Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS5608
2006-08-21 16:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

UNIFIL: HELPING FRANCE MEET ITS RESPONSIBILITIES

Tags:  PREL MARR FR LE KPKO UNSC 
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Lucia A Keegan 08/22/2006 10:19:23 AM From DB/Inbox: Lucia A Keegan

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 05608

SIPDIS
cxparis:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: ODC AGR STRASBOU DCM PAO FCS SCI AMB ORA UNESCO
 DAO ECON

DISSEMINATION: POLOUT
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:KHOFMANN
DRAFTED: POL:JROSENBLATT
CLEARED: DATT:RHODGKINS

VZCZCFRI718
OO RUEHC RUEHEE RUCNMEM RUEHLB RUEHNO RUCNDT
RHEFDIA RUEAIIA RHMFISS
DE RUEHFR #5608/01 2331648
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211648Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0537
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES PRIORITY
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0425
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3603
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0858
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005608 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2116
TAGS: PREL MARR FR LE KPKO UNSC
SUBJECT: UNIFIL: HELPING FRANCE MEET ITS RESPONSIBILITIES

Classified By: CDA Karl Hofmann, for reasons 1.4 (B and D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005608

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2116
TAGS: PREL MARR FR LE KPKO UNSC
SUBJECT: UNIFIL: HELPING FRANCE MEET ITS RESPONSIBILITIES

Classified By: CDA Karl Hofmann, for reasons 1.4 (B and D)


1. (C) Summary: French-U.S. cooperation has been
significant to the restoration of sovereignty and the
progress of democracy in Lebanon over the past two years. We
have an interest in preserving that partnership, even in the
face of disappointment over France's modest contribution thus
far to a reinforced UNIFIL. We do not yet know if the GOF
decision to deploy 200 additional troops signals a refusal to
take a leading role in UNIFIL-plus, or is in fact a first
step toward a significant French contribution. The French
MOD has from the outset argued against a significant
contribution, claiming lack of clarity on the new UNIFIL's
mission, rules of engagement and command structure. The GOF
has made no effort to produce such clarification on its own
terms. Why has Chirac risked disappointing international
expectations, harming France's credibility? A number of
explanations come to mind: Chirac's trademark
procrastination, concerns about his legacy as he winds up his
presidency, a heightened sense of potential exposure to
Iranian and Syrian targeting, and the fragility of the
cease-fire. That said, we believe Chirac has not completely
closed the door to a leading French role in UNIFIL-plus. We
should consider offering high-level consultations with the
GOF, in Paris or New York, to address how the U.S. might
assist France satisfy its desiderata on UNIFIL's conops,
ROEs, and command and control. A senior-level Washington
call to President Chirac might help focus French thinking.
End Summary.


2. (C) We do not yet know the final dimensions of France's
contribution to UNIFIL-plus. While an expectation had built
that France would deploy from 2,500 to 4,000 troops and lead
a reinforced UNIFIL (something the GOF never explicitly
stated),President Chirac has thus far agreed only to a
doubling of France's 200-strong pre-July 12 contingent.
According to the Presidency, France may yet contribute more;
a significantly larger second-phase reinforcement remains
possible. We have been told that this could consist, in
whole or in part, of a rapid reaction force, responsible for

force protection, perhaps within but more likely outside of
UNIFIL command. Any such decision would be taken by President
Chirac, in consultation with PM de Villepin, MFA
Douste-Blazy, and MOD Alliot-Marie. The earliest such a
meeting might take place would be Thursday, August 24.


3. (C) French-U.S. cooperation on Lebanon (and Syria) has
been crucial over the past two years, extending from UNSCR
1559 to 1701. The progress achieved during that time --
Syria's withdrawal, the emergence of the March 14 group, its
parliamentary election victory and assumption of the
leadership of the government, the UN's continuing
investigation of the Hariri assassination -- owed much to
that cooperation. French steadfastness and diplomatic
activism, a reflection of President Chirac's personal
interest and leadership, provided an effective European
partner in support of an important democratic advance in the
Middle East. We have a strong interest in preserving that
partnership for future use, bearing also in mind our
commonality of interest with regard to Iran and Syria. How we
address France's thus far disappointing response on UNIFIL
has important ramifications for the future of that
partnership.


4. (C) Why hasn't France assumed its putative UNIFIL
responsibilities? France, in this case, is Chirac; he has
assumed personal control of the decision-making process. He
appears to have been won over by the MOD argument that French
troops in a UNIFIL-plus would not be empowered and protected
by a sufficiently clear mission, robust rules of engagement,
and the kind of command and control arrangements required in
a dangerous and volatile environment. If this is Chirac's
main concern, it is not clear why the French have not taken
the initiative in defining and demanding whatever it is they
think their requirements. Instead, they, and MOD
Alliot-Marie in particular, complain petulantly about lack of
clarity, as if they have nothing to contribute to the process
and no lines into DPKO. In short, they have been a model of
passivity in a context of urgency.


5. (C) At this point, we can only guess why such concerns
have prevented Chirac from assuming a role consistent with
France's sense of itself and its special responsibility for
Lebanon.
-- Is it his reflexive caution, his trademark refusal to be
forced to make a decision until he has absolutely no other
choice, always hoping that with additional time more
palatable options will emerge?
-- Is it legacy concerns about irresponsibly sending French
troops off to their deaths during the final months of his
Presidency?
-- Is his caution fed by a grim French analysis concerning
the likelihood that the cease-fire will not hold in any case,
or that the Iranians and Syrians will actively target the
French.


6. (C) Any or all of the above are possible, but what is
more troubling is Chirac's apparent willingness to squander
the good will he has earned with the U.S. over the past two
years, along with the diplomatic and political capital he has
expended to demonstrate how much France still counts in the
region. This is certainly not the outcome the MFA, faithful
to its vision of France's regional role, prefers. The
peculiarities of the political moment do not lend themselves
to a snowballing of domestic pressure. It seems unlikely
that Presidential hopefuls Segolene Royal or Nicolas Sarkozy,
neither of whom are particularly comfortable on foreign
policy terrain, will take this on as an issue, although
Royal, in a speech August 20, vaguely warned against France
"standing aside." Le Monde has weighed in editorially, along
with Dominique Moisi, a notable pundit, calling on France to
lead UNIFIL. It is possible, even in August, that the
political class will wake up and take up the cause, but as of
now there are few signs that will happen.


7. (C) An offer: We should take the GOF at its word that a
final decision on the extent of France's participation has
not yet been made. There remains, at least for a few days,
an opportunity to influence France to follow its own
interests, despite the considerable risks, and assume a
leadership role in UNIFIL-plus. We should consider offering
to help the French formulate their own requirements for
UNIFIL's mission, rules of engagement, and command structure,
and work together to see that they are satisfied in New York.
We might also consider what the U.S. could offer in the way
of logistical, intelligence or planning support to a
French-led UNIFIL. If the French were receptive, a
high-level PM/IO team could meet with them in New York or
Paris to work through both elements -- before any final
decision by the GOF. A high-level phone call to Chirac could
also help focus French thinking. We will continue to explore
French receptivity, and to help push the GOF to live up to
its rhetoric of responsibility. We welcome Washington views
on this approach.


8. (C) A caution: As we continue to support international
efforts to field a robust and credible UNIFIL-plus, we should
try to avoid any scenario that weakens the potential for
future partnership with France on Lebanon, Syria and Iran.
Even if in the end France flinches definitively on UNIFIL,
our own interests will not be served by contributing further
to France's loss of credibility.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

HOFMANN