FRANCE/BURUNDI: AMBASSADOR MOLLER'S AUGUST 22

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 005848

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM BY FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE/BURUNDI: AMBASSADOR MOLLER'S AUGUST 22
CONSULTATIONS

REF: A. BUJUMBURA 726

B. STATE 139995

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.5 (b/
d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: French MFA and MOD officials expressed
views on Burundi and the Great Lakes region similar to those
of the U.S. during August 22 discussions with visiting U.S.
Ambassador to Burundi Patricia Moller. MFA officials
expressed concern about the recent arrests in Burundi in
connection with alleged coup plotting and reviewed French
assistance programs, centered on education, refugee support,
public financing, general "capacity building," and limited
police and military training. These paralleled similar
programs in other Great Lakes countries. The MFA officials
stressed the need to keep Burundi moving in a positive
direction and, thereby, serving as a positive example of a
country emerging from a long and destructive period of ethnic
warfare. Both sides agreed on the relative lack of
sophistication of Burundi's leaders and its need to cultivate
a more positive international image and build donor
confidence. FM Batumubwira seemed to be more perceptive than
other leaders but her ability to get things done was
uncertain. The French agreed with Ambassador Moller on the
importance of the Tripartite Plus and other regional
approaches. The MOD military advisor for Africa and the
Middle East offered a terse description of France's interests
in Burundi and the region. He tended to minimize France's
interests and its ability, given other demands and limited
resources, to influence events there. He stressed the need
for greater involvement in the region on the part of the
international community. All of Ambassador Moller's
interlocutors cited good U.S.-France cooperation on Burundi
and the region, and stressed their commitment to continue
working with us to achieve our common goals. END SUMMARY.

Meeting at MFA
--------------

2. (C) THE "COUP": MFA AF PDAS-equivalent Elisabeth
Barbier (expected soon to become Ambassador to Kenya) and
Burundi desk officer Laurent Chevallier met with Ambassador
to Burundi Patricia Moller on August 22. Barbier immediately
expressed concern about the situation in Burundi following
the recent series of arrests in connection with an alleged
coup plot. She was keenly interested in Ambassador Moller's
assessment. Ambassador Moller reviewed recent events and
noted clear signs that those arrested had been mistreated, if
not tortured. Barbier confirmed reports that former
President Ndayizeye remained in confinement. Ambassador
Moller said that she and other ambassadors had expressed in a
direct manner their concerns about the arrests to FM
Batumubwira.


3. (C) LEADERSHIP ISSUES: Ambassador Moller said that FM
Batumubwira was one of Burundi's leaders capable of seeing
the "big picture" and of understanding how the international
community's perception of Burundi affected relations. Other
GOB leaders lacked sophistication and experience, many having
been far from the centers of power before assuming control a
year previously. Barbier and Ambassador Moller discussed the
many uncertainties about the arrests and the GOB's claims of
having evidence of a coup plot but its failure to display
such evidence.


4. (C) RESPONSES TO THE "COUP": Barbier and Ambassador
Moller noted the absence of any apparent links between the
arrestees, making a coup plot less plausible. The Burundian
army had not, so far, taken any action. Barbier expressed
disappointment in President Nkurunziza's August 17 speech
(ref A) and his failure to take decisive measures, although
she agreed that addressing the issue publicly was a good
step. Ambassador Moller described her exchange with FM
Batumubwira and different perceptions in Burundi and the U.S.
on presidential speeches during a crisis -- obligatory in the
U.S. but a possible sign of weakness in Burundi.


5. (C) DONORS CONFERENCE/FRENCH PROGRAMS: Concerning the
Burundi donors conference scheduled for the autumn,
Ambassador Moller and Barbier discussed Burundi's often naive
concept of international assistance and the expectation that
simply holding a conference would generate new assistance.
Barbier said that France was trying to orient its assistance
programs to meet Burundi's priorities, with the education
sector an object of French support. France was also helping
with police training (which Ambassador Moller welcomed).
Other areas for assistance included refugee support, public
financing, and "capacity building." These were French

priorities for other countries in the Great Lakes region.
The political and security background in Burundi would be
important for donors -- unrest and signs of instability would
scare off donors. Ambassador Moller reiterated Burundians'
failure to appreciate the importance of projecting a positive
image internationally and the sometimes differing responses
one received from different GOB ministries.


6. (C) Chevallier noted with dismay that some Burundians
viewed foreign assistance as a form of reparations from the
colonial era and not a resource to be carefully invested for
Burundi's future. He stressed the importance of making clear
to the GOB that donors would expect improvement in such areas
as human rights and good governance. The question of
demobilized FNL members after the signing of an accord was
also complex and potentially costly, and determining the
FNL's intentions was always difficult.


7. (C) POLITICS: Barbier said that FM Batumubwira seemed
aware of Burundi's image problems and asked whether the FM
could do anything about them. Ambassador Moller said that
that was a key question that remained to be determined.
Deskoff Chevallier noted that the present coalition led to a
lack of cohesion within the GOB. Ambassador Moller pointed
out President Nkurunziza's high popularity in contrast with
his relatively weak leadership. Barbier was concerned about
postponement of the GOB-FNL summit, which would be an
opportunity to bring key actors together and to push
President Nkurunziza in the right direction. She hoped the
summit would take place. Ambassador Moller lauded South
Africa's and Tanzania's policies towards Burundi. Barbier
and Ambassador Moller agreed that France, the U.S., and
like-minded countries were sending similar signals concerning
Burundi.


8. (C) ONUB: Both Ambassador Moller and Barbier expressed
uncertainty about ONUB's fate following the UNSYG's
recommendation that it be downsized (ref B),and to what
extent it might continue playing a positive role politically
and economically should its mandate continue. Ambassador
Moller noted that the downsizing was in part a result of a
Burundian request. It was not clear whether Burundi had
taken into account the strong contribution to the local
economy ONUB's personnel had been making. Another
uncertainty centered on how Burundi would handle
truth-and-reconciliation issues. On the positive side,
Ambassador noted that the Burundian press was much freer than
its counterpart in Rwanda and had done a good job covering
the recent arrests. Chevallier cited another positive -- the
recent "coup" arrests remained a political issue only and had
fortunately not acquired an ethnic dimension.


9. (C) A GOOD EXAMPLE: Barbier said that Burundi so far
represented a good example of a country lifting itself out of
prolonged ethnic turmoil, with all its complications. France
wanted it to continue moving in a positive direction and to
serve as an example, particularly to the DRC. Rwanda was not
serving as such a model politically, she said. She agreed
that Rwanda was enjoying relative economic success. The
international community needed to keep steering Burundi in
the right direction. Barbier hoped that donors had not been
negatively affected by the arrests and subsequent
controversy. She agreed with Ambassador Moller that
Burundi's ambitious social programs (health care, education)
would be expensive, and a failure in these areas could
produce serious problems. The issue of the sale of the
presidential aircraft was not helping.


10. (C) TRIPARTITE PLUS: Barbier and Ambassador Moller
agreed on the value of the Tripartite Plus process, which had
been useful for all parties involved to address common
problems such as insurgencies. Chevallier commented on the
importance France placed on stability in the DRC and how
French regional efforts always took into account the DRC.
Ambassador Moller reported good cooperation among Tripartite
Plus ambassadors in Bujumbura and her good working
relationship with France's ambassador. She described USG
assistance programs following the lifting of 508 sanctions in
December 2005. Various IMET programs were in train and the
U.S. had helped organize a civil-military seminar and similar
meeting that had been well received.


11. (C) The meeting closed with a commitment by both sides
to continue existing U.S.-France cooperation in Burundi in an
effort to achieve the many goals the U.S. and France shared.

Meeting at MOD
--------------


12. (C) Colonel Eric Bonnemaison, the MOD's military
advisor for Africa and the Middle East, met with Ambassador
Moller prior to her meeting at the MFA. (COMMENT:
Bonnemaison tended to view Burundi from a narrow military
perspective and he did not address many of the concerns
Barbier raised. END COMMENT.) He said that one of the
biggest security challenges in the region was the difficulty
in controlling borders, which insurgent groups exploited. He
suggested the need for a regional approach because individual
countries could not solve border control issues individually.


13. (C) MODEST INTERESTS: In Bonnemaison's view, France's
interests in Burundi were relatively few. Economic interests
were limited and the Francophonie movement, while important,
did not, in his view, warrant major French involvement. Most
interventions in the region were for humanitarian purposes.
He noted France's involvement in Rwanda during the 1990s and
continuing problems stemming from France's performance during
the 1994 Rwandan genocide and questions surrounding Operation
Turquoise. This difficult era and continuing judicial and
public inquiries concerning France and the genocide, he
suggested, were inhibiting France-Rwanda military cooperation.


14. (C) DRC: When asked, Bonnemaison said that the DRC
posed many challenges. It was a large country and difficult
to govern. One objective was simply to avoid having it
collapse. He believed it necessary to involve a range of
other countries, suggesting that France's ability to shoulder
the costs of supporting stability in the DRC were beyond its
means. However, aside from the U.S., UK, and France, there
was not much interest among others in the DRC, especially
with other crises in Africa demanding attention. Migration
(legal and illegal) from Africa was one concern of Europe's
Mediterranean states.


15. (C) CHINA: Concerning China's increased influence in
Africa, Bonnemaison said that China could play a helpful
role, but had chosen not to do so. The Chinese did not share
our concerns regarding democracy, transparency, and the rule
of law. Ambassador Moller noted China's activism in Burundi
and PRC programs to build roads, schools, and water-related
facilities. Bonnemaison said that the MOD estimated
500,000-750,000 Chinese in Africa; he expected China to
continue its "invasion" of Africa. He said that Chad's
dropping of Taiwan and establishing relations did not
surprise him.


16. (C) FRENCH MILITARY IN AFRICA: Asked about the
restructuring of French military headquarters in Africa,
Bonnemaison said that the purpose was to give a more regional
focus to them, and to align them in ways that would parallel
Africa's several sub-regional multilateral organizations.
This would not come, he said, at the expense of France's
existing bilateral military relations. Bonnemaison explained
military training programs offered to Rwanda and Burundi,
including the "maison metier" program, which he described as
a program to offer broad-based basic skills training to the
military in Burundi. (COMMENT: Barbier suggested that the
"maison metier" program had recently ended but similar forms
of cooperation were either in progress or under
consideration. END COMMENT.) Ambassador Moller described
the ending of the 508 sanctions in December 2005 and U.S.
programs initiated since then. Bonnemaison encouraged
cooperation between the French and U.S. embassies in Burundi,
and with France's defense attache, resident in Rwanda.


17. (U) Ambassador Moller authorized transmission of this
message.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON