EUR DAS BRYZA MEETS FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 006179

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL FR GG NATO EUN KDEM
SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA MEETS FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR ON
GEORGIA, NATO ID

REF: PARIS 5423

Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) Summary: In a September 12 meeting with EUR/DAS Matt
Bryza and EUR/CARC Director Rood, French Political Director
Laboulaye expressed relief over U.S. efforts to persuade
Georgian President Saakashvili to avoid being overly
provocative toward Russia at the UNGA. To give Saakashvili
an added incentive, Laboulaye suggested that NATO ministers
in New York decide informally on NATO Intensified Dialogue
for Georgia only after hearing Saakashvili's speech, with a
formal NAC decision soon to follow. Laboulaye agreed with
the U.S. not to oppose a GUAM resolution being placed on the
agenda, while conditioning support for the resolution itself
on Armenia's concurrence.


2. (C) Separately, Bryza and PDAS-equivalent for Continental
Europe Smessow discussed in more detail the outlines of
Saakashvili's likely remarks, as well as Georgia's broader
and delicate challenge of dealing with the South Ossetians'
refusal to negotiate without unduly provoking the Russians.
Bryza made clear the U.S. position on the need for Georgia to
proceed with a "competitive" rather than confrontational
approach to the Russians, but defended the Georgians' need to
assert their sovereignty over their entire territory. He
called for an incremental approach, with the support and
coordination of the international community, to put pressure
on Russia gradually to diminish its presence, and to impress
upon the Russians that there was also a cost for blocking
progress. End Summary.


3. (SBU) Visiting EUR DAS Matt Bryza and EUR/CARC Director
Elizabeth Rood met September 12 with French outgoing
Political Director Stanislaus de Laboulaye to discuss NATO
Intensified Dialogue (ID) for Georgia. Separately, they held
a broader discussion of Georgia with PDAS-equivalent for
Continental Europe Serge Smessow (who will soon go to Yerevan
as the French Ambassador),DAS-equivalent for Russia and the
former Soviet Union Aurelia Bouchez and desk-officer for the
Caucasus Marie DuMoulin (notetaker). PolMinCouns and Deputy
PolCouns (notetaker) joined Bryza and Rood.

Political Director Laboulaye on NATO ID, GUAM
--------------


4. (C) Bryza reviewed briefly for Laboulaye the U.S.
strategy of encouraging Georgia to adopt a competitive rather
than a confrontational strategy for advancing its interests,
making full use of multilateral mechanisms as a way of
garnering the support of the international community and
demonstrating to Russia that there would be costs associated
with preserving the status quo. He made clear that the U.S.
was encouraging Saakashvili to avoid being unduly provocative
in his UNGA speech, and that the Georgians were being given
to understand that unilateral recourse to the use of force
would likely trigger an overwhelming Russian response and
leave them isolated vis-a-vis the international community.
Laboulaye said he was very relieved to hear Bryza's message
to the Georgians, saying that France had earlier worried that
the U.S. might allow Georgia go too far. Now, he said, he
felt "reassured" about the U.S. position. He agreed the
threat of an overwhelming Russian response was real, and
hoped the Georgians understood that as well.


5. (C) Turning to NATO Intensified Dialogue, Bryza suggested
that it should be possible for the NAC to decide on ID in
principle in advance of UNGA, then have it blessed by
ministers on September 21. Laboulaye doubted that there
would be a NAC immediately before the UNGA and said that it
made sense for Ministers to listen to Saakashvili's speech,
meet with Georgians and come to an informal decision in New
York that would subsequently be blessed formally by the NAC.
Bryza underscored the importance of avoiding a difficult,
potentially even contentious discussion in New York that
could be embarrassing to NATO and/or the Georgians.
Laboulaye agreed that this should be avoided if at all
possible, but reiterated that it was only reasonable to
listen to Saakashvili first, assess the situation and take a
decision if appropriate, and then have the NAC follow up.
This would offer the additional advantage of providing an
incentive for Saakashvili to avoid overly provocative remarks
at UNGA. (Note: At no time did Laboulaye suggest -- verbally
or through his body language -- that France would not support
ID for Georgia.)


6. (C) Laboulaye asked wither the GUAM group intended to go
forward with an UNGA resolution, noting that this issue had
divided the West the last time round. Bryza responded that

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the U.S. had told Armenia it would not support a GUAM draft
that was not also supported by Armenia, but that it would not
oppose inscribing a GUAM resolution on the agenda. Laboulaye
characterized the U.S. approach as reasonable.

Smessow and Bouchez on Georgia-Russia
--------------


7. (C) During the discussion that preceded the meeting with
Laboulaye, Smessow expressed concern that Saakashvili
intended to denounce Russian participation in the CIS
peacekeeping force (PKF). France and other EU members were
concerned that this could have an impact on the UNOMIG
presence, possibly even leading to a worsening of the
situation as compared to the current -- admittedly
unsatisfactory -- status quo. He worried that Georgia was at
a crossroads and expressed the hope that a crisis could be
averted, which would also serve as a precedent for
Moldova/Transnistria.


8. (C) Bryza agreed that the status quo was not
satisfactory, while noting the catch-22 Georgia faced in
trying to change it. If it did nothing, South Ossetia would
continue to separate itself from Georgia; yet it also needed
to avoid being overly provocative, lest that trigger an
overwhelming Russian response and aggravate European fears
that Georgia is being too provocative. The U.S. approach, he
said, was focused on encouraging the Georgians to channel
their energies in constructive directions. That said, he
reminded Smessow, the Georgians were right in their desire to
establish their sovereignty over their entire territory, just
as they had a right to decide whether Russian troops should
be allowed on their soil. U.S., French and even Russian
foreign policy implicitly recognized Georgia's right to do so
by virtue of our policies of supporting Georgia's territorial
integrity.


9. (C) Smessow agreed, but expressed the hope that change,
for example in the mandate for the CIS PKF, could occur
incrementally. Bryza assured Smessow that the U.S. was
working hard with the Georgians to encourage them to pursue
multiple goals within an overall strategic framework, for
which UNGA was only one way-station at the end of an initial
phase. Based on his consultations with Georgian officials,
Bryza said he believed that Saakashvili's speech would be
generally positive in tone, avoid demands, and stress
Georgia's desire to become a NATO ally and its determination
to behave like one. Smessow responded that Bryza's
characterization corresponded with what the French Embassy in
Tbilisi was hearing.


10. (C) Stating that the UNGA could mark a turning point for
Georgia, for better or for worse, Bryza underscored U.S.
efforts to convince Saakashvili to avoid confrontation. He
believed that the Georgians understood the U.S. message, and
were now thinking in terms of how to move forward on
confidence-building measures, demilitarization, and economic
rehabilitation even without South Ossetian cooperation. The
problem was that there had not been progress toward a
political settlement and the existing negotiation mechanisms
were not working, nor did the CIS PKF appear able to prevent
incidents from occurring. He hoped that reconfiguring the
Joint Consultative Commission (JCC) format, for instance by
introducing international observers, and a Georgian pledge of
non-use of force in Ossetia and Abkhazia, might offer
possibilities for moving forward. He concluded that it would
be important for Saakashvili to define categories for
positive action while expressing his dissatisfaction with the
status quo.


11. (C) Bouchez agreed on the need to achieve a delicate
balance, which she hoped the Russians would understand and
respect. Her concern was that Russia would seize on any
negative elements to relaunch unproductive debate. She hoped
Saakashvili understood that anything he said might be used
against him. Smessow underscored that Georgia needed to
appear credible, and show that it could honor its
commitments, for example on demilitarization; this was also
necessary as a platform from which to criticize the Russians
and the Ossetians. Bryza reminded Smessow that Georgia's
recourse to unilateral implementation of some commitments was
the direct consequence of the South Ossetians' refusal to do
their part and was in fact a positive reflection of Georgia's
commitment to a peaceful settlement. Rood added that the
Ossetians' had refused proposals to which even the Russians
had agreed. That said, she noted Russian resistance to
changing the status quo on negotiation modalities at the same
time that it was pursuing changes to the status quo on the
ground. This made it difficult for Georgia to continue to

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proceed peacefully.


12. (C) Smessow and Bouchez asked whether the Russians could
be brought around to accepting some changes in the status
quo, either in the JCC or the PKF. Bryza noted the
importance of constructive evolution, saying it would be
important for example to complement the CIS PKF before trying
to replace it (Bryza underscored this distinction); the
objective should be to create a multinational force in which
Russia would not have a preponderant role. DuMoulin tried to
suggest that the Georgians were abandoning negotiations for
unilateralism. Bryza pointed out forcefully that, given the
South Ossetians' refusal even to negotiate, the U.S. had
encouraged the Georgians to implement what they could even in
the absence of reciprocal steps by the South Ossetians. The
key was to gain the understanding of their situation from the
international community.


13. (C) Smessow agreed that the situation was difficult,
although he repeated that crisis would lead nowhere and was
to be avoided. Bryza agreed, adding that the real key was to
convince the Russians that the price of blocking progress was
higher than moving forward. That said, the U.S. had been
clear with Georgian officials that unilateral implementation
could not include recourse to force. This would evoke with
certainty a Russian response, using overwhelming force, which
could put an end at once to Georgia's military and its
Euroatlantic aspirations. If Georgia provoked the Russians,
it could find itself abandoned by the international community.


14. (C) Bouchez speculated that Russia needed to be
persuaded that moving forward, however incrementally, was the
best way to minimize the risk of the situation spinning out
of control in the region. Perhaps there were ways to move
forward -- through changes in the negotiating format,
political gestures, or economic rehabilitation -- that would
not be perceived by Russia as inimical to its interests.
While such measures were "very modest," perhaps they could be
explored. Bryza agreed on the need to get negotiations
started and to use institutions such as the OSCE (he cited
the U.S. food-for-thought paper) to get across to the
Russians that some Georgian claims were justified; perhaps
there was also something that could be done in the G-8
framework, and allies should also consider coordinating on
how they would respond to Saakashvili at UNGA. Bryza
repeated that the Russians needed to see there was a
political cost for obstructionism, while assuring them that
they would continue to have a role in any solution. At the
same time, Georgia needed to avoid provocative actions or
overly harsh rhetoric, which also had benefits such as NATO
ID.


15. (C) Bouchez noted a global hardening in the Russian
position and agreed that it would be important not to call
into question Russia's presence in the region; to do so would
be a casus belli. She argued that upcoming Russian elections
would also likely stiffen Russian obstructionism, and that it
would therefore be necessary to offer the Russians
face-saving ways to move forward. She wondered if it would
be possible to broaden the format of discussions, for example
through use of the steering group for the donors' process.
Bryza responded that Georgia needed to think through a
strategy for complementary approaches, while accepting at the
same time the reality of the Russian presence.


16. (C) Bouchez worried that Georgian provocations could
endanger the UN fact-finding mission. Bryza responded that
Georgia was more focused on the greater dangers of a real
crisis or the loss of NATO ID, and felt they needed to speak
up about their situation in international fora. Smessow said
he understood the need, but worried about a confrontational
approach that would not advance Georgian interests. Bryza
responded that the U.S. was working hard with the Georgians
to get them to distinguish between confrontation and
competition. While they needed to use international fora and
international pressure to press their advantage competitively
where they could, the U.S. was doing its best to steer them
away from confrontation, in particular the use of force.


17. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.

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