Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS6042
2006-09-08 15:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
FRENCH AGREE WITH U.S. ON SERBIA'S NEED TO
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C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 006042
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ICTY SR YI FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH AGREE WITH U.S. ON SERBIA'S NEED TO
COOPERATE WITH THE ICTY
REF: STATE 146343
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO
NS 1.5 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 006042
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ICTY SR YI FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH AGREE WITH U.S. ON SERBIA'S NEED TO
COOPERATE WITH THE ICTY
REF: STATE 146343
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO
NS 1.5 (b) and (d)
1. (C) French MFA officers responsible for the Balkans
confirmed on September 7 that the GOF was "completely in
line" with U.S. thinking on Serbia's need to demonstrate
effective cooperation with the ICTY. France, he said, had
been skeptical about the EU "Action Plan" from the start and
was now convinced that it had only served to complicate the
situation. French officials continue to encourage Serbia to
take concrete steps to apprehend Mladic and deliver him to
The Hague.
2. (C) MFA officials noted that not all countries in the EU
shared France's resolve and that the Finnish Presidency, EU
High Representative Solana, the Italians, Germans, and the
Austrians might be willing to overlook Serbia's lack of
cooperation with the ICTY, in order to restart SAA
negotiations. Many EU members, they added, thought it was
necessary to give Serbia some sort of incentive as Kosovo
final status negotiations enter the end game. The GOF hoped
that Carla Del Ponte's upcoming report might give France's
position more traction in the EU. The French stressed that
lacking real Serbian commitment to the Action Plan, France
would lobby against reopening SAA negotiations. They added,
however, that the GOF was not likely to block consensus. The
Croatia experience had shown them that it was not worthwhile;
bilateral tensions with Zagreb persist as a result of
France's holdout position on SAA negotiations last year.
3. (C) The French surmised that EU demands for greater
cooperation with the ICTY as a precondition to reopening SAA
negotiations would not put significant pressure on Serbia.
The principle, however, is important. Serbia still viewed EU
membership in the abstract; the visa regime has more
immediacy and is, they said, the most effective tool
Europeans had to pressure Serbia. That said, when asked what
France thought about using Schengen talks as a stronger
political tool, our MFA interlocuters noted that there is a
great deal of sympathy in the GOF for the Serbs' visa
situation. It was in no one's interests to block your
average Serbian citizen from access to EU countries where
they could better learn western values and discover business
opportunities that would eventually assist the recovery of
the Serbian economy.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR ICTY SR YI FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH AGREE WITH U.S. ON SERBIA'S NEED TO
COOPERATE WITH THE ICTY
REF: STATE 146343
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO
NS 1.5 (b) and (d)
1. (C) French MFA officers responsible for the Balkans
confirmed on September 7 that the GOF was "completely in
line" with U.S. thinking on Serbia's need to demonstrate
effective cooperation with the ICTY. France, he said, had
been skeptical about the EU "Action Plan" from the start and
was now convinced that it had only served to complicate the
situation. French officials continue to encourage Serbia to
take concrete steps to apprehend Mladic and deliver him to
The Hague.
2. (C) MFA officials noted that not all countries in the EU
shared France's resolve and that the Finnish Presidency, EU
High Representative Solana, the Italians, Germans, and the
Austrians might be willing to overlook Serbia's lack of
cooperation with the ICTY, in order to restart SAA
negotiations. Many EU members, they added, thought it was
necessary to give Serbia some sort of incentive as Kosovo
final status negotiations enter the end game. The GOF hoped
that Carla Del Ponte's upcoming report might give France's
position more traction in the EU. The French stressed that
lacking real Serbian commitment to the Action Plan, France
would lobby against reopening SAA negotiations. They added,
however, that the GOF was not likely to block consensus. The
Croatia experience had shown them that it was not worthwhile;
bilateral tensions with Zagreb persist as a result of
France's holdout position on SAA negotiations last year.
3. (C) The French surmised that EU demands for greater
cooperation with the ICTY as a precondition to reopening SAA
negotiations would not put significant pressure on Serbia.
The principle, however, is important. Serbia still viewed EU
membership in the abstract; the visa regime has more
immediacy and is, they said, the most effective tool
Europeans had to pressure Serbia. That said, when asked what
France thought about using Schengen talks as a stronger
political tool, our MFA interlocuters noted that there is a
great deal of sympathy in the GOF for the Serbs' visa
situation. It was in no one's interests to block your
average Serbian citizen from access to EU countries where
they could better learn western values and discover business
opportunities that would eventually assist the recovery of
the Serbian economy.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON