Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS6786
2006-10-13 16:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRANCE: VISIT OF VENEZUELA COORDINATOR DEBORAH

Tags:  PREL CO CU BL VE PGOV SNAR UNSC SP FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 131605Z OCT 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2198
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY 0354
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0410
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ PRIORITY 0252
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006786 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS: PREL CO CU BL VE PREL PGOV SNAR UNSC SP FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE: VISIT OF VENEZUELA COORDINATOR DEBORAH
MCCARTHY


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 006786

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/27/2016
TAGS: PREL CO CU BL VE PREL PGOV SNAR UNSC SP FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE: VISIT OF VENEZUELA COORDINATOR DEBORAH
MCCARTHY


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In October 6 meetings with WHA Venezuela
Coordinator Deborah McCarthy, French MFA officials reiterated
French opposition to a Venezuelan seat on the UN Security
Council but judged it remained a distinct possibility.
DAS-equivalent Michel Pinard argued that overall the Chavez
Administration had made progress through its social programs
and was addressing a South American need for self-assertion,
more popular-based governments and reformed institutions.
While the Chavez regime showed clear authoritarian
tendencies, so far freedom of expression and electoral
process were still largely protected. On Colombia, he shared
McCarthy,s skepticism concerning the latest FARC gesture for
a humanitarian exchange of prisoners, while arguing that
Uribe might be tempted to negotiate a peace agreement to
assure his place as a key figure in Colombian history and
that the U.S. should encourage him in that direction. On
Bolivia, Mr. Pinard expressed his conviction that President
Morales was in great need of international support to
overcome sizable gaps in experience and that Europe and the
U.S. had an obligation to provide him with alternatives to
Chavez and Castro. END SUMMARY


2. (C) WHA Venezuela Coordinator Deborah McCarthy met October
6 with DAS-equivalent for South America Michel Pinard
(Venezuela, Colombia, and Central America desk officers also
attended),followed by separate meetings with MFA UN desk
officer for Central and South America Nicolas Kassanidas and
MFA officer Eric Wiart, who covers South American narcotics
trafficking. Acting PolCouns and Poloff accompanied McCarthy.

Venezuela
--------------


3. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent Michel Pinard argued that political
change in South America in general and in Venezuela was less

of a deliberate swing to the left than the reflection of the
gulf between the rich and poor and the inability of
institutions run by elites to respond to the disenfranchised.
Although the need for self-assertion vis-a-vis the U.S. was
real, the pressing necessity was to take care of the poor and
to reform existing political institutions. Pinard
acknowledged that Chavez showed authoritarian tendencies but
argued that they were still framed -- unlike the situation in
Cuba -- by an electoral process with relatively free
expression. Pinard expressed guarded optimism about Chavez's
first steps toward institutional reform and opined that,
despite obviously widespread corruption and opaque internal
processes, Chavez's social programs had delivered "real
results" for the poor, and Chavez had not thus far crossed
any repressive red lines in consolidating his political
power. McCarthy noted that indeed the changes in the
Hemisphere, particularly in the Andes were the result of the
fracturing of institutions which had not been responsive to
or representative of the wide body of citizens but noted that
in Venezuela there was an increasing concentration of power
in the executive. Pinard agreed with McCarthy that most of
the Chavez Administration's social spending had involved
direct transfers from soaring oil revenues rather than
investment in education or other skills-building programs.
Pinard agreed with McCarthy's emphasis on the importance of
encouraging the development of a viable political opposition
as a means of assuring democratic choice. McCarthy indicated
that the USG had proposed to have exchanges in specific areas
with the GOV (drugs, terrorism, commercial activities) but
that the response had not been positive and was unlikely to
be so until after the elections. She stressed the need for a
strong international observation noting that EU participation
would be very important.


4. (C) Pinard acknowledged readily that Venezuela would not
be good for the UN Security Council and added that Chavez was
taking stands that France could not support -- notably on
Iran. He stated that the GOF was prepared to be clear and
direct with the GOV regarding its candidacy. He indicated
that the GOF was considering agreeing to a visit by FM
Rosales as an opportunity for a frank conversation on
developments in Venezuela.


5. (C) Kassianides repeated Pinard's line on Venezuela but
added that France was "fairly worried" about the possibility
of a Venezuela victory, based largely on the fact that the
vote would be in secret and his assessment that many
countries were likely to seize the opportunity to vote
against U.S. and European preferences. Raising the
possibility of an eventual third candidate, he opined that

PARIS 00006786 002 OF 002


the United States and Europe would be best served by
refraining from too much overt campaigning for their
preferred choice. McCarthy noted that the USG was not
discussing a third candidate and that, given the division in
the GRULAC, the final result would depend on votes from other
areas, notably Africa where France could use its influence.


6. (C) McCarthy reviewed USG concerns regarding the increased
outflow of drugs through Venezuela and noted that while
cooperation with the US on counterdrug efforts had declined,
it appeared to be sustained with certain European countries.
She also noted that the outflow was a major problem for Haiti
and the Dominican Republic. She stated that the GOV was
doing little to control the border with Colombia despite
assertions to the contrary. Wiart noted that the border was
impossible to control and that efforts were best concentrated
on port and airport security. McCarthy noted that the USG
had unspent funds for such programs but that the GOV was
still not willing to sign the LOA required. Equipment
purchased by the U.S. was not being used. Wiart listened
intently to U.S. concerns about the easy accessibility of
Venezuelan identity documents. McCarthy noted that GOV lack
of concern was undermining efforts being made by the
Hemisphere to tighten border security to protect the region
from being used by terrorists. Venezuela,s rapprochement
with Iran was also of concern in this regard. She noted that
repeated attempts by the USG to exchange information on the
travel of SIAs remained unanswered.

Colombia
--------------


7. (C) McCarthy and Pinard addressed the latest FARC gesture
for a humanitarian exchange of prisoners. Pinard noted the
GOF,s ongoing concern regarding Ms. Betancourt, and McCarthy
noted that the USG had three hostages there as well.
McCarthy warned that one of the first concessions the FARC
would likely demand -- as had Colombian paramilitaries
before them -- would be that the GOC desist from extraditing
people to the U.S., which would be unacceptable to the U.S.
The FARC was also likely to be concerned about preserving its
highly remunerative drug business independent of any military
agreement. McCarthy noted that FARC intentions behind the
proposal remained unclear and cautioned that the FARC
remained convinced that it could continue the fight.
McCarthy also reviewed USG policy on arms transfers to
Venezuela in the context of the FARC, noting that there would
be likely seepage/leakage of weapons into the hands of the
FARC which would undermine President Uribe,s efforts.


8. (C) Pinard speculated that Uribe could yet be tempted by a
peace agreement "to assure his place in the pantheon of
Colombian history." Pinard argued that the Colombian
military might be growing tired of fighting, and he urged the
U.S. to persuade Uribe to open negotiations for a peace
agreement, which he said would be welcomed and praised
internationally.

Venezuela's Impact on Neighbors - Bolivia, Cuba
-------------- --


9. (C) Pinard stated his conviction that Bolivian President
Evo Morales had "good intentions" but was inexperienced and
desperately in need of international guidance; it was
important to provide Morales with alternatives to Chavez and
Castro. McCarthy noted the early outreach made by the USG to
Morales and continued ongoing bilateral dialogue, noting that
Bolivia had not been designated as non-cooperating in the
recent US certification process.


10. (C) In the case of Cuba, Mr. Pinard remarked on the
apparent intimacy of the Castro/Chavez rapport, which he
likened to a filial relationship. He expressed interest in
receiving a USG a psychological assessment of the
relationship between the two leaders. McCarthy noted
Chavez,s continued firm intent to support the Castro regime,
opining that Chavez,s ties were primarily to Castro and that
it remained unclear what role/influence Chavez would play in
the longer run in Cuba.


11. (C) Special Coordinator McCarthy cleared this report.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON