Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS6845
2006-10-17 14:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

CHIRAC'S AFRICA ADVISER ON UNSC ELECTIONS, DARFUR

Tags:  PREL PHUM UNSC SU IV FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1729
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHPA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #6845/01 2901412
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171412Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2262
INFO RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 1018
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA IMMEDIATE 0719
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0889
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 1092
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 1205
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0934
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006845 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
AF PASS SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC SU IV FR
SUBJECT: CHIRAC'S AFRICA ADVISER ON UNSC ELECTIONS, DARFUR
AND COTE D'IVOIRE

REF: A. PARIS 6651 B. 10/12 D'ELIA-ELDRIDGE E-MAIL C.

10/13 D'ELIA-ELDRIDGE E-MAIL D. PARIS 4448

E. 10/13 KANEDA-EMBASSY ABIDJAN E-MAIL F.
PARIS 6753 G. 10/13 PLUMB-D'ELIA E-MAIL

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann. Reasons 1.4b,d

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006845

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
AF PASS SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM UNSC SU IV FR
SUBJECT: CHIRAC'S AFRICA ADVISER ON UNSC ELECTIONS, DARFUR
AND COTE D'IVOIRE

REF: A. PARIS 6651 B. 10/12 D'ELIA-ELDRIDGE E-MAIL C.

10/13 D'ELIA-ELDRIDGE E-MAIL D. PARIS 4448

E. 10/13 KANEDA-EMBASSY ABIDJAN E-MAIL F.
PARIS 6753 G. 10/13 PLUMB-D'ELIA E-MAIL

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Karl Hofmann. Reasons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: DCM met with Presidential African Affairs
Counselor Michel de Bonnecorse on October 12 to follow up on
French advocacy with Francophone sub-Saharan Africans to
bolster the Security Council candidacy of Guatemala.
Bonnecorse confirmed his intervention with the AU President
and with Gabonese FM, while pledging to expand his outreach
efforts. On Darfur Bonnecorse reiterated French concerns
about potential destabilization of Central African Republic
(C.A.R.) and Chad. Bozize wanted UN forces on C.A.R.
territory but Deby had begun equivocating on interpositionary
forces in Chad. Bonnecorse recounted how Sudanese
Presidential Adviser Dr. Ghazi Salahuddin had urged a "third
way" between a UN deployment to Darfur under SCR 1706 and the
current African Union Mission. Bonnecorse called for
stepped-up pressure on Bashir to accept SCR 1706 and appealed
for USG efforts to modify the Egyptian position on Sudan. On
Cote d'Ivoire, Bonnecorse found the ECOWAS recommendations to
the AU to be better than the French had initially believed.
He lamented haphazard UNDP budgeting for the UN Elections
Representative Stoudmann, whose office was understaffed, and
appealed for budgeting directly from the UN. End Summary.


2. (C) DCM and Africa Watcher met with Presidential African
Affairs Counselor Michel de Bonnecorse on October 12 to
follow up on French advocacy with Francophone sub-Saharan
Africans to bolster the Security Council candidacy of
Guatemala (Ref A). Bonnecorse confirmed that he had already
spoken directly on October 11 with Congo-Brazzaville
President Sassou-Nguesso in the latter's capacity as African
Union President. Sassou-Nguesso "got it," Bonnecorse
claimed, adding that he had underlined Guatemala's legitimate
credentials as a nation distinguished by the Nobel Peace

Prize, and declaring, with regard to Venezuela, that the
Security Council did not need an "entertainer" among its
members. Bonnecorse had also reached out to Gabonese FM
Ping, former UNGA President, who called back to report
President Bongo had instructed the Gabonese UN delegation in
NY to support Guatemala. Ping had portrayed the Venezuelan
Permrep in NY in highly negative terms, Bonnecorse added.


3. (C) Bonnecorse, affirming he shared USG concerns about a
Venezuelan seat, pledged to reach out to additional
sub-Saharan African nations, provisionally Benin, Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau,
Madagascar, TOGO and possibly others. He said he would ask
Minister-Delegate for Cooperation, Development and
Francophonie Brigitte Girardin to intervene with the Niger
FM, a woman with whom Girardin had developed a friendship
(Ref B). (Note: Presidential African Affairs Deputy
Labriolle told Africa Watcher on October 13 that Bonnecorse
had spent the morning of October 13 working the phones with
African leaders to emphasize France would vote for Guatemala.
Labriolle noted that Central African Republic president
Bozize had pledged his delegation would vote for Guatemala
(Ref C). End Note.)

Darfur/Chad: Reticence on Interpositionary Force
-------------- --------------


4. (C) DCM raised Darfur, asking about French thinking on
the protection of Sudanese refugees in Chad. Bonnecorse
reiterated French concerns about the potential
destabilization of Chad and the Central African Republic
(C.A.R.). As for a prospective interpositionary force,
whether UN or ad hoc, Bonnecorse remarked on the emerging
discrepancies between the views of C.A.R. President Bozize
and Chadian President Deby. Bozize explicitly wanted circa
600 UN personnel on C.A.R. territory, and had personally
appealed to Chirac for his support at the September 2006
Summit of Francophone nations in Bucharest. Deby however was
now equivocating on international deployment; he had moreover
signaled he only wanted African forces, and reserved the
right to approve or reject troop contributors according to
their nationality. Deby's attitudes were at present too

PARIS 00006845 002 OF 002


volatile and unreliable for the international community to
make international deployment in Chad the core of a strategy
for Darfur, Bonnecorse observed. Deby's equivocations aside,
Bonnecorse expressed misgivings about deploying forces into
Chad but not Darfur. Securing the border and refugee camps
(Ref D) could paradoxically prompt a further exodus of
refugees from Sudan, posing a further burden to Chadian
stability and consolidating, if not accelerating, the
Janjaweed program of ethnic cleansing in Darfur. (Note: MFA
AF DAS-Equivalent Helene Le Gal told Africa Watcher on
October 16 that the MFA did not know what to make of a recent
cable from N'djamena reporting a conversation with Deby in
which he had backtracked radically from his earlier appeals
for outside help. She noted the Deby Government had
previously sought EU intervention. End Note.)


5. (C) Bonnecorse called for international pressure on
Sudanese President Bashir to implement UNSCR 1706. He urged
the USG to try to modify the position of the Egyptian
government on UNSCR 1706. Bonnecorse emphasized the need to
demonstrate the advantages and incentives of a UN mission in
order to overcome the current phase of rhetorical posturing.
Bonnecorse had recently met with Bashir's adviser Dr. Ghazi
Salahuddin, who called for a "third way," i.e. an alternative
to UNSCR 1706 or the continuation of the status quo with the
African Union mission. Ghazi, according to Bonnecorse,
complained that the UNMIS mandate for Darfur under UNSCR 1706
reinforced the impression that Sudan was a failed state.
Bonnecorse remarked that Arab states have lost confidence in
the UN. Moreover, there is Arab confusion about the U.S.
agenda in Sudan, particularly, he added, given the initial
strong backing by the USG for Darfur rebel groups. If the UN
intervenes, Ghazi warned that the Darfur Arab populations --
by which he did not mean the Janjaweed -- would rise up and
give succor to Al Qaeda elements. Proposals for NATO
collaboration with the UN were unsettling for Arabs,
Bonnecorse suggested, with reference to the NATO SYG's offer
of assistance to AU President Sassou-Nguesso. Deputy African
Affairs Counselor Jacques de Labriolle cautioned against
fomenting an Arab-Black African split. Egypt was ready to
mediate, he suggested, but not in order to foist an
antagonistic solution on Khartoum.

Cote d'Ivoire: Empower the UN Elections Effort
-------------- --


6. (C) On Cote d'Ivoire, Bonnecorse and Labriolle expressed
their relief that the actual 6 October ECOWAS recommendations
to the AU were more positive than indicated by the ECOWAS
communique and press leaks (Ref E). (Comment: Previous MFA
conversations had been more downbeat (Ref F). End Comment.)
The 10/17 AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Addis
Ababa needed to strengthen the message further. For
Bonnecorse, the roadmap on Cote d'Ivoire should entail: a)
augmented authority for the Prime Minister, such as the power
to sign decrees in lieu of the President; b) charting a sound
electoral process, which required greater empowerment for SYG
High Representative on Elections Gerard Stoudmann; and c)
sanctions for Afi N'guessan and Koulibaly (with Bonnecorse
noting the importance of a USG demarche to Ghana to lift its
hold at the UN Sanctions Committee (Ref G).) Bonnecorse
explained that Stoudmann had insufficient staff and resources
in Abidjan because his budget derived from UNDP. All UNSC
delegations, with the exception of USUN, agreed on the need
to rectify Studman's resource situation by shifting budgetary
responsibility directly to the Department of Political
Affairs at the UN in New York, he said.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON