FRANCE/DJIBOUTI: AMBASSADOR SYMINGTON'S PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 006177

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON EAID MARR PINS ER ET SO DJ FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE/DJIBOUTI: AMBASSADOR SYMINGTON'S PARIS
CONSULTATIONS

REF: PARIS 553

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: GOF officials at the MFA, President's
office, and MOD were uniformly supportive of close and
cooperative U.S.-France policies on Djibouti during their
September 7-8 meetings with U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti W.
Stuart Symington. They welcomed U.S. engagement in Djibouti,
despite the potential for Djibouti's leveraging France and
the U.S. against each other with respect to basing fees.
French assistance to Djibouti amounts to 25 million
euros/year, with an additional 30 million euros/year in base
fees, a large sum on a per capita basis. The French
expressed concern about the increasing influence of radical
Islam in Djibouti and the region and suggested working with
the U.S. to counter this trend.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: The lack of a modern legal system
and business laws meeting international standards impedes
economic growth and discourage investor confidence, French
contacts stated. Djibouti's economy was based on its port;
the French saw few other possibilities for immediate economic
growth and job creation but agreed that fishing, tourism, and
thermal energy could provide opportunities over the long
term, if preceded by infrastructure improvements.
Developments in Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia have a large
impact on Djibouti, which is in turn an excellent point for
observing those countries. France continues to place high
value on its military presence in Djibouti, which allows
France to cover a broad swathe of Africa, the Middle East,
and Indian Ocean. France is trying to align its forces in
Africa to support Africa's sub-regional organization (but not
at the cost of its bilateral military relations). The Borrel
case remains an irritant to relations with Djibouti, with
France's independent judiciary continuing to pursue a case
that to several of Ambassador Symington's interlocutors was
not worth the effort. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Djibouti W. Stuart Symington on
September 7 and 8 met with MFA DAS-equivalent Helene Le Gal
and desk officer Francois Gautier; President Chirac's Africa
Advisor Michel de Bonnecorse and his deputy Jacques Champagne
de Labriolle; a roundtable of French military officers
covering Djibouti and the Horn of Africa region; and Major
General Benoit Puga, Commander of France's Special Operations.


4. (C) At each meeting, Ambassador Symington expressed his
intention to strengthen U.S.-France cooperation on Djibouti,
which he and his interlocutors considered already quite good.
He said that his three priorities as he began his mission
were to: (1) ensure continued close cooperation with
Djibouti, France, and other allies on security-related
issues; (2) exploit Djibouti's strategic location and its
unique status as a "crossroads" of regional activity in order
to promote regional stability; and (3) promote economic
growth and job creation. He welcomed French advice and
insights and said he hoped to work closely with the French
once in Djibouti. The French were receptive to Ambassador
Symington's pledge to cooperate and expressed their intention
to reciprocate.

Meeting at MFA
--------------

5. (C) After mentioning the Borrel case (see paras 17-18),
DAS-equivalent Le Gal and desk officer Gautier began by
noting that Djiboutian officials frequently visited France,
often privately. On an official basis, President Guelleh
visited Paris in May 2005, PM de Villepin stopped in Djibouti
in February 2006, and FM Dileita intended to visit France
later in September. French assistance to Djibouti (about 25
million euros/year) was high on a per capita basis. Base
fees amounted to another 30 million euros/year. Le Gal
welcomed U.S. interest in Djibouti -- "we do not seek a
monopoly there" -- and stressed that the U.S. and France were
not "rivals." Ambassador Symington said that he shared this
view completely.


6. (C) Gautier said that French forces in Djibouti numbered
somewhat under 3,000. He noted Djibouti's desire to
renegotiate base fees with France after the U.S. established
its base. He and Le Gal acknowledged that Djibouti would try
to play France off against the U.S. on this and other issues,
but they said that France accepted that reality. "It's OK if
they have more friends," Le Gal noted, and remarked that
France was the only EU country with an embassy in Djibouti.
Gautier noted recent GOF efforts to restructure France's
military presence in Africa to function on a regional basis
and to realign those forces consistent with Africa's

sub-regional groupings.


7. (C) The MFA officials agreed with Ambassador Symington
that more and more investors from other regions (e.g.,
Singapore and Dubai) were doing business in Djibouti, the
reason being Djibouti's port and the access it provided to
neighboring countries, especially Ethiopia. Le Gal agreed
with Ambassador Symington's comments on Djibouti's serving as
a platform for observing the region, adding that the
Djiboutian government was a good source of information about
Djibouti's neighbors. She noted the presence of Somalis in
Djibouti and Djibouti's contacts with Somalia's Islamic
Courts. France's embassy in Djibouti had been instructed to
meet with moderate elements of the Islamic Courts, in the
hope that the moderates, rather than the radicals, would gain
dominance. Le Gal noted that Djibouti was also useful in
following the Somaliland issue. Djibouti had managed to
maintain a balanced relationship with Ethiopia and Eritrea.


8. (C) The French noted that the possibility of social
unrest existed in Djibouti, in part because income from the
bases was not necessarily being distributed broadly. The
labor movement was relatively strong in Djibouti because of
the port and labor unions consisting of dockworkers. Gautier
commented that the political opposition lacked strong
leadership. The widespread use of khat, a stimulant imported
mainly from Ethiopia, was a significant factor in Djiboutian
society. It had generally negative effects on the political
process and economy. Social unrest was always possible when
supplies of khat dwindled.


9. (C) Ambassador Symington solicited views on job
creation, perhaps linked to the port, the railroad, related
service, tourism, and the fishing industry. The French said
that Djibouti's port remained the central element of its
economy. Some wanted to make Djibouti a regional hub.
However, obstacles to growth and investor confidence existed
-- a weak legal system with business laws not conforming with
international norms, which "thwarted ambition." Yemen
provided certain services to the fishing industry. Djibouti
offered possibilities regarding thermal energy, which had not
yet been studied closely, Gautier said. A number of French
companies operated in Djibouti -- BNP, Total, France Telecom
-- but these were small operations with "three expats" at
each company. The EU was engaged in renovating Djibouti's
railway system but this project would take time.

Meeting at French Presidency
--------------

10. (C) President Chirac's Africa advisor de Bonnecorse and
his deputy Labriolle expressed concern about Islam's growing
influence in Djibouti, which they described as "not
completely African," with increasing ties to the Arab world.
Bonnecorse stressed the need for Djibouti to work more
closely with the West. Increasing numbers of Somalis,
Eritreans, and Ethiopians were in Djibouti, attracted by
Djibouti's port and the illusion that it would always provide
more jobs, which was not the case. Ethnic tensions were
growing in Djibouti.


11. (C) Bonnecorse said that France welcomed the U.S.
military presence in Djibouti. He encouraged close
cooperation with France's military and diplomatic
representatives in Djibouti. On the economic side,
construction of an oil refinery could provide opportunities.
Tourism offered limited opportunities. Truck drivers,
seeking to protect their status, were a threat to the railway
system and hindered its renovation. Labriolle was more
positive than his MFA colleagues on thermal energy, noting
that an Italian company had been involved during the 1970s
and that interest could revive with higher oil prices. On
the fishing industry, Labriolle said that beyond catching
fish, it was important to have a processing capability and
qualified workforce, which Djibouti lacked. Ambassador
Symington underscored the importance of sustainable
management of fisheries resources and the potential for that
effort to encourage sub-regional cooperation. Labriolle
added that the French and U.S. military presence in Djibouti
operated in Djibouti's favor economically by enhancing
stability, which was not the case in places such as Yemen.


12. (C) On areas of U.S.-France cooperation, Bonnecorse
stressed the need to work with President Guelleh ("who holds
99 percent of the power") in the context of discouraging the
rise of radical Islam. Guelleh only looked at short-term
issues -- wealth and power -- but needed to consider
long-term perspectives. Bonnecorse said he knew Guelleh
because of his periodic 2-3 day visits to Paris, during which
he sometimes meets with Chirac. Bonnecorse described Guelleh
as an agreeable personality but a bit of a "character," with

a bad temper when suspicious. Guelleh did not trust
Westerners. In contrast, Bonnecorse had favorable
impressions of Djibouti's Prime and Foreign Ministers. He
warned Ambassador Symington to beware of Minister of
Presidential Affairs Moussa.


13. (C) On ethnic issues, Labriolle said that, despite
problems, a relative balance existed between the Issa and
Afar. Unfortunately, disputes and conflicts always had an
ethnic component, exacerbated by the influx of Somalis,
Eritreans, Ethiopians, and others, which threatened the Afar
more than it did the Issa. On the positive side, this mix
and Djibouti's location allowed Djiboutians to know the
region very well, Labriolle said.


14. (C) Labriolle suggested that Ambassador Symington work
with the French to track developments in Somaliland and to
determine Djiboutian attitudes towards it. The question of
an independent Somaliland was likely to arise, Bonnecorse
said, with the UK supportive. It was not an issue for France
at present, but would become one.


15. (C) The Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute was a much more
serious matter, Bonnecorse said, and it was imperative that
the two sides respect the Algiers Agreement. The risk of war
remained high and the regime in Eritrea was erratic.
Djibouti followed the issue closely, was active
diplomatically, and was concerned about its own border issues
with Ethiopia. France was trying to improve its own
relations with Eritrea, including a ship visit and a planned
visit later in September by Minister-Delegate for
Cooperation, Development, and Francophonie Brigitte Girardin.
Labriolle said that crime against Westerners in Eritrea was
rising, a sign of possible increased instability.


16. (C) The French noted Djibouti's good relations with
Iran, a possible source of cheap oil, which Djibouti once
received from Saudi Arabia but no longer did. Relations with
Iran also served to "warn" the West that Djibouti had
alternatives to the West. Djibouti's relationship with Iran
was consistent with the desire of small nations to seek as
many friends as possible.

Borrel Case
--------------

17. (C) DAS-equivalent Le Gal began the MFA meeting by
referring to the Borrel case and its continuing
complications. (NOTE: The case involves the death of French
magistrate Bernard Borrel in Djibouti in 1995, first ruled a
suicide. Mrs. Borrel has been contesting the ruling,
claiming that he was the victim of foul play. French
judicial authorities have asserted their independence in the
case and have refused to provide their files to Djibouti,
despite an MFA public statement that the GOF would do so.
Litigation continues at the International Court of Justice.
See Ref A. END NOTE.) Le Gal said that the French have
tried, with only limited success, to convince Djiboutians
that the GOF's ability to control the French judiciary was
limited because of the separation of powers, a principle the
judiciary aggressively defended. She described the case as a
continuing irritant that flared up from time to time and
negatively affected relations.


18. (C) Presidential Advisor de Bonnecorse and his deputy
Labriolle were much blunter, suggesting that the case was an
entirely "franco-francais" waste of time and resources. They
both firmly believed that the death was a suicide, citing
evidence supporting such a finding (the decedent's note to
his wife, instructions on the sale of his collection of
military medals, liquidation of a bank account, and his
purchase of a jerrycan of gasoline shortly before his
immolated body was discovered). They regretted that the
incident continued to affect relations but noted that cases
entering the French judicial system often took on a life of
their own, however unwarranted.

Meeting with Joint Staff
--------------

19. (C) Colonel Gerard Dubois (Africa and Middle East
Advisor to the CHOD),Colonel Bernard Friedling (Chief Africa
Branch, Joint Operations Center),Lieutenant Colonel Benoit
Clement (Africa Division, International Relations
Directorate, Joint Staff),and other staff hosted a
roundtable meeting for Ambassador Symington. Clement
reviewed French deployments in Africa (about 16,000 troops,
including Operation Licorne in Cote d'Ivoire, 26 attaches in
sub-Saharan Africa, and 300 military "cooperants" working
across Africa). He described the importance of France's
African presence in support of such operations as Task Force
150, engaged in anti-terrorism maritime patrols. The French

discussed the piracy issue and the pirates' relatively
skilled way of darting between national and international
waters to avoid capture.


20. (C) The officers expressed optimism despite Africa's
crises. Its resources were attracting many non-Africans,
although crises often seemed to erupt in resource-rich areas.
They reviewed France's on-going military restructuring in
Africa so as to align French forces and command structures
with Africa's sub-regional organizations. This realignment
would not, however, detract from France's bilateral military
relationships, they stressed. France's military presence in

Africa had gone through three stages -- a phase of
"assistance" during the immediate post-colonial period, then
"cooperation" during the 1970s and into the 1990s, and then
"partnership" since the end of the 1990s. Worrisome areas of
uncertainty included the directions that Somalia, Ethiopia,
and Eritrea would take and how this would affect Djibouti.
Would Somalia come under radical Islam's domination? How
would Eritrea react? Would IGAD, which so far had performed
less than impressively, mature and increase its effectiveness
as a regional player? The French indicated they would try to
help IGAD become more effective.


21. (C) The French officers welcomed cooperation with the
U.S. and others, emphasizing that France and the U.S. were
not in competition in Africa. U.S.-France cooperation in
Djibouti was excellent. The French mentioned renewed
U.S.-France evacuation planning from Djibouti as one area of
possible cooperation. Prior planning had gone dormant and
should be reinvigorated, they believed. In Djibouti, the two
sides worked well on search and rescue programs.


22. (C) The French were less optimistic about economic
growth and job prospects, noting Djibouti's barren terrain.
Its coastal areas offered potential but lacked
infrastructure, and Djiboutians did not seem focused on
exploiting the country's maritime economic potential.

Meeting with Major General Benoit Puga
--------------

23. (C) Major General Puga, Commander of Special
Operations, stressed the importance of Djibouti for its
strategic position between the Arab world and Africa. French
forces there focused on the Horn of Africa and the Indian
Ocean, but also used Djibouti as a projection platform for
the rest of Africa and Central Asia. He noted that close
cooperation with the U.S. existed and remained important. He
said the French were confident that the Djiboutian government
had good knowledge of in-country developments and that the
Djiboutians regarded the terrorist threat as low. An
incident could happen, however, but the Djiboutians thought
the local police and intelligence services were on top of
things.


24. (C) French forces in Djibouti were important
forward-deployed forces. Puga believed that the ability to
respond quickly to crises with a small force was often better
than waiting too long to build up a large force and then
arriving after a small fire became a big one. French forces
were following the situation in Somalia and shared
information with the U.S. France had no contacts with the
Islamic government. Unlike Afghanistan, there was no
evidence of terrorist training camps in Somalia, although
Puga said individual terrorists might be present and believed
that Somalia might be used as a transit point or refuge for
terrorists on the run. Arms and drug trafficking were
concerns. He concluded that Somalia was a worry for the
medium term.


25. (C) Puga said that French forces were cooperating with
Yemen and had helped to train Yemen's Special Forces over the
past two years. The trainers were not a permanent presence
but worked in Yemen on a periodic basis. The French were
following the Ethiopia-Eritrea crisis and tried to promote
equilibrium. France was perhaps more worried about a
possible spillover of the crisis and its effect on Djibouti.
He said that France's military interest included making sure
that France had an evacuation plan in place. Puga mentioned
in passing the difficulties in working with Eritrea. Puga
said that a French general officer was stationed in Addis
Ababa to work with the African Union. The AU was not yet a
mature, effective organization, but France would be patient
and would remain engaged in helping it succeed.


26. (U) Ambassador Symington has cleared this message.



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