FRENCH PONDER NEXT STEPS ON LEBANON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006843

SIPDIS

NSC FOR SINGH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/16/2016
TAGS: FR KDEM PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: FRENCH PONDER NEXT STEPS ON LEBANON


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: While the French MFA's NEA and IO equivalents
are convinced of the need to support PM Siniora, implement
UNSCR 1701, and ensure UNIFIL's credibility, they have not
yet ironed out differences in their thinking on potential
next steps -- and may be seriously overestimating the
potential for movement on the future of the Sheba'a Farms.
End summary.

Disconnects Within the Quai d'Orsay
--------------


2. (C) Poloff met October 16 with the MFA's Martin Guillard
(NEA/ELA office director equivalent),Lebanon Desk Officer
Remy Bouallegue, Syria Desk Officer Jean-Christophe Auge, and
later with Selena Grenet, who handles Syria-Lebanon in the
MFA's IO equivalent. Poloff asked about reports that the
French, who had initially floated but later backed away from
the idea of standing up a sanctions committee to enforce the
arms embargo in UNSCR 1701, were preparing to move forward
with the idea. Guillard cautioned that the MFA is "still
thinking about it" and said that while ANEMO (NEA's French
counterpart) supports the idea, his IO counterparts are not
yet in agreement. He added that President Chirac's office
has not yet endorsed the idea either, although he did not
foresee any objections from the Elysee. Grenet subsequently
clarified that her directorate's hesitancy reflected its
perception that USUN was reluctant to see a sanctions
committee established; if the U.S. view has shifted, France
would likely join a consensus. However, she readily admitted
that whereas the USG would expect any sanctions committee to
be as strong as possible, the French doubt the Russians and
Chinese would accept a committee with a strong, coercive
mandate. Consequently, the French would prefer to see a
committee that, while not toothless, "would not be too strong
or offensive." She added that Lebanese Prime Minister
Siniora is "quite reluctant" to accept a sanctions committee
because he fears an overly aggressive committee would prove
counterproductive and weaken the GOL.

Air-UNIFIL?
--------------


3. (S) Turning to the question of Israeli overflights of
Lebanon, Poloff asked about French thinking on adding an
aerial surveillance component to UNIFIL. Guillard
acknowledged that the idea has been discussed within ANEMO
and at the Ministry of Defense, but said that the MFA has not
yet formulated an official position, nor has the idea been
blessed by the Elysee. He added that the French were
somewhat reluctant to add an aerial border surveillance
dimension to UNIFIL for fear that the UN peacekeepers would
be tarred as foreign intelligence agents. Moreover, the
French would want to ensure that any imagery shared with the
GOI would not be used to facilitate a new round of Israeli
air strikes in Lebanon. (Grenet, in contrast, recoiled in
horror at the prospect of what she described as "an expansion
of UNIFIL's mandate" and said France preferred to keep any
intel sharing with the GOI in bilateral as opposed to
multilateral channels.)

Sheba'a Farms
--------------


4. (C) With respect to the Sheba'a Farms, Poloff sought the
latest French thinking with respect to placing the Farms
under UN-trusteeship or allowing the UN to unilaterally
demarcate the Syrian-Lebanese border in such a way as to
attribute the farms to Lebanon. Specifically, he asked
whether the French had floated these ideas with the Israelis
and, if so, how the Israelis reacted. With a wry laugh,
Guillard noted that FM Douste-Blazy personally broached the
subject with FM Livni during the recent Israel-Hizballah
conflict but did not get very far. Nevertheless, Guillard
claimed the Israelis "might be interested and might
eventually make a gesture" on Sheba'a Farms, but he
acknowledged they would first need "many" security
guarantees. "This is all purely hypothetical -- we have not
discussed it in detail with the Israelis," Guillard admitted.


5. (C) With respect to demarcating the Lebanese-Syrian
border, Guillard said as there was only one precedent (NFI)
for a unilateral redrawing of the border by the UN, such an
action would "raise questions," and the UN General
Secretariat was "clearly reluctant" to proceed. Moreover,

SIPDIS
the idea would need clear support in advance from all the
concerned parties -- especially Lebanon, Syria, and Israel --
if it were to be effective. He added, with vigorous
agreement from Bouallegue and Auge, that a re-demarcation of
the border was a "single-shot gun" and the international
community would not get a second chance to resolve the
Sheba'a impasse through cartography. He also observed that
the French are open to the idea of absorbing UNTSO into
UNIFIL as a means of leveraging the UN's assets and mandates.
(Guillard noted that he personally was prepared to bet that
Syria would spike either an informal UN trusteeship or a
redrawing of the border by reasserting a claim to the Sheba'a
Farms the moment Israeli troops withdrew and UN or Lebanese
forces took their place.)


6. (C) Grenet, in contrast, seemed much more enthused about
the possibility of allowing the UN to unilaterally redefine
the Lebanese-Syrian border, and noted that the UN Secretariat
has already asked its cartographer to start working on the
question. She seemed convinced that the next report
(expected this week) by Terje Roed-Larsen, the Secretary
General's Special Envoy for the implementation of UNSCR 1559,
would endorse such a solution, and that once a notional
revision of the border had been blessed by the UN's legal
department it would be possible to approach the Israelis.
She conceded that persuading the Israelis that a concession
on the Sheba'a Farms was not tantamount to a victory for
Hizballah might prove "difficult." Like Guillard, Grenet
emphasized that we would only get one shot at redrawing the
border, adding: "In principle, this is an important card to
play but we need to use it at the right time." But unlike
Guillard, who worried that the Syrians would thwart this
maneuver by refusing to relinquish their claim to Sheba'a,
Grenet opined that it would be much easier to pressure
Damascus into signing away its claim to the Farms once a UN
force is in place. She concluded by saying the MFA would
refine its thinking on sequencing once Larsen releases his
report.


7. (C) Comment: While our MFA interlocutors are sincere in
their desire to make implementation of UNSCR 1701 a success,
they seem to have convinced themselves that the Sheba'a Farms
issue offers the path of least resistance for progress in the
near term. We are somewhat concerned by their apparent lack
of detailed discussion with the Israelis, and suspect that
the French have underestimated the difficulty of obtaining
Israeli buy-in on this issue.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
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