MFA A/S-EQUIVALENT PESSIMISTIC ON TURKEY-EU TRAIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 006946

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - WORD CORRECTED OTHER SECTIONS ADDED

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL FR EU TU CY PGOV RS ENRG ETRD
SUBJECT: MFA A/S-EQUIVALENT PESSIMISTIC ON TURKEY-EU TRAIN
WRECK, RUSSIA

REF: A. ANKARA 6037

B. ANKARA 5976

C. PARIS POINTS OF 10/20/06

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Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA A/S-equivalent for European Union
affairs Gilles Briatta told us October 20 that Turkey understood
that the French National Assembly's passage of legislation
criminalizing denial of the Armenian "genocide" was only a
first parliamentary step, and that Turkey had managed the
issue responsibly in a way to avoid, at least for the time
being, any lasting damage to bilateral relations. That said,
this and other issues such as Turkey-Cyprus were increasingly
susceptible to electoral -- read, nationalist --
interpretations in all three countries and were limiting
governments' margins for maneuver. Briatta was pessimistic
that the EU would succeed in avoiding a "train wreck" on the
November 8 report on Turkish implementation of its Ankara
Protocol obligations, although he held out the possibility of
"failure with hope" that would demonstrate that progress was
still possible, and argued that achieving a "temporary"
agreement was not an insurmountable challenge per se. He
foresaw several scenarios in the event of failure, from
freezing of current chapters under discussion to complete
suspension of accession negotiations for an unspecified
period; France would support a "reaction," although he said
it had not yet determined what that should be.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONT: Briatta predicted that the EU's
current enlargement fatigue would persist, believed a "mini"
treaty on institutional reforms might still be possible by
the end of the 2008 French presidency (and that France would
want to move quickly),and saw energy policy -- probably
through small coalitions of like-minded member states -- as
the next EU policy frontier. In that regard, he asserted
that Russia remained "the vital issue" for Europe, while
lamenting the near-impossibility of member states' finding
consensus on almost any issue affecting Russia. END SUMMARY.

Turkish reaction to Armenian "genocide" legislation
-------------- --------------

3. (C) MFA A/S-equivalent for European Affairs Gilles
Briatta began the October 20 meeting with PolMC and POL
Deputy by indicating that he had traveled to Ankara October
10 to inform the Turks that the National Assembly with
near-certainty would vote to approve legislation
criminalizing denial of the Armenian "genocide." At the same
time, he had sought to reassure them that this was only a
first step, and that prospects for passage by the Senate were
far less certain. Although the Turks had responded with
"execrable humor," Briatta was pleased that they had so far
taken no concrete retaliatory steps, thanks largely to the
deft management of FM Gul, who had been careful to use the
"conditional" tense with respect to potential future
retaliatory measures in the event of final passage of the
legislation. Briatta believed that the worst was over for
the time being.

A domestic and foreign-policy issue
--------------

4. (C) Briatta noted the GOF's genuine concern, shared by
French companies who are heavily invested in Turkey, about
the damage to bilateral relations that would ensue if the law
were promulgated -- mainly retaliation against French
businesses. But the Armenian community had proved far more
effective than business in lobbying parliamentarians (he
complained that business engaged only after the law had been
passed); above all, French deputies were preoccupied with
their reelection prospects in the upcoming presidential and
legislative elections and were reluctant to alienate half a
million voters. Briatta expressed some confidence that the
Senate, which he said traditionally attached more importance
to protection of freedom of expression, would take a dimmer
view of criminalizing denial of the "genocide." He indicated
there was also a possibility that the Constitutional Council
would find the legislation, at least as currently written,
unconstitutional. If the Council did become involved,
however, this would carry with it the risk that the existing
law criminalizing denial of the Holocaust might also be
overturned, a potential outcome of much more gravity to the
degree that it would touch on France's attempts to come to
terms with its own history. PolMC asked, in such a
circumstance, whether the Constitutional Council would
question only the criminalization of denial of the Holocaust
and/or Armenian "genocide", or go so far as to rule
unconstitutional the laws recognizing the two. Briatta
responded that, while both outcomes were possible, he judged

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that only the criminalization legislation would be affected.

Pessmistic on avoiding a "train wreck"
--------------

5. (C) Returning to Turkey, Briatta expressed satisfaction
that, in this "delicate phase," Turkey had so far lived up to
its European aspirations by reacting responsibly -- although
this could change after November 8. Asked if this were
grounds for optimism that a "train wreck" on Turkey-Cyprus
could be avoided, however, Briatta judged there were only
very meager chances that an agreement among the different
parties, based on the Finnish proposals, would be reached.
He noted that, although Brussels had that same day approved
assistance to northern Cyprus, five-six member states had
voted against the package. And while France had in this
instance voted for/for the assistance, this did not change
the fact that there were all kinds of "baroque" legal
situations that inevitably stemmed from Turkey's illegal
occupation of the northern part of the island. To cite an
example, France had supported Cypriot attempts to block EU
funding for "public property" projects in Northern Cyprus, on
the grounds that, in the strict legal sense, public property
was tied to recognized governments.


6. (C) PolMC asked whether the Cypriots appreciated the
strategic importance of keeping Turkey engaged with Europe
and not closing the door completely. Briatta responded by
regretting that increasingly -- in Turkey and Cyprus, but
also in France -- national views were being driven by
domestic electoral considerations. That said, he believed
that Cypriot President Papadopoulos might be willing to allow
others to restrain him (for example, "the UK made me do it"),
and that Turkish PM Erdogan was trying to be reasonable. But
one should never forget that, deep down, the Cypriots
continued to view the Turks as "the enemy" given the
continuing military occupation of the north. Moreover,
because Erdogan was mistrusted by the military, his own
margin of maneuver vis-a-vis was small in general and on
Cyprus in particular. Briatta judged that the tourism
potential of northern Cyprus for all of Cyprus once unified,
combined with the economic burden northern Cyprus represented
for Turkey, offered the only real, albeit small, incentives
for the Turks and Cypriots to compromise (in combination with
agreement to open up its ports to Cypriot vessels).


7. (C) PolMC asked what would follow after November 8 in the
event there was no agreement. Briatta responded that both
sides would resort to their customary "blame game." The
reality was that each side was already focused on determining
how best to shift responsibility for failure to the other,
and both fully expected that the feared collision would
occur. They were reacting to the Finnish proposals
positively enough only to demonstrate that they were acting
in good faith, but nothing more. The only alternative he saw
to complete failure was "failure with hope," i.e., something
small that would provide the Finns, Turks and Cypriots with a
fig leaf to claim that something -- he did not know what --
had started. Briatta said getting to an agreement was not
rocket science: all that was required would be, on a
temporary basis, for the Turks to open their ports while
Cyprus opened Famagusta and perhaps Ercan airport. Varosha
could be handed over to the Cypriots in stages. Where there
was a will, there was a way.

Suspension scenarios
--------------

8. (C) Asked what would happen to accession negotiations in
the event of failure, Briatta said there were a number of
possible scenarios: one would be to suspend three chapters in
the customs area (since they implicitly covered the ports
issue); another would be to extend the freeze to agriculture
and even industry (where he said the Turks had effectively
achieved EU standards); a third outcome would be to suspend
negotiations altogether, either for a shorter or a longer
period. Anticipating PolMC's question, Briatta said France
itself did not yet have a position; however, when we noted in
the light of French positions of the recent past that it was
likely to be severe, Briatta acknowledged that a reaction
would not be lacking. That said, "no one" in the EU wanted a
rupture in relations with Turkey, especially while Turkey was
participating in UNIFIL.

Risks for France-Turkey relations
--------------

9. (C) Briatta lamented that a suspension in accession
negotiations would likely damage France-Turkey relations,
notwithstanding the GOF's abiding interest in a strong, close
relationship. Evoking France's long history of good

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relations with Turkey, he stated that French and Turkish
foreign policy "visions" were compatible, for instance on
Iraq. Unfortunately, the French people were opposed to
Turkish accession, and opening accession talks had led to new
problems. The mutual attraction of yesteryear was being
replaced with mutual suspicion; Turks were becoming convinced
that the French "did not like them" any longer. Briatta
regretted that France had disappointed Turkey, adding that
France had an almost unrivalled cultural and business
presence there that would take others "billions of dollars
and about ten years" to duplicate. France had a lot to lose,
especially with Turkish elites. Asked how Chirac was viewed,
Briatta responded that the Turks had been surprised by
Chirac's call while in Armenia for Turkish recognition of the
"genocide," but that they generally recognized his
contribution to good bilateral relations and harbored no
animosity toward him personally.

EU institutional reforms
--------------

10. (C) Asked how the EU would confront its institutional
challenges over the next couple of years, Briatta referred to
the first-half 2007 and last-half 2008 German and French
presidencies and said France would want to move quickly after
its May 2007 presidential elections. Given the time
constraints involved, this suggested that, even if the
center-left won the elections, the government had little
choice but to proceed along the lines of Interior Minister
and leading center-right presidential candidate Sarkozy's
proposal for a "mini-treaty." Keeping the treaty small was
also necessary in order to avoid having to submit it to
ratification by popular referendum in France, where the
results would be the same as in May 2005. While calling
achievement of an agreement on a mini-treaty "not
impossible," Briatta was nonetheless pessimistic that it
could be ratified quickly. The UK wanted nothing at present,
he said, and things would only get worse when Blair left.
Ratification would be delicate in France even by
parliamentary means. Europe had entered into a period of
aimlessness. Asked if the EU constitutional treaty were to
blame, Briatta responded that it only brought to the surface
what was already the case.

Enlargement pause here to stay
--------------

11. (C) Noting that the EU had decided to take a breather
away from enlargement, Briatta thought it significant that
Commission President Barroso of all people had proposed a
hiatus; this was not official Portuguese policy, he added.
But Barroso had only said aloud what everyone was thinking
quietly, and the fact that no voice had been raised to
contradict him was itself telling. The criterion of the EU's
absorptive capacity had taken hold across the EU and the
European Parliament, even if this could have potentially
negative implications for stabilizing the Balkans. Without
saying so directly, Briatta implied there would be no further
enlargements in the near future. (See also ref C discussion
of French attitudes toward the UK and Russia.)

Energy and Russia
--------------

12. (C) Briatta predicted that energy issues would take on
increasing importance in the EU. The crisis in Ukraine and
rising petroleum prices had served as a wake-up call for the
EU, although there was still no real common EU policy. He
described French views on energy as similar to those of the
UK, given their common interest in nuclear power, climate
change, and their significant energy company investments in
Russia. This was quite different from Germany, which had a
strategic agreement with Russia. Briatta expressed
understanding for the German position, noting that Germany
had no big oil companies, no access to reserves, and
therefore no choice. Moreover, German companies were in a
panic about the prospects for insufficient electricity
generation capacity when they shut down their nuclear plants
in five years. Briatta suggested that, given differences
among member states, energy policy would be coordinated
initially among small, like-minded groups of member-states.
He claimed this would actually be easy in the case of energy,
given that the only requirement was to satisfy EU competition
criteria.


13. (C) On Russia, Briatta repeated previous arguments that
how to deal with it "was the only vital question" for Europe.
Like it or not, he continued, "enlargement had put Russia at
the heart of Europe." That said, he lamented that no one
understood what it was that Russia wanted. Furthermore,
Russia was the "one" issue on which the EU was completely

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divided -- even more than on Iraq in 2003 -- because each
individual member state had its own history with and
interests in Russia. He contrasted French desires for an
alliance with the total mistrust of the Balts and the Poles.
He noted that it was an emotional and historical problem in
addition to a strategic one for nearly every member-state:
France remembered Russia as a liberator, whereas others saw
Russia as an oppressor.


14. (C) As the meeting concluded, Briatta reiterated French
interest in U.S.-Russian discussions on WTO accession.
Asserting that France would do things differently if it could
start over again with Russia on WTO, Briatta said he
suspected the U.S. felt similarly about China.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
HOFMANN