Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS2391
2006-04-12 07:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

MFA OFFICIALS DISCUSS C.A.R. AND CHAD WITH DRL/CAR

Tags:  PREL PINR CT CD FR 
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VZCZCXRO0344
PP RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #2391/01 1020749
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 120749Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6210
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0026
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0364
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0712
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002391 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR CT CD FR
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS DISCUSS C.A.R. AND CHAD WITH DRL/CAR
DESKOFF

REF: FBIS RESTON VA 560149 (101042Z APR 06)

PARIS 00002391 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002391

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR CT CD FR
SUBJECT: MFA OFFICIALS DISCUSS C.A.R. AND CHAD WITH DRL/CAR
DESKOFF

REF: FBIS RESTON VA 560149 (101042Z APR 06)

PARIS 00002391 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA desk officers Charlotte Montel
(C.A.R.) and Lt. Col. Marc Conruyt (Chad) briefed DRL/CAR
desk officer Stuart Crampton on April 6. Regarding C.A.R.,
Montel noted limited but growing contact between French and
C.A.R. parliamentarians and recent calls for increased
government transparency. Information was difficult to
obtain, particularly concerning the northwest region.
President Bozize's Presidential Guard continued to act with
impunity, with Bozize apparently powerless to exert control
over the Guard. The GOF had information indicating that
Lord's Resistance Army leader Kony had recently been in C.A.R.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: Chad was perhaps the least unified
and most fractured country in Africa in terms of ethnic
divisions, Conruyt said. He expressed continuing GOF support
for Deby, who remained Chad's only credible political leader,
and cautioned against the notion that Deby should be asked to
consider stepping down a year or two after the May 3
elections. Conruyt noted Deby's problems with Sudan and with
other members of his own ethnic group. Paris daily
Liberation in its April 8-9 edition carried an article on
France's strong commitment to the Deby regime and the
importance of French support to Deby's remaining in power.
Although not stated directly, the article carried the
suggestion that France's policies were not balanced and were
tied too directly to one individual (Deby) whose political
future and health status were precarious. NOTE: These
conversations took place before news of the heightened
military activity in Chad began circulating April 11-12. END
SUMMARY.

C.A.R.


3. (C) Montel said the GOF was not assisting C.A.R.'s
parliament but French parliamentarians (Senate and Deputies)
were working within their respective "friendship groups" to
engage Chad's parliamentarians in promoting visits and
increased contact. Montel noted French priorities to
encourage democracy, good governance, and free expression.

She commented on three MPLC deputies and others, including
some journalists, who have asked the government for more
transparency regarding several clashes in the northwest that
produced scores of deaths. There have also been calls for a
government investigation. Montel viewed as very positive
these public calls for a more responsive government.


4. (C) Montel commented on the difficulty of obtaining
timely and accurate information on C.A.R., especially from
the northwest, where only two NGOs (CARITAS and Medecins Sans
Frontieres) maintained a semi-permanent presence. France
hoped that the Multinational Force of the Economic and
Monetary Community of Central Africa (FOMUC) would collect
and disseminate more information. Montel said that France
wanted a greater EU role in providing development assistance
to C.A.R.; meanwhile, France continued to provide technical
assistance via about 40 experts seconded to C.A.R. agencies.
She noted particular French interest in public finance and
ways to meet IMF conditions so as to overcome salary
arrearages for many C.A.R. functionaries.


5. (C) Montel lamented the Presidential Guards' brazen
impunity and willingness to act violently. She believed
President Bozize was "trapped" by the debt he owed to those
who helped him gain power, including many in the Presidential
Guard. Bozize could neither control some of them nor bring
them to justice for their many abuses.


6. (C) Montel stressed the serious nature of the attacks,
including the killing of civilians, reportedly committed over
the past several months by a mixture of rebels, highway
bandits ("coupeurs de route"),and other criminal elements
operating in the northwest and elsewhere in C.A.R. She said
the MFA did not know whether former President Patasse was
behind the unrest and doubted that he could coordinate the
activities of such diverse groups from Togo, where he has
remained in exile since President Bozize seized power in 2003.


7. (C) While highlighting the lack of available information
about and in C.A.R., particularly in the northwest, Montel
said the MFA had reports that Lord's Resistance Army leader

PARIS 00002391 002.2 OF 003


Jospeh Kony had been in C.A.R. at some point during the last
few months. She said the MFA considered these reports
credible.


8. (C) Montel stressed the importance of C.A.R. in relation
to Chad and the security of the sub-region. She noted that
northeast C.A.R., along the frontiers with Chad and Sudan,
was the most neglected and little-known region of C.A.R. She
cautioned that this area was of high concern since unrest
from Sudan and Chad could quickly spillover into C.A.R.

CHAD


9. (C) The briefing continued during a meeting with back-up
Chad deskoff Lt. Col. Marc Conruyt, a military secondee to
the MFA. (NOTE: Lead Chad deskoff was on TDY in Benin. END
NOTE.) Emphasizing the complexity of Chad and its history,
as well as the country's current multiplicity of players and
interests, Conruyt said Chad was essentially a "country only
in name." Fragile and populated by a large number of nomadic
and agriculturalist ethnic groups, Chad was unique, and, in
his view, perhaps the least unified African country.
Populations with different interests -- black Africans and
North African "Arabs" -- found their destinies suddenly and
awkwardly intertwined during the colonial period. During
that period, French training and education tended to serve
the black African community in the south and not the more
nomadic "Arab" populations to the north. Conruyt commented
that some of the northerners, such as the Zaghawa, were
historically viewed as great warriors, which might help
explain why they remained largely in control of Chad today.
The lack of a military tradition in the south had hampered
the development of a mature political opposition, he
speculated.


10. (C) Conruyt said that rebels of various backgrounds,
including the Sudan-supported Rally for Democracy and Liberty
(RDL) and former allies of President Deby, had coalesced
against Deby. Although Deby's overthrow remained a major
French concern, Conruyt said it was not clear what France
would do if Deby were deposed by force. In addition, Conruyt
repeatedly said that, despite Deby's serious flaws (including
a lack of respect for human rights),Deby was a "statesman"
and a much more viable leader than anyone else. The
opposition severely lacked the "necessary political skills,"
in Conruyt's view.


11. (C) Conruyt acknowledged that the lifting of
presidential term limits, which began with the National
Assembly's vote in May 2004 and concluded with the June 2005
referendum, was lamentable. However, when pressed on the
issue of whether Deby might stand down a year or two after
this May's elections -- provided that a deal was brokered
discreetly by France, among others, and that a suitable
successor were identified -- Conruyt replied that such
intervention by France, the U.S., and other members of the
international community would lack legitimacy. Conruyt did
not think Deby would agree to step down under such a
scenario. France simply viewed Deby as the only person able
in the circumstances to lead the strife-ridden country,
particularly since the political opposition, according to
Conruyt, was "not credible," too divided, and "incapable" of
agreeing on any sort of platform other than to have Deby
leave power.


12. (C) The opposition's boycott of the May 3 election,
according to Conruyt, was similar to the boycott of the
referendum held in June 2005 to end presidential term limits.
Although some members of the opposition had made strong
statements threatening to "block" the elections, Conruyt said
he did not expect them to succeed in blocking the elections.
Conruyt thought it quite possible that, after winning the May
3 election, Deby would make some concessions to the
opposition.


13. (C) Conruyt highlighted Deby's problems with Sudan and
members of his Zaghawa ethnic group, some of whom have
accused Deby of failing to protect his own clan members, in
Darfur and Chadian villages on the Sudanese border, from
Janjaweed and Sudanese government attacks. Conruyt remarked
that Deby belonged to both the Bideyat and the Zaghawa, very
similar but separate groups, with the Bideyat nonetheless
"subordinate if not inferior" to the Zaghawa. Although the
exact source and details were murky, Chad continued to
provide intermittent support to rebels in Sudan, just as the

PARIS 00002391 003.2 OF 003


Sudanese government supported rebels in Chad, Conruyt stated.
Despite this situation, however, Conruyt said that both
governments claimed to work together to monitor the border in
efforts to prevent the outbreak of war.


14. (C) Asked about the status of the oil revenue
management agreement, which Chad breached in 2005, and
relations with the World Bank, which suspended all loans to
Chad as a result, Conruyt said that the World Bank team
currently visiting Chad was attempting to renew contacts,
repair the badly damaged relationship, and arrive at a
face-saving "gentleman's agreement" to move beyond the
current impasse, which benefited neither the Bank nor Chad.
Conruyt said he expected that Deby likely would pursue some
judicial reforms and anti-corruption measures after his
re-election in 2006.

LIBERATION


15. (U) The April 8-9 edition of Paris daily Liberation
carried a story on the importance of French civilian and
military support to Deby's ability to stay in power (ref A).
The article notes the role France played in assisting Deby to
overcome the March coup attempt and French support for the
campaign against the rebels. Deby remains "in the eyes of
the former colonial power, and also according to a number of
local analyses, the only one who can govern a profoundly
unstable country. Is it Deby or chaos?" asks Liberation. A
member of France's military chief of staff in Paris says that
French forces "accomplish a deterrent mission concerning
external threats and furnish logistical support to Chad's
armed forces. In no case will our soldiers participate in
combat." But for how long, Liberation asks? A Chadian
observer notes: "We are protected and directed by France.
No one cares about the future of Chad; the only thing that
counts is guaranteeing the regime."



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton