Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS6189
2006-09-14 16:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

FRANCE WANTS MORE CONCRETE MEASURES TO GIVE TEETH

Tags:  PARM PREL KNNP MNUC WMD CT PTER KN KS FR 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHFR #6189 2571608
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141608Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1349
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 006189 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, EUR AND EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC WMD CT PTER KN KS FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE WANTS MORE CONCRETE MEASURES TO GIVE TEETH
TO UNSCR 1695

REF: A) STATE 150039 B) PARIS 05639 C) STATE 136495

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Bruce Turner, reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 006189

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, EUR AND EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP MNUC WMD CT PTER KN KS FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE WANTS MORE CONCRETE MEASURES TO GIVE TEETH
TO UNSCR 1695

REF: A) STATE 150039 B) PARIS 05639 C) STATE 136495

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Bruce Turner, reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d).


1. (C) Summary: MFA nonproliferation office, while
reiterating France's steadfast support for international
efforts to constrain North Korea's weapons program and
enforce UNSCR 1695, expressed some concern about a perceived
lack of concrete mechanisms -- whether in the Proliferation
Security Initiative or UNSCR 1695 -- to insure that the
transfer of technology, materials and finances to or from
North Korea is truly curbed. France emphasized that any
initiatives must acknowledge Russia and China's role as PSI
partners. End Summary.


2. (C) On September 13, in response to a previous MFA
request, we shared Ref A points with Arnaud Mentre, MFA
official in the office of disarmament and non-proliferation
responsible for North Korea, as to how the U.S. envisions
leveraging existing procedures and cooperation under PSI to
support UNSCR 1695 and the interdiction of missile-related
shipments and activities.


3. (C) Mentre, speaking frankly, provided us with his initial
assessment that the procedures described might be too vague
and possibly generic to combat resourceful and well-funded
proliferators. Shipping routes evolve, proliferators' boats
carry different flags or company names, and specious
manifests may conceal dangerous cargo, he said. Further,
because PSI does not target a single country, its measures
are too diffuse to enable PSI partners to hone in on North
Korean proliferation. He cautioned that if PSI is their only
defense, well-intentioned nations might remain one step
behind North Korea's missile-related shipments.


4. (C) Asked if he had French suggestions to offer, Mentre
only noted that PSI partners could establish some mechanism
to facilitate the sharing of intelligence on particular
shipping routes, transfer points, and companies suspected to
be involved in North Korean proliferation efforts. Although
the disbanding of the PSI core group precludes such regular
information sharing, he said its reinstitution was not
necessarily the best way forward, as it could introduce a
slow-moving bureaucratic overlay.


5. (C) Mentre cautioned that any additional measures should
be implemented while taking into accountthe concerns of
Russia and China. "The goal should be to achieve the maximum
operational gain with the minimum diplomatic fallout." He
proposed encouraging Russia to contribute meaningfully as a
newer PSI partner, and to engage with China on the idea that
maintaining its status as an interlocutor with North Korea is
compatible with refusing to accept its ballistic missile
program and proliferation activities.







Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON