TFLE01: FRENCH PRESIDENCY VIEW: ABSOLUTE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 005305

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2016
TAGS: PREL AEMR MARR CASC LE KHLS FR IS SY IR
SUBJECT: TFLE01: FRENCH PRESIDENCY VIEW: ABSOLUTE
NECESSITY TO REACH AGREEMENT...BUT CONCERN TIME MAY NOT YET
BE RIGHT FOR UNSCR


Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO
NS 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Presidential Middle East Advisor Dominique
Boche offered a measured and candid take on where we are on
Lebanon late August 4. Stressing that Franco-American
cooperation on the UNSCR was excellent, Boche said he
nevertheless feared that some key differences -- deriving
from the opposing needs of the Israelis and Lebanese at this
time -- might not yet be bridgeable. Israel, he said, may
insist on more time to eradicate Hezbollah from the south,
while Hezbollah (and Iran),riding high, would not make it
easy for the Lebanese Government to agree a political package
and an international stabilization force. That said, we must
do everything to reach agreement on a UNSCR as soon as
possible: The situation was rapidly deteriorating, risking a
dangerous escalation of events that could lead to Lebanon's
failure as a state, the spread of the conflict into other
parts of the region, and an increased threat to Israel,s
long term security.


2. (S) Boche said Iran had clearly been party to Hezbollah,s
original provocation. France judged that Tehran was at the
core of the problem, and was not yet interested in being a
party to a solution; based on its outreach last week (special
envoy Cousseran in Tehran and Foreign Minister Douste-Blazy
in Beirut),the GOF had concluded that for now at least, the
Iranian regime saw no advantage to playing a constructive
role. That could change however, depending on the situation
on the ground. Syria was not a prime player, he said;
Spanish (or German) efforts will not bear fruit. Addressing
France's continued refusal to enter detailed discussion of or
preparation for an international force, Boche took the
familiar position that a political agreement must be achieved
-- and the nature of the force's role -- first. END SUMMARY


3. (S) Political Minister Counselor met August 4 with
Presidential Middle East Advisor, Dominique Boche, to review
French thinking on the way forward in Lebanon. (Boche is
holding down the fort at the Elysee diplomatic cell during
the August holidays; President Chirac returns only in late
August, preceded by a few days by Diplomatic Advisor
Gourdault-Montagne. Both Chirac and Gourdault-Montagne are
of course attending to urgent Lebanon business from their
vacation redouts.) Boche began by emphasizing the need to
move as quickly as possible toward a resolution. He was
concerned that the Lebanese population -- of all confessions
-- was swiftly becoming radicalized, making a settlement more
difficult in the short term and putting its integrity at risk
over the long run. Hezbollah was gaining support -- or was at
least enjoying temporary solidarity -- throughout Lebanon.
The vast quantities of displaced persons would inevitably
cause interconfessional tensions. A further escalation
risked drawing other regional parties into the conflict,
thereby risking the destabilization of several already
fragile states. Despite the extensive destruction in Lebanon,
he said, Hezbollah is currently seen by the Lebanese (and
many in the international community) as the triumphant winner
of the conflict against Israel. This was certainly
Hizbollah's (and Iran's) view. Hezbollah was therefore in no
mood to facilitate Lebanese government agreement to a
realistic political package and to an international
stabilization force. That could change, however, if
Hezbollah suffered serious reverses on the ground.


4. (S) Despite close U.S.-French cooperation, negotiations on
the UNSCR were progressing slowly, with differences over key
points still outstanding. These were not essentially
U.S.-French differences. They derived from our respective
understandings of what the parties could agree to and could
realistically implement, with France more attentive to
Lebanese perspectives and the U.S. to Israel's. With this
tacit division of sensitivities, but with the same shared
understanding of what the traffic would bear on both sides,
our missions in New York were doing their best to forge a
workable approach. Boche feared, however, that perhaps the
time is not yet ripe for agreement. Perhaps necessary
convergence will require a change in the situation on the

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ground sufficient to erode the appearance of a victorious
Hezbollah, enabling both Israel and Lebanon to acquiesce to a
common political package, and permitting the dispatch of
stabilization force with a realistic chance of accomplishing
its mission. This was his reluctant analysis, however, not
French policy: The U.S. and France must continue to do all
within our power to reach the earliest possible settlement.
If at times it appeared that the US and France differ on
certain issues, this can actually be to our advantage in
dealing with one or another of the parties.


5. (S) Probed about Iran's role, Boche said that the GOF was
convinced Tehran had been behind the kidnapping of the
Israeli soldiers on July 12; the timing, coming as the
pressure on Iran over its nuclear program was reaching a
head, was more than coincidental. There is no question that
Iran is a key player, which is why Paris decided to sound out
Iranian intentions last week. He said that the GOF had
concluded from their meetings with high-level Iranian
officials July 31 and August 1 in Tehran and Beirut that for
the moment Tehran saw no advantage in facilitating a
settlement, and that it remained adamantly opposed to the
presence of an international stabilization force in Lebanon.
With Hezbollah riding high, with the surge of support for it
throughout the region, Tehran would demand terms impossible
for Israel to accept: an unconditional cease-fire, an
international force deployed only on the Israeli side of the
Blue Line, and prisoner exchanges. All of this with no
meaningful quid pro quo. This could change, said Boche. If
the situation on the ground were to evolve significantly, and
to Hizbollah's detriment, Iran might be prepared to play a
braking role on Hezbollah. France might, therefore, check in
again with Tehran at some time. (That said, clarified Boche,
French envoy Jean-Claude Cousseran's visit to Tehran was for
now a one-shot exercise.) As to Iran's motivation more
generally, Boche said Iran -- even the current regime --
desperately wanted recognition from the West, and the U.S. in
particular, as a regional power. While there is something
for us to work with here, admittedly those currently in
charge in Iran do not now appear to be moving in the
direction of serious dialogue.


6. (S) Syria is a completely different story, Boche stressed.
It lacks motivation for resolving the crisis -- which
diverts attention from a possible Hariri tribunal -- and is
in any case not a key actor. It is a only a supporting
player both in terms of its regional position and its
influence on Hizbollah. Reaching out to Syria, as Spain has
advocated, would be like negotiating in the Cold War with
Poland or Bulgaria rather than the Soviet Union -- a foolish
waste of time. Syria's role is now largely limited to that of
a transit state. Spanish efforts were ill advised, as they
attributed to Damascus an importance it does not merit.


7. (S) Concerning a UN-sanctioned stabilization force, Boche
insisted that the time was not yet right to address
specifics. Hewing to current GOF orthodoxy, he argued that a
political agreement must be in place before its mandate or
composition could be realistically discussed. That said, he
offered that the GoF hoped a force would be multi-sourced,
including forces from Turkey, Arab countries, and of course
Europe, notably France. A sine qua non would be acceptance
by all the parties. France could not agree to the deployment
of any force that would be targeted by Hezbollah. Like the
U.S., France remembered 1983 only too well. Its mandate,
broadly, would be to assist the LAF in stabilizing the
southern region of Lebanon and ensuring border security.
Admitting that preparation of the force could take some time,
Boche referred vaguely to UNIFIL's possible interim role.


8. (S) Despite the wear and tear, France's improved relations
with Israel, Boche said, continue to hold. Douste-Blazy and
Gourdault-Montagne were in regular contact with their Israeli
counterparts, and the GOF with Prime Minister Olmert. Israel
understood France's position and role, and he noted there was
no intention on the part of France, or Israel he thought, to
move away from their continued close dialogue. Boche noted
that France's Ambassador to Israel, Gerard Araud, would be

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taking up his new duties as MFA Political Director
early-to-mid September. (Note: Araud's appointment was
warmly greeted by the Israeli Embassy here.)


9. (S) Boche closed by returning to the heart of the matter:
The strategic goal is the full and final disarmament of
Hezbollah. While this may take some time, it can only be
reached through as rapid as possible an agreement among the
parties, involving compromise for both, on the elements of a
UNSCR. Increasingly, the future of Lebanon and the stability
of the region depended on our success.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

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