SCENESETTER FOR NSA HADLEY'S NOVEMBER 3-4 VISIT TO

S E C R E T PARIS 007024

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL FR NATO KNNP IR IZ LE SY IS RS GG
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR NSA HADLEY'S NOVEMBER 3-4 VISIT TO
PARIS

Classified By: DCM Karl Hofmann for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) When you meet him, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne's focus
will be on some of the same subjects that are currently
preoccupying us: Iran, Syria/Lebanon and NATO (global
partnerships, Afghanistan.) We would expect MGM to be in his
usual cooperative, problem-solving mode on the first two,
where are perspectives largely coincide. Our differences
over NATO's role continue to translate into French resistance
to U.S. initiatives. Even more worrying, there is the
possibility Chirac's increasingly pessimistic prognosis for
Afghanistan may trigger a gradual French disengagement there.


2. (C) MGM operates in a peculiar domestic context. All
attention is fixed on the leading contenders for the
Presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy and Segolene Royal. Chirac,
although he claims not to have ruled out running again next
year, is a lame duck whose popularity and authority has only
marginally rebounded from the historically low levels reached
early this past summer. Despite his political eclipse,
Chirac remains dominant on foreign policy. There are no
institutional checks and balances, either within the
bureaucracy, or across France's other branches of government,
that permit a challenge to the policy direction set by the
Presidency. Nor is there much campaign discussion or
criticism of Chirac's policies. All of that puts MGM in a
position of unusual influence, making all the more valuable
the relationship you have developed with him.


3. (C) Given your ongoing telephonic dialogue with him, you
will have a much better feel than we for MGM's views on next
steps on Iran. We offer here, however, broad assessments of
where the French are on Iran and the other key issues that
will likely make up your meeting agenda, including also
Russia and Georgia. Iraq looms in the background.


4. (S) Iran: As you know, France has been among the most
steadfast on the Iranian nuclear issue, largely owing to
Chirac's profound mistrust of Iran (and Shia generally) and
his refusal to countenance the possibility of Iran as a
nuclear power. Chirac does differ with us over sanctions.
He has long opposed them, reflecting French energy and
commercial interests. This opposition is dressed up as a
matter of principle (sanctions simply don't work: if they
are too broad they become politically counterproductive, if
they are too fine-tuned they don't have bite). In the case of
Iran, Chirac has been prepared to make an exception. But he
will continue to be wary of anything too ambitious, and will
stress the need for UNSC consensus. Chirac's call, on the
eve of his UNGA visit, for synchronized suspension of Iranian
enrichment activities and UN consideration of sanctions was
testimony to a continuing over-riding priority: finding a
diplomatic solution to the current impasse. Israel's
"disproportionate" response to Hizballah surprised and
spooked the French, alarmed by a possible lowering of
Israel's threshold for action against Iran itself. Although
the GOF has not responded to a recent Iranian suggestion
calling for an international consortium for enrichment in
Iran, we do not believe they have ruled out the idea
completely.


5. (C) Syria-Lebanon: Our solidarity with France on Lebanon
and Syria remains strong, and is the vital lubricant that
facilitates cooperation on the broad range of our interests
in the Middle East. The French share our interest in
supporting PM Siniora, agree that we must help him fend off
the current effort by Hizballah and General Aoun to undermine
his government, and recognize that the implementation of
UNSCR 1701 is critical to Lebanon,s stability now and in the
future. But we do not always see eye to eye on how to make
progress within that framework, and the French remain
allergic to the idea of coordinating our security assistance
to the LAF. Moreover, the deployment of French peacekeepers
has created a dynamic that increasingly threatens to pit
France,s interest in minimizing the vulnerability of its
soldiers against Israel,s interest in maximizing pressure on
Hizballah to disarm. The clearest manifestation of this
inherent tension was President Chirac,s call for Israel to
end its violations of Lebanese airspace, but it is also
visible in the Quai,s eagerness to resolve the status of the
Sheba,a Farms in Lebanon,s favor, something you have often
heard MGM discuss. In short, the French see Israeli
compliance with UNSCR 1701 as the path of least resistance to
establishing UNIFIL,s credibility and strengthening PM
Siniora. Our challenge will be to keep the French focused on
the far more critical questions of disarming Hizballah and
enforcing the arms embargo.


6. (C) Syria: The French will likely probe for evidence of
any softening of the U.S. position. They are intensely
interested in the comments former Secretary Baker has made
about the utility of talking to one,s enemies, and are

alarmed by the notion that the confluence of U.S. interests
with respect to Iraq, Iran and the Palestinians may lead to a
re-thinking of our Syria policy. Any reassurance you can
give will be helpful.


7. (C) Iraq: While the French have become more pragmatic
about Iraq, Chirac firmly believes that subsequent events
have vindicated his opposition to the war ) and we see
little prospect of any substantive French commitment to Iraq
during the remainder of his presidency. The good news:
President Talabani is expected here on November 2; the French
will almost certainly attend the signing ceremony for the
Iraq Compact; and the French have not evinced any interest in
complicating the extension of the UN mandate for Coalition
Forces in Iraq.


8. (C) NATO: As noted, France and the U.S. do not see
eye-to-eye on two major issues for the Riga Summit -- Global
Partnership and Afghanistan. On partnership, the main French
concern seems to be a theological one -- that the U.S. has in
mind an overly-formalized, U.S-led set of global
partnerships. On Afghanistan, we are concerned that Chirac's
belief that Afghanistan is heading in the wrong direction --
and therefore will not permit French forces to be deployed in
the south and east -- could turn into a self-fulfilling
prophecy that the French would then use to call NATO a
failure.


9. (C) Russia (and Georgia): French officials understand
that Russia is heading down the wrong path but are reluctant
to be tough with the Russians, given memories of Russia's
shared opposition to the Iraq war and Russia's increasingly
hefty energy influence. Hiding behind the EU, they tried to
stall on NATO Intensified Dialogue for Georgia as long as
possible. They are deeply concerned that independence for
Kosovo could impel Russia to support the same for Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON