Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS5544
2006-08-17 09:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

TOGO: EX-MINISTER BOKO DISCUSSES POLITICAL

Tags:  PREL PHUM PGOV TO FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2790
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHFR #5544/01 2290905
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 170905Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0448
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005544 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: EX-MINISTER BOKO DISCUSSES POLITICAL
DIALOGUE

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reason
1.5 (b/d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005544

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TOGO'>TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: EX-MINISTER BOKO DISCUSSES POLITICAL
DIALOGUE

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reason
1.5 (b/d).



1. (C) SUMMARY: TOGO's ex-Interior Minister Francois Boko
said on August 16 that he hoped the political dialogue in
Ouagadougou between the TOGOlese government and opposition
would be productive, but he believed the process would result
only in cosmetic changes designed to improve the
international acceptability of the Faure regime, now seeking
legitimation after a period of consolidation. Boko said that
the Faure regime, the French government, and elements of the
opposition asked him to join in the dialogue, but he refused,
saying that he preferred a role outside the process that
would allow him to engage in constructive criticism. Boko
said the Faure regime was determined to establish itself
firmly before the May 2007 French presidential elections and
the almost certain departure from power of President Chirac.
Boko commented ironically that his actions in speaking out
against the Faure government have led to his isolation among
many Africans and to limited job opportunities. END SUMMARY.

Political Dialogue
--------------

2. (C) At an August 16 meeting, former Interior Minister of
TOGO, Francois Boko, said he was following closely the
political discussions between TOGO's government and members
of the opposition, taking place in Ouagadougou. He said that
the dialogue would likely result in superficial changes that
would make the Faure government more acceptable to the
international community and would facilitate the resumption
of foreign aid, one of the regime's main priorities. In
Ouagadougou, Faure would not agree to reforms that would
challenge his hold on power but might, for example, name an
associate (NFI) of UFC opposition leader Gilchrist Olympio as
Prime Minister, and place other opposition figures in
position of ostensible authority.


3. (C) After having spent the past 18 months consolidating
its hold on power, the Faure regime was now in "Phase II," an
effort to gain legitimacy, Boko observed. He noted that
Faure was succeeding to some degree in giving the impression

that he would govern TOGO in a more enlightened fashion than
had his father, but Boko cautioned that this only reflected
Faure's more sophisticated approach to crafting his image,
using modern public relations tools, and following his
counselors' advice.


4. (C) Boko said he had been approached by the GOT, members
of the opposition, and the French to join in the Ouagadougou
talks, but had declined. These approaches consisted of
appeals to his patriotism and his experience, but Boko said
he preferred for the moment to remain outside the process and
to establish his family in France. He believed that he could
serve better as an "outside, constructive critic" than as a
member of the GOT, should the GOT follow up on its suggestion
that it would offer him a government job if he joined the
political dialogue. "If Faure gets everybody into the
process, who would be left to serve as an independent
critic?" he asked. He said that his role would not be
destructive. "I want to hold them to whatever they decide in
Ouagadougou. If they decide to investigate the hundreds of
killings at the time of the 2005 elections, and they don't do
so, I'll be in a position to call this to public attention,"
he said.


5. (C) Boko said he did not want to give the impression
that he was against the Ouagadougou talks or that he
discounted their value. The opposition, he said, had to take
what it could and make the most of it. "Even if opposition
members in the government have only symbolic powers, they can
still make a difference, and at the very least 'slow the
damage,'" he said. He nonetheless reiterated that the Faure
regime intended to co-opt as much of the opposition as it
could, and the opposition, "tired" after so many years in the
wilderness, was probably more pliable than one would want.
With a government integrating significant opposition members,
Faure could credibly claim "reform," and international
pressures against him could subside, Boko said. This was
what Faure hoped to achieve.

TOGO and France
--------------

6. (C) Boko said that both the Faure regime and the French
wanted rapid measures that would further entrench the Faure
regime in power. Progress in Ouagadougou would allow the
French to receive Faure honorably during his planned
September 2006 visit to Paris, and reconciliation with the
opposition and the formation of a "national unity government"
before the May 2007 French presidential election would do
much to ensure a stable, more palatable Faure regime in place
before Chirac's almost certain exit from the French political

PARIS 00005544 002 OF 002


scene. Given France's long engagement with TOGO and the
Gnassingbes, and its desire not to "lose" another of its
former colonies, France wanted a secure long-term
relationship with TOGO, Boko said. From TOGO's perspective,
firming up Faure's status while Chirac was still in office
was a high priority, as none of his probable successors would
likely view the Faure regime, the Gnassingbe clan, and
France-TOGO relations as favorably as has Chirac.

Still Being Hassled Over Cote d'Ivoire
--------------

7. (C) Boko commented briefly on the continuing
repercussions of the bombing incident in Cote d'Ivoire on
November 6, 2004, when, as TOGO's Interior Minister, he
ordered the arrest of the Belarusian personnel involved in
the attack but then had them released, purportedly after the
GOF's intervention, and later had to testify before a French
judge investigating the matter. (A recent series of new
press reports again highlights Boko's role in this affair.)
Stressing that "I was the good guy" in responding to the
bombing, Boko said that he continued to receive thinly veiled
threats from those associated with Faure, to the point where
he had again requested GOF assistance and protection. He
indicated that the present threat level was lower than it had
once been, but still worrisome, and he appeared comfortable
with the GOF response. He predicted that the GOF would never
completely investigate the Cote d'Ivoire bombing and the
French role in not pursuing the Belarusians -- "this touches
on a matter of state, and the French won't permit an
investigation that would embarrass France."

Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don't
--------------

8. (C) Without regretting the actions he took against the
Faure regime, which led to his exile in France, Boko said
that his anti-Gnassingbe stance continued to complicate his
life. He said that his several applications to work at
international organizations had not, so far, led to any
prospects. He noted the irony -- African countries that have
embraced the Faure regime do not want to support his
applications because they view him as a troublesome dissident
who did not remain loyal to Eyadema (with whom a number of
African despots have much in common),while Western countries
opposed to Eyadema and Faure view Boko as damaged goods
because of his service as an Eyadema minister. Boko confided
that he was seeking to set up an independent law office in
Paris, separate from the French law firm now employing him.
His new office would be loosely affiliated with the French
firm (with which he remains on excellent terms personally),
but he and the French firm agreed that it was best that they
end their official ties -- his presence there was hurting the
firm's business, which depends on many clients from many
sectors seeking opportunities across Africa.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

HOFMANN