (C) In response to Ambassador Herbst's query, Bermann
explained that the EU military mission in support of MONUC in
DRC had been envisioned as a security operation only for the
duration of the election process. Unfortunately, security
problems are ongoing and the possibility exists that the EU's
ESDP mission, in consultation with the UN's DPKO, will need
to be extended. Germany may pose a problem, Bermann
confided, given that the German parliament would need to
bless any decision to extend the German component, who are
scheduled to de-mobilize in November.


7. (C) Turning to the UN mission in Darfur, Bermann stated
the international community would need to obtain Sudanese
President Bashir's support. We will need to reassure him
that we are not promoting regime change, but are looking to
support AMIS Plus, she added. To make progress with Bashir,
we also will need the help of Egypt and other Arab countries.
Bermann explained that the AU and some Arab countries
believe it is still possible to obtain Bashir's concurrence.
In response to Ambassador Herbst's question on whether France
would intervene should the killing intensify, Bermann would
only note that this would depend on the situation and whether
it could be termed "genocide," which implied an obligation to
intervene.


8. (U) French Participants in Ambassador Herbst meeting with
Sylvie Bermann:

-- General Jacques Bonningues, MFA representative from the
Office of the High Representative for Security and the
Prevention of Conflicts.

-- Michel Gardas, representative from the same office.

-- Paul Dahan, PDAS-equivalent for the MFA's Strategic
Affairs, Security, and Disarmament Directorate.

-- Florian Escudie, Desk officer in the same Directorate.

-- Benoit Guidee, Desk officer in the MFA's IO Directorate.

-- Lt.Col. Benoit Semur, representative from the MFA's
Directorate for Military and Defense Cooperation.

Actual Projects in the Field
--------------


9. (C) At a separate meeting hosted by the MFA's Policy
Planning office with representatives from the MFA, MOD, and
the Secretariat General for National Defense (SGDN) from the
PM's office, Ambassador Herbst briefed attendees on S/CRS,
noting the office writes exercises and country plans and
conducts joint exercises with DOD. With the use of the 10
million USD from DOD in FY06, S/CRS had created projects for
de-mining and for building up police capabilities in Lebanon.
Other projects under consideration in FY07 include enhancing
police capabilities in Haiti. The S/CRS office had already
deployed people "on the ground" in places as varied as Nepal,
Beirut, Sudan and Chad and in Haiti. Once people see the
value they can add, S/CS is often requested to extend their
deployments. He also described the S/CRS office "Active
Response Corps," a group of 12 experts currently available to
deploy abroad within one or two days; four of whom have

already been sent to Darfur to assist. The Office also has
developed a "Standby Response Corps" of 300 Foreign Service
officers and recent retirees who have agreed to be deployed
to a trouble spot when needed. Together they form the
pre-cursor to a larger civilian reserve corps, assuming that
Congress agrees to provide the necessary funding.

Goals for the Future



10. (C) To a very receptive audience at the Policy Planning
office, eager to learn from S/CRS's experiences, Ambassador
Herbst laid out the progress made to date and described
several goals that he would like to see S/CRS achieve during
the next 18 months. These include S/CRS obtaining its own
budget and further establishing its role as an interagency
coordinator with the capability to frame issues for decision
at a PCC-level. S/CRS would like to build up a civilian
reserve corps to provide a ready supply of civilian experts
(such as economists, judges, police, water experts and
others) who are prepared to deploy for short-term assignments
in post-crisis areas. More long-term, he noted completion of
a study on how to structure and manage a grander program
which could be modeled on that of the U.S. Army Reserves. He
offered to share the study with the French if they were
interested in seeing how such a concept could be developed
and implemented.

Establishing an International Network
--------------


11. (C) Ambassador Herbst said that he had traveled to, or
met with, interested counterparts in London, Brussels (EU and
NATO) and Berlin, and that he believed that an international
understanding was developing that could support similar
coordination efforts in other countries. There is as yet no
international consensus on what form stabilization and
reconstruction efforts could take, but there is large
agreement within the foreign policy community that civilian
efforts are as important as military ones. He noted that all
the countries in Europe have the ability to develop further
their stabilization and reconstruction capabilities, and that
it is within our common interest to share our experiences and
develop contacts with each other.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) France clearly has not made and is not seeking to
make much progress in developing an independent RS capacity.
Sylvie Bermann's policy-level meeting highlighted the
different approaches French agencies have taken to date,
implying a reluctance by these agencies to cede
responsibility to a new organization. By contrast, the
working level group assembled at the French MFA's policy
planning center (CAP) appeared more engaged on setting up a
focused reconstruction and stabilization program. They
agreed that threats today could only be partially defended
against through traditional military action and that failed
states, extremist ideologies and loose control of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) also needed to be addressed in new
ways. They were pleased that the USG model supported close
cooperation with the UN and other international bodies
(including NGOs). End comment.


13. (U) This message was reviewed and cleared by S/CRS
Ambassador Herbst.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
HOFMANN