TOGO: APRIL 5 MEETING WITH EX-MINISTER BOKO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002348

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PHUM TO FR
SUBJECT: TOGO: APRIL 5 MEETING WITH EX-MINISTER BOKO

REF: A. PARIS 1118

B. 05 PARIS 4103

C. PARIS 1919

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Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reason
1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Togo's ex-Interior Minister Francois Boko
said during an April 5 meeting that the regime in Togo feared
active U.S. intervention in Togo's affairs and that the U.S.
could readily influence events in Togo if it chose to do so,
and even compel the leadership to step down, as in Haiti and
Liberia. The U.S. could, for example, demand that the GOT
investigate the deaths of those who died during the April
2005 elections and insist that it do something about drugs
and arms trafficking. Togo's fear of the U.S. makes it very
unlikely that any damage will be done to USG
properties/personnel in Togo. Boko recounted his failure to
meet with Gilchrist Olympio, whom he deemed "more of a guru
than a political leader." The GOT has become more overt in
threatening Boko, and he has obtained some cooperation from
the French for his and his family's protection. END SUMMARY.

U.S. INFLUENCE


2. (C) On April 5, we met with Francois Boko, Togo's
Interior Minister until April 2005. Our last meeting took
place in February (ref A). Boko emphasized the potential
power the U.S. could wield in Togo. He said the Gnassingbe
clan had always expressed fear and concern that the U.S.
might turn attention to Togo and exert pressure. Eyadema,
Boko said, had feared that the U.S. would someday do to Togo
what Eyadema believed the U.S. had done in Haiti and Liberia,
which was to tell Aristide in Port-au-Prince and Charles
Taylor in Monrovia: "OK, your time's up, we've had enough.
It's time for you to go." Boko cited several occasions when
Eyadema had told his inner circle to back off certain
projects for fear of attracting unwanted attention from the
U.S., one being the drug smuggling case described ref B.
Another incident involved the issuance of a diplomatic
passport to a Togolese known to be in disfavor with the USG
(whom Boko did not identify). Eyadema instructed that the
passport not be issued, to avoid "complications with the
Americans."


4. (C) Because of this fear, Boko said that it would be
very unlikely under the present regime that any harm would
ever intentionally come to USG properties or personnel in
Togo. He said that the burning down of the German cultural
center at the time of the 2005 elections in Togo could not
happen to a U.S. facility. If such a thing happened, Togo's
leaders feared that the next day a U.S. aircraft carrier
would appear off-shore and launch all manner of retaliation
against Togo and its leaders. "They have learned what your
military is capable of doing and that Washington seems less
hesitant to use force than was perhaps the case in the past,"
Boko remarked.


5. (C) Boko said that the U.S. could exploit this fear to
produce positive change in Togo. Although acknowledging that
"perhaps Togo is not your highest priority," Boko suggested a
number of steps. The U.S. could send a "strong message with
a hint of menace" to Togo and demand that its human rights,
anti-corruption efforts, and good-governance practices
improve. It could demand that Togo undertake, in cooperation
with outside legal authorities, a complete investigation of
drug and arms smuggling involving Togo. The U.S. could
initiate UN Security Council action to demand an
investigation of the hundreds of deaths that took place
during the 2005 elections. Boko said that the more direct
and insistent the U.S. appeared, the more Togo's leaders
might feel inclined to cooperate.


6. (C) The Department's annual Human Rights Report on Togo
also made a big impression. Togo's leaders dreaded its
appearance, Boko said, and had put in place a mechanism to
produce a quick response showing how the HRR was "wrong."
Boko said that he found the reports "90 percent" accurate
("you could hardly expect 100 percent accuracy") regarding
individual cases, but that more importantly, it presented an
accurate global picture of a dismal human rights situation.

GILCHRIST OLYMPIO


7. (C) We informed Boko, without going into detail, that we
had met recently with Paris-based opposition leader Gilchrist
Olympio (ref C). Boko said his frustrations with Olympio
continued, most of which centered on Olympio's belief that
he, Olympio, embodied the opposition and was the only
opposition figure who mattered. However, Boko believed
Olympio did not function as a political leader should.
Olympio operated on the assumption that the Togolese exile

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community should come to him, express loyalty and gratitude,
and adopt his positions without quibbling. Unfortunately,
Boko continued, Olympio never seemed to take action or
inspire others to take action. His view of himself as
opposition leader rested mainly on his decades' old belief
that the Gnassingbes illegally stripped power from the
Olympios and that Gilchrist was the only proper heir to a
claim to power in Togo. Expressing his frustration, Boko
said "he's more like a guru. We don't need a guru but rather
an active political leader." He remarked dryly that Olympio
and Eyadema shared the same birthday (December 26),although
Eyadema was born three years before Olympio.


8. (C) Boko said that because of comments we had made at
our last meeting, he had decided he should seek a meeting
with Olympio, which he tried to arrange in March. He almost
called it off when he learned that during a public speaking
engagement in Accra, Olympio, when asked about Boko, said
"well, he seems to be plotting a coup." This outraged Boko.
Such an accusation would only increase the risk that the GOT
would try to harm him or his family. Nonetheless, Boko
worked through intermediaries to arrange a meeting with
Olympio. Boko wanted a formal meeting, with an agenda and
specific things to discuss. "I wanted him to understand that
this was business and that I wasn't going there to kiss his
ring," he said. However, the effort came to naught when
Olympio reportedly said, "well, I really don't want or need
to see him." Boko indicated that he would not continue
pursuing a meeting with Olympio for the time being.

THREATS


9. (C) Olympio's statement in Accra was not the only reason
the GOT had increased threats against Boko, he said. At his
February 4 meeting with the Togolese diaspora (ref A),Boko
was questioned, by someone he later learned was an agent of
the GOT, about the "Gilchrist Olympio passport affair" and
Togolese drug smuggling. Boko said he answered these
questions but without revealing details. He explained to us
that the Olympio passport issue involved a request in 2004
from Eyadema that Boko, as Interior Minister, issue Olympio a
new passport. The problem was that Eyadema wanted Boko to
use a scanned signature of Olympio's, and to create in effect
a forged passport. (COMMENT: Boko did not elaborate on why
Eyadema wanted Olympio to have this passport. END COMMENT.)
Boko refused to issue the passport on the basis of the
scanned signature. Instead, he asked the Togolese consulate
in Paris to obtain a genuine signed passport application from
Olympio that Boko later used to issue the passport. On the
drug smuggling issue, Boko said that at the February 4
meeting, in response to the question, he explained evidence
of drug smuggling in Togo without being specific.


10. (C) In March, in response to what Boko said at the
February 4 meeting, a GOT-controlled journalist in Togo
published an article denouncing Boko's "disclosure of state
secrets" (i.e., his discussion of the Olympio passport affair

SIPDIS
and the drug smuggling). The article accused Boko of further
disclosing "state secrets" when he testified to French
authorities investigating arms trafficking and the November
6, 2004, bombing of French forces in Cote d'Ivoire by the
Ivoirian military. Boko said he interpreted this article as
calling for his death. The article said that by revealing
"state secrets," Boko had "violated an agreement he had made
with France, Germany, and the United States when he left Togo
after the April 2005 elections." Boko said he knew of no
such "agreement." He was heartened, he said, when certain
Togolese military officers subsequently distributed
statements saying that if anything happened to Boko, they
would retaliate against the journalist.


11. (C) Boko said that soon after, Togo's Foreign Minister
paid a private call on Boko at his Paris law office, and
beseeched him to "be quiet" and not "betray state secrets."
Boko countered the accusations and said that he was now a
private citizen engaged in legitimate political discourse who
had never revealed state secrets. He told the Minister about
the GOT agent who had asked the provocative questions at the
February 4 meeting, and indicated he would not bow to Lome's
threats.


12. (C) Also in March, Boko learned that a member of the
Togolese security service was coming to France. According to
contacts in Togo, this individual might be traveling to
France to organize Boko's assassination. Boko said he had
notified French authorities, who said they would keep watch
over the individual. Several of Boko's friends agreed to
observe him as well. The Togolese arrived and then
immediately went to the South of France with a female French
acquaintance, where they stayed for about two weeks. The
French authorities provided the same information to Boko that
his friends did, which Boko found reassuring.

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THE FRENCH


13. (C) Boko said he meets sporadically with MFA AF
A/S-equivalent Bruno Joubert to discuss his situation. Boko
was ambivalent about the sincerity of Joubert's commitment to
help him. He said that when the GOT issued a world-wide
diplomatic note canceling Boko's diplomatic passport (ref A,
para 8),the French MFA circulated the note with a cover
letter to the immigration and customs services instructing
them to seize Boko's diplomatic passport if he tried to use
it in entering or leaving France. Boko was upset about this
and confronted Joubert, asking "so now you are executing the
instructions of the Togolese government?" Boko said that
Joubert accepted his arguments, said it must have been a
mistake, and made a few calls to remove Boko's passport from
the black list. Boko continues to use the diplomatic
passport, as the GOT will not issue him a new civilian one.


14. (C) Boko said that he has also discussed with Joubert
an apparent attempt by the GOT to obtain records of Boko's
phone calls. He explained to Joubert that "I don't care if
the French are listening to my calls," which he said Joubert
emphatically denied was happening, but that he especially did
not want the GOT to know the identities of his associates or
confidants in Togo who would phone him, which would be very
dangerous for those individuals. Joubert, according to Boko,
assured him that the GOT would receive no GOF assistance in
obtaining a record of Boko's phone calls.


15. (C) Boko said that, for now, he had not received
further requests to testify in the arms smuggling case that
French investigative judge Brigitte Raynaud had been pursuing
before her recent move to another job (ref A, paras 3-5)
Immediately after the press reported on his testimony, Boko
said he complained to Raynaud about the apparent leaks on
which the reports were based. She denied leaking the
material to the press. However, Boko said that Raynaud
indirectly indicated that the leaks "may have been made" in
order for her to establish some public record of where she
had taken the case before she changed jobs. Devoted to her
cases, Raynaud wanted to make it difficult for them to
disappear once she was no longer overseeing them. Boko
believed that one reason Raynaud shifted to another job was
because her investigations, which included other unrelated
cases in Rwanda and Cote d'Ivoire, were making other elements
of the GOF uncomfortable.


16. (C) COMMENT: Boko was quite insistent that if the U.S.
flexed its muscles, Togo would cower and be more cooperative.
He was a bit more direct at this meeting in labeling himself
an opposition "leader" than he has been in the past Although
clearly troubled by the threats he believes are directed
against him, Boko was calm in describing them. He indicated
that exposure to some danger was among the lumps one has to
take if one travels the road of an opposition leader in
exile. END COMMENT.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton