EUR DAS BRYZA'S PARIS CONSULTATIONS ON GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 005423

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016
TAGS: PREL FR EUN GG NATO KDEM
SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA'S PARIS CONSULTATIONS ON GEORGIA

REF: TBILISI 1876

Classified By: PolMC Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.4 (B & D).


1. (C) Summary: Visiting DAS Matt Bryza met August 2 with
French Deputy PolDir Baleine du Laurens to discuss
developments in Georgia and Abkhazia. On Georgian reforms,
Bryza countered a suggestion by Laurens that Georgia was
regressing by pointing to continued improvements in press
freedom, treatment of prisoners, judicial independence, and
reducing corruption. But Bryza conceded there was still room
for improvement in the GOG's inter-agency coordination and
implementation of reforms. Bryza affirmed the importance of
a September decision on NATO intensified dialogue for
Georgia, while the French complained that the Georgians were
unnecessarily provocative vis-a-vis Russia. On Abkhazia,
Laurens and Bryza agreed on the need for a UN police force in
Gali. Bryza speculated that the recent Kodori operation had
potentially changed the strategic terms of Georgian-Abkhaz
relations and created a greater justification for the Abkhaz
to allow for an expanded UN presence on their doorstep.
Bryza and Laurens agreed that the Abkhaz needed to be shown
they had options other than Russia's embrace, including
possible trade ties with Turkey. End Summary.


2. (SBU) EUR DAS Matt Bryza discussed Georgia and Abkhazia
August 2 with MFA Deputy PolDir Frederic Baleine du Laurens.
Laurens was accompanied by Deputy Director for Continental
Europe Serge Smessow and Office Director for Russia, the
Caucasus and Central Asia Aurelia Bouchez. EUR CARC
Conflicts Advisor and Deputy PolCouns accompanied Bryza.

Georgia
--------------

3. (C) Bryza briefed Laurens on the recent Georgian police
operation in the Kodori valley. He stressed that the U.S.
had warned the Georgians to avoid being drawn into any
military confrontation in the Kodori Valley or elsewhere in
the region. He told Laurens that Georgian efforts to assert
its authority over the Kodori Valley needed to focus on
establishing civil authority through rebuilding
infrastructure and providing services to local residents --
not by any further military or police actions in the region.
While he was confident that President Saakashvili understood
the U.S. position, he was less confident about MOD
Okruashvili's hawkish tendencies.


4. (C) Laurens expressed concern that Georgia was regressing
on the issues of the rule of law, corruption, and democratic
institutions. Seeing the glass as half full, Bryza argued
that Georgia continued to move forward, even if the pace of
reforms was slower than before. He cited advances in press
freedom, decreases of police abuse of prisoners in custody, a
lowering of corruption, and increasing judicial independence.
Bouchez speculated that Saakashvili's commitment to reform
did not lead to concomitant implementation by Georgia's
ministries. Bryza acknowledged that the government had
difficulty converting its intentions into deeds, and called
for a change in political culture that would also empower the
political opposition. Noting the upcoming municipal
elections, he commented that Saakashvili's enormous
popularity could produce election results that, ironically,
might lead observers to question the fairness of the
elections. Bouchez noted that the electoral rules were
rigged to produce an outcome that was not necessarily
representative. Bryza agreed that this was a potential
problem and undertook to raise it with Georgian authorities.


5. (C) Bryza, citing U.S. support of NATO intensified
dialogue (ID) with Georgia, noted the importance Saakashvili
attached to the international community's role in supporting
his country. Even allowing for Georgian paranoia, Bryza said
Saakashvili had been feeling abandoned and that ID was
therefore an important acknowledgment of Georgia's European
vocation. Bouchez complained that Georgia often acted
against its own interests, particularly vis-a-vis Russia,
undervaluing European efforts to assist it and tending to
view a "balanced" approach to Georgia and Russia as betrayal
of Georgia. Bryza urged Bouchez to show more understanding
for Georgia's concerns about facing Russia alone. That said,
he assured Bouchez that any U.S. decisions on NATO membership
(or MAP) for Georgia would be based on performance; he
expressed hope that France would judge Georgia's candidacy on
its own merits, as well, and not through the optic of
relations with Russia.

Abkhazia
--------------

6. (C) Laurens said the moment had arrived to begin
considering the deployment of a UN international police force
to Gali to foster the return of IDPs, although he was not
sure that the UN was fully on board. (Bryza noted that the

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Georgians had told him that a UN fact-finding mission for a
potential international police force in Abkhazia would
commence later this month.) Laurens thought the UN could
also do more in the areas of health and education. Without
immediate attention, he feared Abkhazia would disappear from
the international agenda, and Georgia would be tempted to
consider a non-peaceful resolution of the conflict. Bryza
agreed on the desirability of demonstrating to Georgia that
solutions other than military ones were possible and
speculated that the Abkhaz might well have an interest in
winning some "breathing space" from Russian pressure. He
said he had asked Abkhaz de facto FM Shamba if the presence
of UN police could help Abkhazia deal with (Russian) CIS
forces, to which Shamba had responded affirmatively. Others
in the Abkhaz leadership had rejected this idea, however,
because any significant return of refugees would lead to an
eventual referendum result against independence.


7. (C) Bryza said the recent Georgian police action in
Kodori had shifted the strategic terms of the conflict. He
added that the U.S. saw the Georgian action as justified, as
it allowed Georgia to reassert its authority over a region
dominated by criminal elements for many years and created the
opportunity to resume UNOMIG observation activities in the
region. He speculated that it could help bolster Georgian
authority in dealing with the Abkhaz, and help convince them
that a UN police force was needed in addition to CIS
peacekeepers.


8. (C) Laurens asked whether Georgia would agree to enhanced
Turkish-Abkhaz trade ties. Bryza responded that Saakashvili
could accept a joint Georgian-Turkish-Abkhaz customs presence
in Batumi, on Georgian territory, but opposed it in Turkey,
since that could be construed as international recognition
for Abkhazia. Laurens responded the Abkhaz could not accept
a Georgian presence in Batumi, but affirmed it was important
that the Abkhaz have ties to others besides Russia, as a
means of demonstrating to the Abkhaz that they had other
choices.


9. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this message.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON