Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS2067
2006-03-30 13:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL

Tags:  PREL MARR SU CD IV BN LI NI FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6972
PP RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHFR #2067/01 0891313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301313Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5785
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 PARIS 002067 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR SU CD IV BN LI NI FR
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISOR BONNECORSE: SUDAN, CHAD, COTE D'IVOIRE, BENIN,
CHARLES TAYLOR

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG STAPLETON, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 PARIS 002067

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR SU CD IV BN LI NI FR
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENTIAL
ADVISOR BONNECORSE: SUDAN, CHAD, COTE D'IVOIRE, BENIN,
CHARLES TAYLOR

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG STAPLETON, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Zoellick on March 10
discussed Sudan, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Benin, and the possible
transfer of Charles Taylor from Nigeria to the Netherlands
via Sierra Leone, with the French Presidency's Africa
advisor, Michel de Bonnecorse. On Sudan, the two sides
expressed general agreement on the need to encourage progress
in the Abuja talks, create a UN mission for Sudan, and
support AMIS in the interim. Bonnecorse notably did not
engage in a NATO-EU theological discussion of the roles of
the two organizations. He related French efforts to lobby
others to accept a UN operation, noting the possible need to
use non-Western peacekeepers, but with Western support for
planning and logistics. On Chad, both sides agreed on the
need to consult closely in order to support stability and to
plan for ways to ensure a peaceful transition to a post-Deby
Chad. The two sides agreed on the need to strengthen PM
Banny in Cote d'Ivoire. Bonnecorse also suggested increasing
the UN presence in Cote d'Ivoire (but did not push this point
aggressively); the Deputy Secretary said that a drawdown of
UNMEE could provide resources to do so. He suggested P-3
talks on Cote d'Ivoire.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: Bonnecorse expressed concern about
the possibility that those in President Kerekou's circle
might try to derail the ongoing election process in Benin and
thereby allow Kerekou to remain in power. The Deputy
Secretary noted the leverage the U.S. enjoys through the

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Millennium Challenge Account with Benin and that we would use
it if necessary. Bonnecorse noted an agreement between
Liberian President Johnson-Sirleaf and Nigerian President
Obasanjo for Charles Taylor to be transferred to the Hague,
via Sierra Leone, for prosecution. Bonnecorse urged rapid
UNSC approval of this plan and the need to prohibit Taylor

from spending too much time in Sierra Leone because of the
possibility his supporters might try to free him. The Deputy
Secretary agreed on the need for quick action. END SUMMARY.

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3. (C) Deputy Secretary Robert Zoellick met on March 10 for
over an hour with Michel de Bonnecorse, Africa advisor to
President Chirac. MFA A/S-equivalent Bruno Joubert, a
notetaker, and an interpreter attended on the French side;
Ambassador Stapleton, Khartoum Charge Hume, AF DAS
Ranneberger, D Chief of Staff Padilla, D Special Assistant
Smith, and an Embassy notetaker accompanied the Deputy
Secretary.

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SUDAN: U.S. ASSESSMENT


4. (C) The Deputy Secretary reviewed his talks on Sudan in
Brussels earlier in the week. The EU's Solana succeeded well
in framing the issues, which centered on: (1) recognition
that all parties needed to advance the Abuja peace talks; (2)
recognition of the need to strengthen AMIS (although
modalities for doing so were not clear); and (2) moving
forward with creating a UN operation, which the AU was to
discuss on March 10. The Deputy Secretary said that,
concerning Abuja, he would have a better sense of
developments following his meeting later in the day with AU
Special Envoy Salim Salim.


5. (C) The Deputy Secretary reported that the Government of
National Unity (GNU) appeared to be drawing closer to a
common position, a useful step. This would include the
National Congress Party and the SPLM, with First
Vice-President Salva Kiir also involved. The main issues
were: (1) power sharing, (2) the distribution of wealth, and
(3) security. There appeared to be elements on the first two
issues in play but the security issue was more complicated,
with several challenges in terms of sequencing and
operational effectiveness. A certain amount of pressure, and
a way to channel such pressure to make it productive, might
be necessary to effect progress. Salim seemed to express
some weariness with the process. He had mentioned a possible
"enhanced cease-fire," which, the Deputy Secretary said, the
U.S. supported, but an enhanced cease-fire might not be more
effective than the cease-fire that is ostensibly already in
place, which is not widely respected. However, if this could
form the basis of further security discussions, the U.S.
could offer its encouragement. The Deputy Secretary noted
his earlier meeting on March 20 with EU Special
Representative for Sudan Pekka Haavisto, who also mentioned
Salim's interest in going forward in this manner.


6. (C) The Deputy Secretary commented that progress in
Abuja would help in many respects. He noted, however, that
divisions on the rebel side persisted, and that it was

PARIS 00002067 002.2 OF 006


difficult to reach an agreement when one side continued to be
divided. It would be important, if Salim finds a reasonable
solution and is able to bring the GNU along, to press the
rebel side. However, one could not be confident the rebels
would be in a position to negotiate. Progress by Salim would
increase the need for rebel leaders to go to Abuja. The
rebels and government were both part of the process. Another
factor to consider were the tribes/clans in Darfur. Progress
on security would have to complement reconciliation in
Darfur. If not, the process could be manipulated by the
Sudanese government.


7. (C) On AMIS, the Deputy Secretary envisioned support
from NATO and the EU. He had discussed the issue with NATO
Secretary-General de Hoop Scheffer. The most likely option

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seemed to be robust planning support. Recent assessments of
AMIS showed a shortage of personnel, limited access to
intelligence, and logistical and operational planning
shortfalls. The Deputy Secretary said the U.S. was looking
for contributions from NATO and the EU and was not
"theological" on how that could be obtained. However, we
would need an AU or UN . Without support from NATO and the
EU, it was difficult to see how AMIS could be strengthened --
who would provide forces? Who would provide additional
funding?


8. (C) On the UN issue, the Deputy Secretary noted Sudan's
continued opposition to a UN mission. Solana in Brussels had
prodded Sudan Second Vice-President Taha, commenting that in
BBC news footage, many of those protesting UN involvement
resembled soldiers and not students. Solana effectively made
the point that attacking the UN was not sensible and that "we
are all members." At the Sudan Consortium Conference the
previous day, the Deputy Secretary noted his expression of
outrage to Taha and Salva Kiir that some were calling for the
deaths of UN Special Representative Pronk and U.S. Charge
Hume. We needed to push harder in explaining that this was
completely unacceptable, he emphasized. AU Commission
Chairman Konare seemed willing to be supportive regarding a
UN operation, as were other AU PSC members, but this had to
be balanced against Khartoum's pressure to avoid a UN
mission. The Deputy Secretary had received mixed reports on
what the AU might decide on March 10. One option, the Deputy
Secretary continued, would be to emphasize the shared goal of

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achieving successful results at Abuja and to link UN
participation to Abuja. The Deputy Secretary noted that as
he was leaving Brussels, Taha seemed to indicate that he was
not against the UN, and had even said this to the press, but
that some in Khartoum were taking a harder line.


9. (C) On the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA),the
Deputy Secretary said that it was appropriate to acknowledge
progress, but the CPA was a complicated document. We needed
to exert pressure to build momentum. There was also a need
to develop financial controls, to ensure that we know how
funds we provide are used. Within the CPA context, we needed
to push on security issues as well, to encourage North-South
progress, which could have a positive effect on Darfur.


10. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted his first meeting with
Salva Kiir and the huge challenges he faced. He has proved
to be an intelligent individual coping well with the
pressures he faces on many sides -- from Khartoum, the South
(including Mrs. Garang, Bonnecorse interjected). All things
considered, the Deputy Secretary said that Salva Kiir had
done relatively well. We needed to support and strengthen
him. It was easy to criticize him, but that would only
weaken him. The Deputy Secretary believed that Salva Kiir
was capable of a larger role, and noted his efforts to help
with the Darfur problem. Salva Kiir should also be
associated with any progress on the Abuja talks as well.

SUDAN: BONNECORSE


11. (C) Bonnecorse thanked the Deputy Secretary for his
analysis. He said the Brussels meetings had been useful and
that there had been a good climate at the Consortium
Conference on March 9. Concerning the AU PSC and UN issue,
Bonnecorse said that he did not believe the PSC would decide
on an outright "no." However, the PSC might instead express
an "OK, but . . ." Bonnecorse said that there should be a
strong link between progress at Abuja and the move to a UN
mission, and, at the same time, strong continued support for
AMIS. He said there were problems involving timing and the
pressure the international community could bring to bear.
Progress might be achieved in Abuja within three or four
months, with pressure from the international community on
African states, Khartoum, and on the Sudanese rebels. He

PARIS 00002067 003 OF 006


said it was nearing time to "put a gun to their heads" to
reach agreement in Abuja. Bonnecorse also suggested the need
for a cease-fire agreement enforced by AMIS and a framework
agreement on power sharing and the distribution of wealth.
This framework agreement was something that could perhaps be
considered or implemented once the UN mission is operating.


12. (C) Bonnecorse said that the GOF had discussed Sudan
and the UN issue with a number of countries. He noted
President Chirac's discussion with Egyptian President
Mubarak. Chirac called a number of African heads of state
after speaking with President Bush. The "reasonable" leaders
understood the need to go to the UN. However, one message
the French had received was that the UN mission should not be
composed primarily of peacekeepers from Western countries.
He added that concerning operational planning and logistical
support, there was likely to be no objection to Western
leadership. He advised that respecting these factors could
make it easier to obtain support for a UN mission.


13. (C) Bonnecorse said the EU and France did not have
extensive influence over the rebels and encouraged the U.S.
to use its leverage. Mentioning Salim's negotiations,
Bonnecorse said that the rebels should be brought together
and encouraged to develop a common political outlook, which
he said they now lacked. He repeated that France continued
to lobby its African contacts, which included those at the
AU, such as Commission Chairman Konare.


14. (C) The Deputy Secretary said he agreed with
Bonnecorse's analysis, but said that U.S. ties with the
rebels were also limited. He said the U.S. would try to
influence them. He suggested that the EU and U.S. both
attempt to do so together. The rebels had started their
rebellion with no political agenda. Salim's process could
identify an outcome that we should persuade the rebels to
accept.


15. (C) The Deputy Secretary expressed concern that the
situation in Darfur would deteriorate. Violence could
escalate at any point such that NGOs and the UN would have to
leave. Calamity would ensue, with over a million people
unfed and left to fend for themselves. He repeated the need
to push for progress at Abuja, strengthen AMIS, and establish
the UN mission. The UN process could take time, and delays
could complicate existing problems. The Deputy Secretary
said that President Bush raised UN peacekeeping during his
recent visits to India and Pakistan and that we would do so
with the Egyptian Defense Minister during his Washington
visit.


16. (C) MFA A/S-equivalent for Africa Joubert said that,
regarding a UN mission in Sudan, we needed to study carefully
what its role and mandate would be. He noted Sudan's
concerns about such a mission being "too heavy." The Deputy
Secretary said that he and Solana discussed this with Taha in

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Brussels. The Deputy Secretary emphasized that having a UN
presence was in Sudan's interest. Khartoum would be better
off with the UN present, if only to deflect some of the blame
for the Darfur situation. Khartoum would no longer be held
completely responsible. The UN mission's mandate could
depend on the Abuja talks. It would be important to create
an environment where refugees and displaced persons were
confident they could return home safely, without the risk of
being attacked by the Janjaweed or other groups. The UN
mission presented several worries for Khartoum, including
loss of sovereignty, which would be complicated if there is
no progress in Abuja. The Deputy Secretary again noted that
one challenge was to make Khartoum understand that the UN
option was in its own interest.


17. (C) Turning to Joubert's point on the UN mission's
mandate, The Deputy Secretary said the mission would require
a robust one. A lightly armed force would face the same
difficulties as AMIS in dealing with relatively well-armed
hostile forces. He stressed the needed for an environment
conducive to a return home by those displaced. We would have
to keep discussing with the Sudanese. Successful talks in
Abuja would make this easier.

CHAD


18. (C) During the discussion of Sudan, the Deputy
Secretary asked about Libya's interests. Bonnecorse said

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Libya was now engaging France in regional issues such as
Sudan, whereas for 30 years it wanted to have nothing to do
with France in the region, and he offered French assistance
engaging the Libyans. The Deputy Secretary and Bonnecorse

PARIS 00002067 004 OF 006


then focused on Chad. Regarding the recent meeting in
Tripoli, Bonnecorse said that one negative point was that
trust between Chad and Sudan had not been re-established in
Tripoli. One positive development was that support by one
side for the other side's rebels had diminished somewhat. He
said that France "knew" that Chad was helping Sudanese rebels
in Darfur politically and militarily, and that rebels in Chad
opposed to Deby were being helped by Sudan. He did not know
the extent to which Sudanese help was attributable to Bashir
himself or came from local factions. He said there were some
7,000 armed Chadians, supplied by Sudan, in the border areas
and that their objective was to march on Ndjamena.
Bonnecorse said that in addition to his fears of being
overthrown, Deby and many others in Chad were concerned about
the "ethnic cleansing" taking place in Darfur and the
possibility that it could spread to Chad.


19. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted recent discussions
between the French and U.S. ambassadors in Ndjamena on the
succession issue and contingencies. He said the U.S.
welcomed these exchanges and would like the U.S. and France
to continue consulting on these matters. The U.S. shared
France's concern over developments in Chad. We would prefer
that Deby not be destabilized, but at the same time, were
worried about his strength and ability to continue. Deby
seemed to be moving forward to the May elections, but had not
instituted UNDP reforms. If he went forward with elections,
would there be a risk of instability? Would these elections
be accepted? Even if elections were successfully held and he
retained power, how much longer would he last? Could an
election victory followed a year later by stepping down from
power lead to a peaceful transition? These were some of the
things that we needed consider but for which there were no
easy answers, the Deputy Secretary said.


20. (C) Bonnecorse agreed that discussions between the two
ambassadors in Chad were useful and thought they should
continue. He said it would be difficult for France to
support the notion of Chad's not going forward with
elections, as some have suggested. Bonnecorse thought Deby
would implement some of the UNDP's suggested reforms and do
something for the opposition before the elections.
Bonnecorse noted that everyone assumed it would be "easy" for
Deby to win, but France had always said that if the
opposition united behind one candidate, it would have a
chance of winning. The opposition, however, refused to do
so. They will run five or six candidates, thus making it
easy for Deby to win. Bonnecorse predicted Deby would make
some political gesture at opening up, but it was difficult to
say whether the opposition would be receptive to such a
gesture. When asked about Deby's health, Bonnecorse said he
had recently received treatment at the American Hospital in
Paris. He "looks better," Bonnecorse remarked.


21. (C) The Deputy Secretary asked whether holding
elections and making overtures to the opposition risked
encouraging instability. Joubert believed that given current
conditions, the risk for turmoil was not high. On the other
hand, Joubert said Deby also feared being overthrown by
members of his own clan. This would create a void. Deby has
made clear that he has always defended the rights of his
Zaghawa ethnic group. The Deputy Secretary commented that
elections could help identify a successor to Deby. But he
acknowledged that there was no identifiable successor at
present. Joubert agreed, saying that France had been
advising Deby to broaden his appeal and create a more
multi-ethnic base of support. Bonnecorse agreed on the
difficulty of identifying a successor to Deby. He lamented
that Chad in many ways was not really a state but rather a
collection of warlords. Despite this, for the past 15 years,
Chad has been relatively stable, the first such period it has
had since independence. All agreed that another 15 years of
stability would be most welcome.


22. (C) Bonnecorse referred to a ministerial meeting on
March 8 in Tripoli, a follow-up to the previous meeting
involving the same countries. Foreign Ministers from Chad
and Sudan were present. He understood that there was an
agreement to develop concrete measures on joint border
patrols. France had indicated that it could help with air
monitoring, if the parties requested French assistance.


23. (C) Discussion returned to Libya and its motives and
objectives regarding Sudan and Chad. Bonnecorse noted the
complex relations between the three countries, as well as
previous attempts to create multilateral arrangements in the
region that had not succeeded (e.g., Sudan/Chad/CAR border
patrolling). Bonnecorse referred to Qadhafi's megalomania

PARIS 00002067 005 OF 006


and desire to be the first president of the "United States of
Africa."


24. (C) The Deputy Secretary and Bonnecorse agreed on the
need for continued consultations on Chad and the succession
issue.

COTE D'IVOIRE


25. (C) Bonnecorse thanked the U.S. for its attention to
Cote d'Ivoire and its willingness to have senior-level
participation in the International Working Group (IWG). This
was an important signal to illustrate the seriousness of U.S.
engagement. On the current situation, Bonnecorse said that
more and more African leaders were telling the French there
would be no solution as long as the incumbent (e.g., Gbagbo)
stayed in power. Bonnecorse said France also preferred a
stronger international presence in Cote d'Ivoire, including a
stronger UNOCI, mentioning 1,500 additional forces. He
predicted that elections in Cote d'Ivoire would not take
place in October as scheduled.


26. (C) The Deputy Secretary said that Banny's appointment
as Prime Minister was a positive step (with which Bonnecorse
agreed). He reiterated U.S. support for the IWG and
indicated that Washington officials would attend some of its
meetings, in combination with the U.S. ambassador in Abidjan.
He noted the poor security situation in the north and west
of Cote d'Ivoire.


27. (C) As for strengthening UNOCI, the Deputy Secretary
said France seemed to understand the U.S. desire not to risk
destabilizing Liberia. However, UNMEE in Ethiopia and
Eritrea would perhaps wind down soon, freeing up resources
for use in Cote d'Ivoire. He understood that France would
like more police forces rather than soldiers in Cote d'Ivoire
(which Bonnecorse confirmed). The Deputy Secretary suggested
P-3 discussions on how to proceed in Cote d'Ivoire. We
should also work to strengthen PM Banny.


28. (C) Bonnecorse agreed with the Deputy Secretary's
analysis. France supported PM Banny as well -- "the only
good news we've had in 3 and 1/2 years." Bonnecorse said
that two ways to strengthen him were the IWG process and an
enhanced UN presence to counteract the extremists in the
Gbagbo camp. Joubert said that any new mandate put in place
if UNOCI enlarges should allow for UN forces to exert greater
control over Cote d'Ivoire's radio and television
broadcasting facility, which the pro-Gbagbo mob always seizes
to use for propaganda purpose whenever trouble erupts.
(COMMENT: Bonnecorse's suggestion that UNOCI be enhanced was
expressed in very moderate, unaggressive terms. END COMMENT.)

BENIN


29. (C) Bonnecorse then raised concerns about democracy in
Benin. He noted that the first round of elections had taken
place on March 5, with the second round scheduled for April.
President Kerekou had not changed the 1990 constitution and
by its terms was not able to seek re-election. However,
Bonnecorse said that members of Kerekou's entourage wanted
him to run again. Bonnecorse understood that they had a plan
to cancel the results of the March 5 election on the basis of
some invented subterfuge, and then declare that Kerekou must
stay in power until "proper" elections could be held.


30. (C) Bonnecorse said that if this "coup" happened, the
international community would need to condemn it swiftly and
strongly. Two-thirds of Benin's population had stated their
desire for a change in leadership, he observed.


31. (C) The Deputy Secretary noted the recently concluded
Millennium Challenge Account with Benin, which was based
partly on democracy and good governance principles. He said
the U.S. would use its MCA leverage if necessary in response
to problems that might arise in Benin along the lines
Bonnecorse mentioned. The two sides agreed to remain in
contact on events in Benin.

CHARLES TAYLOR


32. (C) Bonnecorse said that France understood that
Liberia's President Johnson-Sirleaf had met with Nigerian
President Obasanjo within the past few days and had agreed on
a plan to transfer Charles Taylor first to Freetown, and then
to the Hague, for prosecution. Bonnecorse said the UN
Security Council would likely have to approve this course of
action.

PARIS 00002067 006 OF 006




33. (C) The Deputy Secretary said his knowledge of the
situation was similar to Bonnecorse's. Bonnecorse said
France had "general" information that a member of the UNSC
might not agree to UNSC authorization of Taylor's transfer.
He said that the agreement so far was backed only by
Johnson-Sirleaf and Obasanjo -- he was not aware that any
other African leaders had taken a position. Bonnecorse said
he hoped that the UNSC could act quickly on this matter.
France very much wanted to avoid having Taylor spend any
significant time in Sierra Leone, given the risk that his
supporters might try to free him from confinement. D Special
Assistant Smith noted that the Dutch seemed opposed to a
Chapter VII UNSC resolution on Taylor; Joubert said France
was aware of and did not support the Dutch position.


34. (C) The Deputy Secretary agreed to study the issue
further. He thought problems with China in the UNSC could be
avoided, as long as the Chinese were consulted early and the
issue was presented in a way consistent with China's
interests. China had not been a problem regarding Sudan and
the AU/UN issue, he noted.


35. (C) The meeting concluded with the Deputy Secretary
telling Bonnecorse that he would keep in touch on the issues
they had discussed, and would inform him of anything
noteworthy from his talks later in the day with Salim
concerning Sudan.


36. (U) The Deputy Secretary's office has cleared this
message.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton