ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR ON FRANCO-ALGERIAN TREATY,

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000466

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/20/2016
TAGS: PREL AG MO FR
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN AMBASSADOR ON FRANCO-ALGERIAN TREATY,
BOUTEFLIKA'S HEALTH

REF: 05 PARIS 6890

Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) During a January 19 introductory meeting with the
Ambassador, Algerian Ambassador to France Missoum Sbih
confirmed that the long-sought Franco-Algerian friendship
treaty remains stalled over differences over historical
issues, namely how to address French colonization of Algeria.
Originally, the GOA had sought to include mention of
colonization in the treaty, to which the GoF objected; both
sides then agreed to consider making appropriate statements
at the time of the signing of the treaty. Ambassador Sbih
added that the French National Assembly's refusal to revoke a
February 2005 French law lauding the positive role of French
colonization had further complicated the issue, which was now
a domestic political controversy in both Algeria and France,
with French opinion polls showing a majority of the public
supporting the law. Those in France who objected to the
February 2005 law, he added, did so by arguing that the
Assembly should not legislate on historical matters, not by
challenging the assertion of a positive French colonial role.


2. (C) Sbih concluded that efforts to rewrite the February
2005 law, led by National Assembly President Debr at the
request of President Chirac, are unlikely to succeed, due to
public unwillingness to own up to France's colonial misdeeds
and the pressures of France's impending presidential
elections in 2007. Sbih concluded that if the Friendship
Treaty is to be signed, it will require a grand gesture of
the part of President Chirac, whom Sbih viewed as weakened
but looking to leave behind a legacy, with few
accomplishments to show and a third presidential term out of
the question. Sbih conceded that it remained possible that
the friendship treaty will be abandoned, which he viewed as
not a terrible loss for Algeria, but a far larger setback for
the GoF. In Sbih's view, Algerian-French relations would
continue at their already excellent level without the accord,
though they would not reach the "exceptional level" (in
Sbih's definition, better than French relations with Morocco
or Tunisia) promised by the treaty.


3. (C) Sbih described himself as a close and longtime
collaborator of Algerian President Bouteflika, having served
as Bouteflika's chief of staff for many years when Bouteflika
was Minister of Foreign Affairs. He added that he remained
at the President's side during his month-long hospitalization
in France. Sbih described Bouteflika as in the "final stages
of convalescing" from his illness, which he insisted was
exactly what the GOA had described to the public: a stomach
hemorrhage and nothing more. Sbih stressed that Bouteflika
was gradually resuming his usual level of activity, and
concluded that perhaps the president's staff had been too
cautious in insisting that Bouteflika remain in France for
several weeks to recover.


4. (C) Comment: Elysee contacts have described upgrading
relations with Algeria as Chirac's most pressing priority in
the Middle East after Lebanon. Failure to conclude the
friendship treaty with Algiers would be a major personal
setback for President Chirac, whose military service in
Algeria prior to independence was a formative experience. We
expect that Chirac will seek to work his longtime personal
relationship with Bouteflika (and the political capital
gained by Bouteflika's treatment by French government
doctors) to bring the treaty to fruition. At the same time,
it does not appear that the GoF will seek to conclude the
treaty at any price; GoF officials continue to stress to us
that a French apology for its colonial past in Algeria
remains of the question. End comment.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton