Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS6945
2006-10-20 17:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRENCH PRAGMATIC ON LEBANON, PEACE PROCESS

Tags:  FR PGOV PREL SY 
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Lucia A Keegan 10/23/2006 10:36:01 AM From DB/Inbox: Lucia A Keegan

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 06945

SIPDIS
cxparis:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: ODC AGR PAO AMB DAO ECON STRASBOU DCM FCS SCI
 ORA UNESCO

DISSEMINATION: POLOUT
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: POL/MC:JROSENBLATT
DRAFTED: POL:RWALLER
CLEARED: POL/D:BTURNER

VZCZCFRI445
OO RUEHC RUEHXK RUEHZL RUCNDT
DE RUEHFR #6945/01 2931701
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201701Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2402
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0942
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006945 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: FR PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: FRENCH PRAGMATIC ON LEBANON, PEACE PROCESS


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006945

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2016
TAGS: FR PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: FRENCH PRAGMATIC ON LEBANON, PEACE PROCESS


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: An authoritative contact at the French MFA
advocated a gradual elimination of Israeli overflights of
Lebanon, evinced interest in promoting Nabih Berri as an
alternative to Hizballah, and provided an update on French
thinking about an international conference on the Middle East
-- which the MFA sees as gaining little traction. End
summary.

Lebanon: General Satisfaction
--------------


2. (C) Poloff met Oct. 19 with Herve Besancenot, the MFA
DAS-equivalent for the Levant, who expressed satisfaction
that, generally speaking, implementation of UNSCR 1701 is
moving forward. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have
deployed in the south, UNIFIL has been strengthened, and the
arms embargo -- though far from being fully enforced along
the Lebanese-Syrian border -- is tighter than in the past
thanks to UNIFIL's maritime presence. "Who would've thought
six months ago that we would be where we are today?" mused
Besancenot.


3. (C) Nonetheless, much work remained to be done. Quickly
reviewing the Quai's litany of arguments on the need to end
Israel's "provocative" overflights of Lebanon (i.e.,
overflights violate Lebanon's sovereignty and the spirit of
UNSCR 1701, weaken public confidence in UNIFIL and in PM
Siniora, serve Hizballah's interests by providing a pretext
for avoiding disarmament, and may eventually provide a
pretext for a resumption of violence),Besancenot then struck
a more pragmatic note. Acknowledging Israel's legitimate
security concerns, he said overflights would have to be
phased out progressively, "even if that's not what the
Lebanese want to hear." To begin with, he suggested that
Israel could: 1) cease overflights of Beirut; 2) use drones
rather than F-16s for reconnaissance flights over southern
Lebanon; 3) make greater use of satellite imagery to meet its
reconnaissance needs. With respect to the possibility of
adding an aerial dimension to UNIFIL's mandate (i.e.,
"Air-UNIFIL"),Besancenot said the idea was worth considering
but said he foresaw technical and political objections. "It
still needs a lot of thought," he concluded.


4. (C) Besancenot disparaged an Italian-led EU initiative to

position border monitors on either side of the
Syrian-Lebanese border. "It's difficult to imagine that the
Syrians, who have already refused to allow UNIFIL to monitor
the border from the Lebanese side, would accept a European
presence on both sides," said Besancenot. Moreover, "when we
pressed the Italians for specifics, they said there would not
be any European monitors, just technical cooperation with the
Syrians," he said derisively, adding: "Technical cooperation
is all well and good, but what we need is a political
decision by the Syrian leadership." He said the MFA was
"saddened" that so many of their EU colleagues were persuaded
of the need to talk to Syria. Reeling off the names of EU
and UN leaders who have met with Syrian leaders in recent
months, Besancenot caustically observed that their meetings
had produced "nothing."

Lebanon's Internal Politics
--------------


5. (C) Noting that PM Siniora is under pressure from
Hizballah and from Michel Aoun to enlarge his cabinet,
Besancenot opined that letting Aoun into the government would
guarantee gridlock -- especially on anything related to the
Brammertz investigation. It was therefore essential to help
Siniora fend off those pressures without steering him into a
direct confrontation with Hizballah. Deploring the fact that
there were no obvious alternatives to Aoun's leadership
within the Christian community, Besancenot seemed intrigued
by the possibility of backing Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri
as an alternative to Hizballah. While acknowledging that
France had "second thoughts" about Berri on a personal level,
Besancenot nevertheless noted that Berri "can be useful" and
had played a helpful role in recent months as an intermediary
between PM Siniora and Hizballah's Sheikh Nasrallah. "Even
though Nasrallah looks like a victor to the Arab world right
now, the reality on the ground is very different. Hizballah
has suffered significantly, both politically and militarily,
and is being criticized even within Lebanese Shia circles,"
he said. Indeed, Besancenot said a possible silver lining to
the deplacement of nearly one million Shiites during the
course of this summer's fighting was that those Shiites who
fled their homes were exposed to a different way of life
inside their own country. "Many of them were amazed to see
that their was an alternative to living under Hizballah's
control," said Besancenot.

Reviving the Peace Process
--------------

6. (C) Turning to Israeli-Palestinian relations, Besancenot
said the Quai still believed a national unity government was
a good idea, although he admitted that Hamas' refusal to
accept the Quartet principles had led to an impasse. He
assessed that PA President Abbas was, characteristically,
having difficulty being decisive, while Fatah remained torn
by internal rivalries. The French still saw Prime Minister
Haniyeh as a pragmatist, albeit one who has no control over
Hamas's armed wing or over Khalid Mishal. The Quai did not
think the Palestinians were likely to find a way forward if
left to their own devices, and fear that a referendum on
whether to recognize Israel might actually fail, which would
be disastrous. Consequently, an outside impetus was needed
-- such as President Chirac,s proposal for an international
conference on the Middle East.


7. (C) Besancenot said that the French envisioned the
conference as an intermediary point between Phase I and Phase
II of the Roadmap, and intended for it to take place within
the context of the Quartet. However, they did not see it as
being bound by the Roadmap, and clearly hoped to use other
points of reference including the Clinton Parameters, the
Prisoner's Agreement, and the 2002 Beirut initiative to map
out the minimal guarantees both the Arabs and Israelis would
need on issues such as the status of Jerusalem and the right
of return for Palestinian refugees. Unfortunately, Chirac,s
proposal had not found traction with either the Palestinians
or the Israelis, although PA President Mahmoud Abbas
expressed polite interest in it. That fact, combined with
the French perception that conditions had deteriorated as a
result of Hamas, refusal to enter into a government of
national unity, meant the French had no plans at the moment
to try to schedule the conference. (Comment: We believe the
French proposal is going nowhere, although in deference to
Chirac the MFA will have to wait a decent amount of time
before admitting as much.)



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
HOFMANN