FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL AFRICA ADVISOR OFFERS OVERVIEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002259

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016
TAGS: PREL XA IV FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL AFRICA ADVISOR OFFERS OVERVIEW
TO AF/W DIRECTOR CARTER

REF: PARIS 1706

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Presidential Advisor for Africa Jacques
Champagne de Labriolle on April 3 provided a broad overview
of French Africa policy during a meeting with AF/W Director
Phillip Carter. He made the following observations:

-- Chad and Cote d'Ivoire were France's main concerns at
present. In Cote d'Ivoire, Banny's appointment as PM seemed
to be ending "three years of waste." Banny would visit
France April 10-13.

-- France was trying to take a regional approach to Africa
and focus less on bilateral projects that have only a limited
impact.

-- A number of geo-political factors were having important
effects: increased north-south migration, leading to ethnic
and religious frictions; colonial-era borders that tended to
increase those frictions; and medical advances (against
sleeping sickness, for example) that indirectly encouraged
migration of nomadic tribes in the Sahel, such as the Taureg,
southward.

-- France sought a flexible relationship between UNOCI and
UNMIL that would permit a rapid deployment of forces between
the two missions as circumstances required. It would have
been wise to consult Africans in advance on plans to arrest
Charles Taylor and prosecute him in the Hague. The failure
to do so would only worsen African suspicions of high-handed
treatment by Westerners.

-- African leadership was often modeled on tribal
structures, which featured long tenures in office. This
explained the tendency of African leaders to prolong their
rule as long as possible. France, without term limits of its
own, could not criticize directly on this point but would
advise abiding by national constitutions in upcoming
succession cases, e.g., in Guinea. Although the coup in
Mauritania had resulted in few repercussions, it served as a
bad example for Guinea, where France hoped that the
succession would not develop as it had in TOGO. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Jacques Champagne de Labriolle, deputy to
Presidential Africa Counselor Michel de Bonnecorse, met with
AF/W Director Phillip Carter on April 3 and, in a
freewheeling, unstructured presentation, discussed a range of
issues. He began by stating that Chad and Cote d'Ivoire were
the countries of most concern to France. He noted that the
steady eradication of tse-tse flies and trypanosomiasis
(sleeping sickness) had led to increased migration southward
from the Sahel, allowing nomadic tribes to move south,
causing increased friction with indigenous southern
populations. The friction was both ethnic and religious, as
northern populations were invariably muslim. The phenomenon
was visible in Chad, where agriculture was declining.
Another factor contributing to north-south tensions was the
way colonial borders had been set. He noted the "natural"
frontier/border that ran through Senegal and the northern
tips of Burkina Faso and Nigeria and then across the middle
of Chad and Sudan. Political borders did not respect this
"natural" divide, however, and he observed that countries
through which the "natural" frontier ran (e.g., most notably
Chad and Sudan, but also including Mali, Niger, and Nigeria)
all had serious north-south tensions/conflicts/problems.


3. (C) France was adopting an increasingly regional and
functional approach to African affairs, Labriolle said.
Concentration on bilateral assistance efforts resulted only
in "small" projects with a restricted local scope. France
therefore sought a broader perspective, with priorities that
included health, water, and reforestation -- activities with
a wider impact. He lamented the difficulty of implementing
change in the French diplomatic service and the need to
change individuals, who were not, especially among the
functionnaire class, always amenable to innovation.


4. (C) Labriolle spoke favorably of Cote d'Ivoire PM Banny,
whose consolidation of power had begun to put an end to
"three wasted years." Pressure from the international
community was important -- if attention shifted, Labriolle
predicted, progress would cease. The International Working
Group was useful, but it could not last forever, particularly

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given its current structure of monthly ministerial meetings.
Although there had been no call for postponing the October
elections in Cote d'Ivoire, Labriolle said that "no one save
the organizers" wanted them, and he thought there could be a
delay of two or three months. Labriolle expressed concern
about security in western Cote d'Ivoire and the performance
of Bangladeshi peacekeepers, who had done well in Abidjan but
not in the more challenging western regions of Cote d'Ivoire.
UN forces were returning to the area but had lost
credibility as a deterrent after the flight of the
Bangladeshis in Guiglo. Labriolle thought it best to
backstop UN forces with French Licorne forces. Labriolle
said that Banny would visit France within the next 15 days
(NOTE: MFA says April 10-13) and would meet with Chirac. A
complicating factor in French calculations was the number of
Ivoirians, including many of the worst political
troublemakers, possessing French passports or residency
documents. This was also the case in Guinea and TOGO. On
UNSC sanctions and Cote d'Ivoire, Labriolle said that the
French now had a better understanding of U.S. procedural
requirements for imposing sanctions, which relieved concerns
on the French side that developed in February.


5. (C) On the UNOCI-UNMIL issue and allocation of forces
between the two missions, Labriolle stressed the importance
of maintaining flexibility to allow rapid redeployment --
within 48 hours -- from one to the other as circumstances
required. Although the UN was weak militarily, the Nigerians
with their reputation for toughness in Liberia were different
and constituted a true deterrent, Labriolle opined. He did
agree with Director Carter that the UN also had to review
what needed to be done to improve UNOCI's efficiency and the
efficacy in meeting its mandate. Aside from the less than
stellar record of the Bangladeshis in UNOCI, many African
peacekeepers were not up to snuff, Labriolle suggested. He
expressed French disappointment in particular with the
performance of the Senegalese detachment to AMIS in Darfur,
which had deployed with French support.


6. (C) On Charles Taylor, Labriolle said that it would have
been wise to consult in advance with the Africans on
transferring Taylor to the Hague, rather than to have them
learn about this after Taylor's seizure and transfer to
Monrovia. This late notification and the image of Taylor
being judged by whites in distant Holland would not play well
in Africa and would increase the impression of high-handed
Western treatment of Africans. Liberia President
Johnson-Sirleaf told Chirac of the plans for Taylor's arrest
and prosecution during her March 7-10 visit to France (ref
A); Labriolle said that "we were surprised to learn of her
deal" with Obasanjo.

7 (C) Speaking generally, Labriolle at several points
referred to African leadership models and their frequent
similarity to tribal structures and expectations on the part
of both rulers and ruled. This accounted, he said, for the
long tenures of African leaders and the importance that rule
over a long period meant to those accustomed to a "chief" at
the top for many years. Nigeria was a concern, but Labriolle
noted the difficulty France, which has no presidential "term
limits," had in calling for others to respect their own
constitutional limits. (Along with these observations,
Labriolle mentioned at several points the lack of an
established "political class" in most African countries. He
faulted Houphouet-Boigny in particular as "not a great man"
but only an African chieftain because of his failure to
develop an Ivoirian political legacy.)


8. (C) Nigeria faced a number of difficult challenges, in
Labriolle's view, including north-south frictions and the
difficulty of governing the Niger Delta and its oil
resources. Labriolle said that the possibility that Nigeria
might "cease to exist" as a functioning state was becoming
more real, although he refrained from predicting an imminent
demise. He believed that, contrary to most cases, Nigeria's
short-term issues were more serious than its mid- or
long-term ones. Given Nigeria's potential troubles --
Labriolle termed it a monstrosity that could implode at any
point -- Labriolle judged Obasanjo's continuation in office
as "reassuring."


9. (C) Labriolle said that Burkina Faso President Campaore
had changed for the better after many years of troublesome
behavior. He said France had delivered several "hard
messages" to Campaore to keep him in line. France had few
doubts that Campaore had supported rebel elements in Cote

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d'Ivoire and was continuing to do so. Nonetheless, France
refrained from a public condemnation of Burkina Faso's
destabilization of Cote d'Ivoire in order to avoid unleashing
massacres in Abidjan. Recent Burkinabe support was within
the limits France had set down, since it did not facilitate a
renewed offensive rebel posture or capability. Labriolle
believed that Burkina Faso's original involvement in Cote
d'Ivoire in September 2002 was predicated on the assumption
that Lionel Jospin, who had earlier declared a "hands off"
policy in Africa, would win that year's French presidential
election. Jospin's candidacy fizzled, however, and the more
interventionist Chirac won a second term, yet Burkinabe plans
for engagement in Cote d'Ivoire were already in train.
Labriolle suggested that Burkina Faso had paid for its
miscalculation and that Campaore had begun to understand his
limits.


10. (C) Labriolle noted that the recent coup in Mauritania
had "passed too well," making no lasting impression with
little subsequent disruption. Labriolle commented that even
those close to the former regime did not seem upset.
Nonetheless, the episode served as a bad example for Guinea.
Labriolle noted Conte's health problems and the possibility
that the constitution would be suspended, which France would
oppose. Labriolle said that France did not want the
succession in Guinea to play out as it had in TOGO and would
insist on respecting the constitution. Noting another
difficulty France had in dealing with its former colonies, he
referred to the fine line between acting too assertively and
provoking cries of "colonial interference," and adopting a
more detached posture, which produced accusations of
"abandonment."


11. (U) AF/W Director Carter has cleared this message.



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