EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES NEXT STEPS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 007057

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL FR GG RS NATO EU KDEM MARR
SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES NEXT STEPS ON
GEORGIA-RUSSIA, FROZEN CONFLICTS WITH MFA DEPUTY POLITICAL
DIRECTOR

REF: PARIS 6179

Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Visiting EUR DAS Bryza and EUR/CARC
Conflicts Advisor Crosby met with newly arrived MFA Deputy
Political Director and A/S-equivalent for non-EU Europe
October 24 to exchange views -- in advance of Georgian FM
Bezhuashvili's November 7 visit to Paris -- on next steps on
Russia-Georgia relations and the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Bryza reviewed U.S. efforts to
de-escalate Georgia-Russia tensions in light of U.S. concerns
that Russia might be tempted to exploit language in the UNSCR
on UNOMIG, and bad blood more generally, to goad the Abkhaz
into immediate aggression. Noting that there were signs that
the situation was calming somewhat, he nonetheless judged it
all but inevitable that Moscow would cut off gas supplies to
Georgia in the winter, and both sides agreed that a Kosovo
settlement would provide a further test of Russian
intentions. Bryza encouraged the French not to let
themselves be intimidated by the Russians and urged them to
work with the U.S. to internationalize the frozen conflicts
issue, proposing a way forward consisting of
confidence-building measures (CBMs) designed to de-isolate
the Abkhaz, improve the situation on the ground in Gali, and
monitor the Roki tunnel separating North and South Ossetia.
Further on the diplomatic front, Bryza proposed using the
upcoming OSCE Ministerial and the January Friends meeting to
increase pressure on Russia and raise the costs of Russian
intransigence. The French appeared largely receptive to U.S.
ideas, and spoke in favor of using French-German-Russian
consultations and the EU Troika to engage critically with
Russia. Both sides agreed that the Russians were feeling
tough and comfortable, with Bryza underlining the challenge
the international community faces in convincing them that the
long-term costs of their intransigence outweigh the
short-term benefits. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Visiting EUR DAS Matt Bryza and EUR/CARC Conflicts
Advisor John Crosby met October 24 with newly arrived MFA
Deputy Political Director Veronique Bugens-Barre and
A/S-equivalent for non-EU Europe Jean-Francois Terral to
discuss latest developments in Georgia-Russia relations.
Terral was joined by DAS-equivalent for the Caucasus and
Central Asia Aurelia Bouchez, French Ambassador to Tbilisi
Philippe Lefort, French Minsk Group Co-Chair Bernard Fassier
and Caucasus desk officer Marie DuMoulin. PolMC and POL
Deputy accompanied Bryza and Crosby.

UNOMIG Renewal and U.S.-Russia Discussions
--------------

3. (C) Terral noted at the outset that Georgian FM
Bezhuashvili would be visiting Paris on November 7 and that
he wanted to exchange ideas with the U.S. in advance of the
meeting, taking into account the results of the Secretary's
recent visit to Moscow. Bryza responded that the subject of
Georgia had figured predominantly on the agenda during the
Secretary's, A/S Fried's, and his own recent meetings with

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Russian officials. He highlighted in particular paragraph 3
language of the recent UNSC Resolution on the renewal of the
UNOMIG mandate -- during the negotiation of which the U.S.
had been abandoned by its allies -- and the U.S. concern that
the Russians might exploit the resolution as a pretext to
encourage Abkhaz aggression -- a concern that was all the
more real for the fact that the Abkhaz themselves had
approached the U.S. to say that they were coming under
intense Russian pressure to initiate action. Moreover, the
UNSCR language had to be interpreted against the backdrop of
the domestic Russian campaign against resident Georgians and
sent a wrong signal.

Need for De-Escalation between Russia and Georgia
-------------- --------------

4. (C) Bryza described the U.S. objective of attempting to
persuade the Russians to urge restraint with the Abkhaz and
South Ossetians while convincing the Georgians that they
should do everything in their power to avoid a military
confrontation with likely disastrous consequences. The key
now was to de-escalate the situation. He judged there was
some evidence the Russian MFA was beginning to realize Russia
had gone too far domestically in persecuting resident
Georgians and that it was time to ratchet down a potentially
dangerous dynamic. Militarily, there were signs the Russians
were withdrawing troops from the border and reducing their
naval patrols. The Russians had made clear, however, that
under no circumstances did they intend to lift their economic
sanctions against Georgia. Abkhazia's request to join the
Russian Federation and the upcoming South Ossetian referendum

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were grounds for additional concern, although it now appeared
that the Russians were waiting to see what happens with
Kosovo. It was critical to convince the Russians that an
outbreak of hostilities could be disastrous for the entire
region, including Russia.


5. (C) The U.S., Bryza said, was also working to persuade
Georgia to be less provocative, without calling into question
its basic right to protect its own territorial integrity. On
the positive side of the ledger, Georgian President
Saakashvili was now focused on the danger in the current
situation and his rhetoric had toned down accordingly: he now
said openly that war was not desirable, though clearly the
Georgians would have to defend themselves if attacked, while
recognizing they would lose. Saakashvili had also told Bryza
that now was not the time to continue to insist on the
withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces. Bryza said there
was reason to hope that this Georgian restraint would provide
the basis for similar restraint on the Russian side when it
came to recognition of Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia. The
problem was that this was only a short-term solution; over
the longer term, it would be necessary to begin working
toward a political settlement. The Russians favored
maintaining the status quo, but this must not be allowed to
persist indefinitely.

Worries about Kosovo Linkage
--------------

6. (C) Terral agreed that de-escalation was the right word
and the right strategy. He stated that France also had
initially opposed the Russian-drafted language on Georgian
actions in the UNSCR, which Russia had tabled in
contravention of the understandings reached with the other
Friends of Georgia during meetings in Berlin. Unfortunately,
he clarified, the language of the UN report citing Georgia
for violations of past agreements had pulled the rug out from
under France's feet, and convinced it that accepting the
language was the only way to guarantee the extension of the
UNOMIG mandate. Acknowledging that this had caused tensions
with the U.S., he argued that the UNSR was still "90 percent"
good. The question was what to do next. He was especially
concerned about the linkages the Russians were beginning to
make between Georgia and Kosovo. A Russian expert had told
him that Moscow intended "to ask for the bill" for Kosovo on
Georgia, and the Slovak PolDir had heard separately that the
bill involved "something on Georgia and NATO." Bugens-Barre
added that the Russian PolDir had suggested that Russia
"would not forget" French actions on Georgia when it
considered next steps on Iran.

Dealing with Russia
--------------

7. (C) Bryza, citing an adage about Soviet FM Gromyko, noted
FM Lavrov's crowing "victory" following the UNOMIG renewal
but said it was nonetheless important not to allow oneself to
be intimidated by the Russians. Terral agreed that Russian
attempts at horsetrading were not acceptable, but said he
also did not want to jeopardize Kosovo (in which he is
personally very invested). A calibrated approach was needed,
he judged. Bryza countered that the international community
had effectively rewarded Russia for dangerous behavior and
said it was time go on the diplomatic offensive. The problem
with the resolution was that it was based on the presumption
that Georgian actions were unjustified; while it was true
that the Georgians may have violated certain agreements, it
was important not to forget the broader principle of their
right to protect the territorial integrity of Georgia.
Noting that the Russians themselves chronically complained
about UNOMIG, he suggested using discussions of the next
mandate extension to put the onus on the Russians to save
UNOMIG. In the meanwhile, it would be important to focus on
other ways and means to address the region's security needs.


8. (C) Terral commented that, by any measure, the picture of
Russia was darkening. Returning to Bryza's earlier remarks
about Russian intentions, he asked whether Russia would cut
off gas to Georgia in the winter. Bryza responded that a
cut-off was inevitable, adding that the Russians were also
threatening to reduce the volume of their trade with
Azerbaijan by whatever amount of energy reached Georgia from
Azerbaijan through Turkey. He said Georgia was now looking
to Iran for gas, but that it would also have to rely on
burning fuel oil for electricity. Much of the expensive
conversion required to do so had already been accomplished
with American assistance. On the diplomatic side, he said it
would be incumbent on the Euroatlantic community to respond
to any cut-off of gas to Azerbaijan or Turkey. The best way
to accomplish that would be to accuse Gazprom, publicly if

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necessary, of being an unreliable partner, as the Russians
were very sensitive to such a charge. Terral agreed that
this was a potential card to play.

De-Isolating Abkhazia
--------------

9. (C) Terral asked for Bryza's judgment as to whether
Russia would risk recognizing the independence of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Noting that not all Abkhaz were delighted
with the Russian embrace, he wondered if this could be used
to advantage. Bryza responded that it would be in everyone's
interest to devise confidence-building measures (CBMs) to try
to de-isolate the Abkhaz and show them they had other
options. The U.S., he said, had come close to granting a
visa to the Abkhaz "FM" to visit the UN, and might have
agreed had Russia not reneged on its commitments on the
UNOMIG resolution. But the U.S. would be prepared to move on
another, more constructive, occasion. Terral asked about the
possibilities for dialogue with the Abkhaz. Bryza responded
that there were not only political but also commercial
options that could be used; Abkhazia should be opened up to
trade with Turkey and through it the EU. Terral asked if
this was acceptable to Saakashvili; Bryza affirmed that it
was. Lefort commented that the trick would be to hold a
dialogue in a forum not "supervised" by the Russians. Bryza
agreed that the FOG format could be useful and suggested that
the Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey might also have a role.

Moving on Gali
--------------

10. (C) Terral asked if there were other tracks. Bryza
pointed to the economic needs assessment undertaken in South
Ossetia and said the UN could undertake similar CBMs in Gali.
Noting that the findings of the fact-finding mission of the
Friends had differed significantly from those of the UN, he
suggested a second Friends' mission. Other possible measures
might include the establishment of a human rights office, a
small police training operation, and a survey of the needs of
IDPs returning to the region. Finally, in discussions of
police training and international peacekeeping, it would be
important to get the idea across that peacekeeping missions
were generally more successful when adjoining countries did
not participate directly. Bouchez asked if the GUAM offered
a possibility for diversifying the CIS peacekeeping force,
with Bryza responding affirmatively. Terral wondered whether
this would be acceptable to Russia. Bryza responded that
they would probably object, but that it was nonetheless
important to try, if only to raise the cost to the Russians
of blocking.

Turning the Tables
--------------

11. (C) Terral asked about next steps. Bryza responded that
it was time to internationalize Abkhazia and South Ossetia in
order to put pressure on Russia, starting with the OSCE
Ministerial and then in the January Friends' meeting. Bryza
continued that the OSCE Ministerial could be used to push for
joint monitoring of the Roki tunnel against smuggling of
contraband, establishment of an OSCE observer post at the
junction of a road bypassing the Roki tunnel (which Lefort
said fell within the geographic zone of the OSCE's area of
responsibility),and the creation of economic incentives to
channel trade through the tunnel. Terral did not disagree
but said his memory of OSCE ministerials was painful. While
he found the ideas interesting, he advised caution in raising
them with the Russians, perhaps through smaller formats in
advance of the Ministerial. He was pessimistic the Russians
would respond positively, but it was important to try.
Evincing more optimism, Fassier pointed out that the Russians
had been intimidating others with the threat of Abkhaz
independence since 1994; it was important to point out that
this could also backfire against them throughout the region
and in Russia itself. Bouchez noted that the upcoming South
Ossetian referendum might provide an occasion to make the
point.

French Interest in Trilateral Format
--------------

12. (C) Terral noted that bilateral channels would also be
important. The U.S. had its own channels with Russia, and
France was interested in raising Georgia within the framework
of regular trilateral France-Germany-Russia consultations.
He welcomed the recent demarche in Moscow by the EU Troika,
and speculated that the EU might also be more active in this
regard during the German EU presidency the first half of 2007.

Short and Long Term
--------------

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13. (C) Terral was not in a position to offer a detailed
readout of the EU informal dinner with Putin at Lahti.
Noting only that Putin had been tough and was feeling
comfortable, he speculated that the Russians were only
looking at the short term. Bryza agreed, citing soaring
Russian infrastructure needs that were being left
unaddressed. He stressed again the importance of convincing
the Russians that the short-term benefits of their continuing
intransigence would be outweighed by the long-term costs.
Terral agreed, concluding that this was a message that needed
to continue to be passed at the highest levels.


14. (U) DAS Bryza did not have an opportunity to clear this
message.


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