FM LIVNI'S AUGUST 22-23 VISIT TO PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 005737

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/28/2016
TAGS: PREL MOPS MARR EUN LE KPKO UNSC FR
SUBJECT: FM LIVNI'S AUGUST 22-23 VISIT TO PARIS

Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO
NS 1.5 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate read-outs of FM Livni's August
22-23 visit to France, French Middle East A/S Equivalent Jean
Felix-Paganon and Israeli CDA Rafael Barak both emphasized
that Livni was adamant on the need for full implementation of
UNSCR 1701, given the explosive regional context. She
stressed the need for a rapid deployment of UNIFIL and
support from the international community to prevent the
rearming of Hizballah. She refrained, however, from pressing
France on a force commitment. Livni and the French agreed to
coordinate on a possible second UNSC resolution and the
establishment of a sanctions committee. The French underlined
the need to target suppliers rather than hold the Lebanese or
UNIFIL responsible for cross-border re-armament of Hizballah.
Livni expressed concern that the French had been overly
solicitous of Lebanese views during the negotiations on UNSCR
1701, seeing little need to remain in touch with Israel, a
role it relegated to the U.S. Livni made clear that Israel
was not prepared to negotiate on Shebaa Farms pending
progress on dealing with the threat posed by Hizballah.
Despite some differences, both sides expressed general
satisfaction with the state of the bilateral relationship,
and were confident that the improvement of the past year
would be preserved.


2. (C) On the Palestinian issue, Livni underscored Israel's
determination to formulate its own plan given that
international efforts had shown few fruits to date, while
French officials expressed qualified support for the Arab
League proposal of a UNSC meeting on the Middle East. On
Syria, Felix-Paganon claimed that other Europeans' efforts to
engage the SARG were indirectly responsible for the SARG's
hard line on monitoring of the Syria-Lebanon border. END
SUMMARY

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French Read-Out of Livni Visit
--------------


3. (C) In an August 24 meeting with the Charge, Middle East
A/S Equivalent Jean Felix-Paganon characterized Israeli
Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni as a constructive interlocutor
who spoke frankly to GOF officials (PM de Villepin, FM
Douste-Blazy, Minister Nicolas Sarkozy and Socialist Party
First Secretary, Francois Hollande) about Israeli concerns
regarding the need for immediate and full implementation of
UNSCR 1701. Her visit to Paris, as the French saw it, was
intended chiefly to highlight the urgent need for a rapid
deployment of UNIFIL and an effective plan to stop the
rearmament of Hizballah. Felix-Paganon said Livni had
stressed that the Olmert government was facing mounting
domestic pressure about its handling of the conflict and that
the GOI had already risked a great deal by agreeing to UNSCR
1701, uncharacteristically turning a vital security role over
to the international community. Livni, he commented, was
clearly personally very invested in the Security Council
Resolution and would continue to play an active role in its
execution.


4. (C) According to MFA officials, Livni implicitly
criticized France's inattentiveness to Israeli concerns
throughout the negotiation of 1701. The GOF had advocated
Lebanese interests, often to the detriment of Israel's.
Felix-Paganon said that GOF officials had explained that they
shared many of Israel's views and that France's promotion of
a stable, fully sovereign Siniora government was ultimately
in the interest of all the concerned parties. If the French
negotiating position in NY seemed at times to favor the
Lebanese, this was because the GOF had believed this was in
everyone's wider interest. Furthermore, French officials had
explained that, given that the U.S. had naturally taken the
lead in explaining the Israeli position to the Security
Council, it had therefore been incumbent on France to fully
reflect the GOLs. French officials, he said, explained that
they had been actively sympathetic to Israel's concerns
throughout the crisis, and had only sought to produce a UNSCR
that was acceptable to all sides, while also avoiding a
collapse of the Siniora government. Felix-Paganon asserted
that Israel had not made a serious effort to communicate with
Paris during the negotiations.


5. (C) Felix-Paganon noted that Livni, while stressing the
importance of UNIFIL's rapid deployment, was careful not to
pressure France on its own commitment of forces. Her
message, he said, was that credible forces needed to go in
quickly, as foreseen in UNSCR 1701. The arms embargo issue
was Livni's other priority. Felix-Paganon said French
officials engaged positively with her on the possibility of a
UN sanctions committee to address implementation of
commitments made in paragraph 15 of 1701. Felix-Paganon said
the GOF was looking into the technicalities of setting up
such a committee. He provided no further details, nor did he
identify the authority under which such a committee would
operate. He said that French officials had stressed their
view that the GOL should not be held responsible for arms
coming into the country; rather, the focus of international
sanctions should be on point of origin states. Expanding on
this point, Felix-Paganon commented that the GOF was looking
at the potential of using 1701 to go after Iran and Syria.
He also noted that the EU would soon take the necessary
implementing action with regard to the embargo provisions of

1701.


6. (C) Livni had laid down three key Israeli positions that
needed to be clear to all the players, according to
Felix-Paganon. First, Israel would not recall all of its
troops from Southern Lebanon until a reinforced UNIFIL had
deployed to the region with the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Felix-Paganon said that France understood the Israeli
government's position; there was a need to ensure the area
remained secure.


7. (C) Secondly, Livni insisted that Israel would not lift
the air and maritime blockade until such time that an
effective plan was in place to monitor the air and sea ports.
Israel could not risk the rearmament of Hizballah, and these
ports remained vulnerable to arms traffic. On this point,
GOF officials had countered that there was little information
that these were key points of entry for arms. Some problems
persisted at Beirut airport to be sure, but PM Siniora's
government was working to resolve them. The GOF had proposed
that Israel differentiate between the airport's passenger and
freight operations, allowing the resumption of passenger
traffic. Livni responded that conditions did not exist for
such action. French officials warned that the longer the
blockade remained in place, the weaker the Siniora
government's position domestically. How could the GOL claim
sovereignty when it needed Israeli permission to use its own
air and sea ports?


8. (C) Lastly, MFA officials said, Livni affirmed that Israel
is not now prepared to address a resolution of the Shebaa
Farms issue. There would need to be significant progress on
the threat of Hizballah, including through its disarmament,
before her government would be in a position to consider
negotiations. Israel, she emphasized, had already risked a
great deal and was waiting for the international community to
live up to its part of the bargain.


9. (C) Noting other EU member states' efforts to engage with
the Syrians, Felix-Paganon said Chirac was convinced that
President Asad was acting in bad faith. By engaging the
Syrians, the misguided Europeans had given him an opportunity
to reject UNSCR 1701. Asad's speech and his direct challenge
concerning UNIFIL deployment to the border only proved
Chirac's point. He stated that PM de Villepin would be
taking up the issue with the Finns shortly. Felix-Paganon,
jocular in tone, but serious in intent, noted how alone
Chirac was in his policy to isolate Syria: "In Europe it's
only France that is opposed to dialogue with Syria, and in
France, it's only Chirac."


10. (C) Felix-Paganon noted that FM Livni, commenting on the
Palestinian issue, stated that Israel had followed everyone
else's lead for too long, with no progress. It was now time
for Israel to formulate its own plan. She provided no
clarifying details.


11. (C) The French expressed general support for the Arab
League initiative to seek a UN Security Council meeting
during the General Assembly that would focus on the Middle
East. The French did not believe that there should be an
operational outcome, however, the Security Council could show
its concern simply by holding a meeting. Of course,
Felix-Paganon added, the interlocutors from the Arab League
should be serious ones; Syria, for instance, would not be a
welcome speaker. FM Livni, he said, had asked the GOF to
consult with Israel as thinking on such a meeting moved
forward.
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Israeli Read-Out of Livni Visit
--------------


12. (C) Israeli Charge d,Affaires Rafael Barak, like the
French, portrayed the visit in a generally positive light,
but he noted that Jerusalem had been unhappy with French
actions throughout the negotiation of UNSCR 1701. Barak
noted that this had been the first crisis in a long time in
which the French had a crucial role. They had been open and
accessible throughout. However, the GOF had told Israel it
would deliver the Siniora government on terms acceptable to
Israel, and instead limited itself to presenting Lebanese
interests at the Security Council. The resulting perception
in New York of the U.S. supporting Israel and the GOF
supporting Lebanon had not endeared the French to the GOI. In
spite of all this, Barak said, France did share Israel's
basic concerns and had not played the same difficult role as
in the years of the Intifada. In recent months, the
relationship between France and Israel had improved
significantly and the animosity had dissipated. Common
interests -- a disarmed Hizballah, a stronger central
Lebanese government, and reduced Syrian influence -- had
allowed the two governments to weather this crisis and keep
the relationship intact.


13. (C) Livni, Barak said, was focused in her meetings on
calling for the French to help implement 1701. With little
to show, politically or militarily, for itself, and given
domestic criticism, the GOI needed to make UNSCR 1701 a
success. Barak said Livni's message was focused on UNIFIL
deployment but stayed clear of putting pressure on the GOF to
send additional troops. That said, Israel was disappointed
by France's lack of military commitment to date. (Note:
Barak was speaking before President Chirac's announcement of
France's 2000 troop contribution.) Israel, like others in
the international community, had expected France to take a
leading role in UNIFIL, in terms of command and numbers on
the ground. He said Israel understood that Chirac was facing
difficult military concerns and needed to consider the
possible dangers to its troops as a result of its troubled
relationships with Syria and Iran.


14. (C) The French called for the lifting of the blockade, to
which Livni responded that her government needed more
assurances on the monitoring of arms traffic. He confirmed
that the GOF had asked that a differentiation be made between
passenger and freight sides of the Beirut airport, to which
the FM gave the general response that Israel could not make
any more concessions until there was some sort of progress on
the threat from Hizballah.


15. (C) FM Livni, Barak told us, was satisfied with the GOF
response on the arms embargo. It had agreed that Israel
would work with France in NY to come up with a new UNSCR or
to identify other means, such as the creation of a sanctions
committee. On Shebaa, Barak said, the Israelis pre-empted
the issue by bringing it up themselves and stating
unequivocally that the time was not right for discussion with
the GOI. The GOF side contented itself with noting that
Shebaa remained a matter for future discussions.


16. (C) Barak explained that Livni had not limited herself to
meeting with PM de Villepin and FM Douste-Blazy. On the
Embassy's recommendation, and with an eye on the future, she
also met with Nicolas Sarkozy and Francois Hollande (the
latter in lieu of Segolene Royal or any of the other
presidential candidates). Israel, he observed, needed friends
in Europe right now and the GOI had to work harder to broaden
its contacts.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

HOFMANN