Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS6836
2006-10-17 11:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

POLISH AMBASSADOR ON RUSSIA AND FRENCH/EU TIMIDITY

Tags:  PREL FR RU EU GG MD 
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Lucia A Keegan 10/18/2006 09:55:51 AM From DB/Inbox: Lucia A Keegan

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 06836

SIPDIS
cxparis:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: ODC STRASBOU DCM FCS SCI ORA UNESCO AGR PAO AMB
 DAO ECON

DISSEMINATION: POLOUT
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:CRSTAPLETON
DRAFTED: POL:KCKRHOUNEK
CLEARED: DCM: KHOFMANN, POL:JROSENBLATT, POL:BTURNER

VZCZCFRI225
PP RUEHC RUEHZL RUEHCH RUEHKV RUEHSI
DE RUEHFR #6836/01 2901158
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171158Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2246
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU PRIORITY 0343
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV PRIORITY 0494
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 0391
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006836 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012
TAGS: PREL FR RU EU GG MD
SUBJECT: POLISH AMBASSADOR ON RUSSIA AND FRENCH/EU TIMIDITY

REF: WARSAW 2188

Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006836

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2012
TAGS: PREL FR RU EU GG MD
SUBJECT: POLISH AMBASSADOR ON RUSSIA AND FRENCH/EU TIMIDITY

REF: WARSAW 2188

Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In an October 13 meeting with the
Ambassador, Polish Ambassador to France Jan Tombinski
expressed concern about the increasing concentration of power
in the Kremlin and criticized President Chirac for French
reluctance to confront the Russians over their increasingly
negative policies (e.g., on energy and defense). Poland had
hoped for a stronger EU to balance Russian domination of
Eastern Europe, but instead of coordinating with each other,
each member-state is acting independently based on its own
bilateral interests. According to Tombinski, the Poles would
like to see a review of the current EU policy of viewing
Russia as a strategic partner in addressing global issues;
they believe that this policy has not brought the desired
benefit of integrating Russia more into the international
community or improving Russian internal policies on democracy
and human rights. Finally, the recent Polish decision to be
a part of the proposed missile defense system has met with
immediate repercussions from Russia, which is now threatening
to "reconsider" its own defense posture in response. End
summary.

Russia as Autocratic Power
--------------

2. (C) Tombinski addressed a long list of concerns over
growing Russian intransigence, beginning with Polish worries
over the lack of transparency and the shift of
decision-making authority from the Russian MFA to the Kremlin
(and ultimately to Putin himself). Putin had announced
several negative decisions (e.g., on energy and gas reserves)
shortly after his visit to France, leading the Poles to
suspect that Chirac "gave him the green light" to proceed
without worrying about French criticism. Developments such
as the massing of Russian troops in Abkhazia, the recent
assassination of Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya,
Russian plans to redirect oil and gas supplies and the
current tension between Georgia and Russia were all troubling
signs of an increasingly arbitrary and autocratic regime.
Tombinski noted that Russia has all the accoutrements of a
global power, but it did not understand how to act like one
without operating as an empire. According to him, Putin

wanted to dominate neighboring countries as the easiest way
to convey to the Russian public that their country was once
again a superpower.

A Divided EU
--------------

3. (C) Tombinski said that Poland had hoped for a strong EU
to balance Russian domination over Eastern Europe, noting
that Poland and its neighbors were too weak to do so
bilaterally, especially on energy and defense issues.
Unfortunately, there had not been even a weak attempt to
coordinate European positions on these critical issues. A
case in point: just a week before the regular GAERC meeting
of EU Foreign Ministers, the Finnish presidency had yet to
circulate any common positions for discussion. Even worse,
other European countries were all acting independently
towards Russia, based on their own interests. Germany, for
example, was pursuing a purely bilateral course with Russia;
he claimed that in the recent meetings between Putin and
Merkel, there had been virtually no discussion of "Europe."


4. (C) Tombinski said that Poland was pushing France and
other European member-states to review the EU's current
policy of considering Russia as a strategic partner on global
issues (e.g., Iran, North Korea, Middle East Peace). Poland
believed that the result of this policy had been much more
favorable to Russia than to Europe. In retrospect, Europe
had not derived the benefits it expected from trying to
integrate Russia; instead Russian interests were used to
override global interests, there had been little to no change
in internal Russian policies, progress on democratization in
Russia had lagged or gone in reverse, and there has been no
progress in resolving several "frozen conflicts" where Russia
could play a major role. The Poles wanted to help Russia to
be a strong partner, but they did not share the assessment
that involving Russia deeper in foreign policy issues would
achieve this goal. In response, Ambassador Stapleton noted
that Russia had a necessary role to play in addressing global
conflicts. Many of these problems had ended in a referral to
the United Nations Security Council where Russia is a
permanent member with a right of veto; including the Russians
in efforts to address these global issues was important.

Repercussions on Missile Defense
--------------

5. (C) Tombinski noted that the Polish President and PM had
both visited Washington in September, during which a
tentative decision had been reached to participate in the
proposed missile defense system. This announcement, although
largely supported by the public in Poland, had had an
immediate negative effect on Polish relations with Russia.
The Russians were now threatening to "reconsider" their own
defensive posture vis--vis their western border, claiming
that Polish participation in missile defense would alter the
balance of defensive interests in Europe.

Comment
--------------

6. (C) Tombinski was clearly disappointed by what he
considered to be the failure of the EU -- and France -- to
take a harder line on Russia. Noteworthy was his suspicion
of French complicity, active or passive, in Russian hardening.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON