Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS1924
2006-03-24 18:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

CHIRAC'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR ON SYRIA/LEBANON, IRAN

Tags:  PREL FR SY LE SP UNSC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001924 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: PREL FR SY LE SP UNSC
SUBJECT: CHIRAC'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR ON SYRIA/LEBANON, IRAN
AND IRAQ

REF: A. STATE 44251

B. PARIS 1588

Classified By: DCM Karl Hofmann for reasons 1.4 (B & D).

Summary
----------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001924

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: PREL FR SY LE SP UNSC
SUBJECT: CHIRAC'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR ON SYRIA/LEBANON, IRAN
AND IRAQ

REF: A. STATE 44251

B. PARIS 1588

Classified By: DCM Karl Hofmann for reasons 1.4 (B & D).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) Amb Stapleton took the occasion of a meeting March
23 with President Chirac's Diplomatic Advisor Maurice
Gourdault-Montagne (MGM) on another subject (septel),to
discuss Middle East issues, focusing on Syria/Lebanon, Iran,
and Iraq. Concerning Syria/Lebanon, MGM said the GOF
continues to believe UNSYG Special Envoy Roed-Larsen should
go to Damascus, enabling him to declare that specific demands
had been made directly of President Asad. The right package
of threats and incentives needed to be agreed on, said MGM,
and he looked forward to further discussion during the
Secretary's upcoming visit to Paris and his own visit to

SIPDIS
Washington the first week of April. He reported
just-received news that Spanish FM Moratinos plans to engage
further with the SARG. MGM stated that Chirac will ask
Zapatero to turn this off. More generally, MGM observed that
while it has been able to hold on, the Syrian regime is
uneasy. Europeans need to be reminded of Syria's close ties
to Iran. Arab governments, beginning with the Saudis, are
fearful of what might come "after Bashar"; this weighs on
their perceptions and policies. MGM had been struck, during
Chirac's recent visit to Saudi Arabia (ref B),by how
troubled King Abdullah is by what he regards as the
destabilizing results of elections across North Africa and
the Middle East.


2. (C) On Iran, MGM said he was pleased by the degree of
agreement between the U.S. and France on how to proceed in
New York -- beginning with a PRST as the vehicle for
expressing Council unity. To reach unanimity in the Council,
however, some further flexibility may be necessary. MGM said
he had offered for consideration to Chirac two changes in the
draft PRST: dropping references to the specifics of the IAEA
resolution, and leaving out for now a Chapter VII invocation.
On Iraq, MGM said that greater Arab support for the
political process was essential, and cited Saudi concern
about Iranian involvement and its implications, particularly
for the stability of its Northeast Province. End Summary.


Syria/Lebanon
--------------

3. (C) MGM noted the fluidity of the moment, and looked
forward to a briefing by UNSYG Special Envoy Roed-Larsen
following his trip to the region. Noting Syrian FM Muallem's
visit to Moscow, and the news just in that VP Shara will be
visiting Riyadh on March 23, MGM said France will "need to
scrutinize" any Saudi or Egyptian initiative, referring to
the possibility that the Saudis might, at the Arab Summit
(and at prior French behest--ref B),encourage Lahoud to
leave office; the Egyptians would then follow up with an
effort of their own. On the whole, observed MGM, the Arabs
remain reluctant to involve themselves. MGM noted a
difference of view with Washington over the advisability of
Larsen going to Damascus, and what "basket of threats and
incentives" he should carry with him. The French would like
to see him go before April 26. MGM reiterated France's view
that it was important that Larsen, as the international
community's single legitimate interlocutor, be able to say
publicly that he had made specific demands directly to Bashar
al-Asad. Referring to recent conversations with Washington,
MGM said he looked forward to discussing the matter with
Secretary Rice next week. He could also be address it when

SIPDIS
he next visits Washington the first week of April.


4. (C) MGM cited opposition to European contact with the
SARG, recalling the French protest to Madrid over FM
Moratinos' trip to Damascus. He added that the GOF had just
learned of Moratinos' intention (not further specified) to
further engage Syria. Chirac would speak directly to
President Zapatero to dissuade him from any further Spanish
efforts -- and from "breaking ranks" with the rest of Europe.
MGM also noted that France remained vigilant in the EU in
order to ensure that the association agreement with Syria
remains frozen. Responding to DCM Hofmann's reminder of the
succession of EIB loans granted to Syria, MGM noted that
France could not oppose those loans that were largely for
humanitarian and developmental purposes; the latest loan, for
water purification, fell in that category. MGM conceded that
the previous EIB telecom loan was unfortunate. With regard
to bilateral sanctions, France still does not have, absent UN
action, the legal basis for undertaking them.


5. (C) Concerning Syria more generally, MGM posited the
need for careful handling so as not to create the impression
of the West ganging up on the Arabs or on Muslims more
generally. Citing perceived impatience in Washington over
Syria, MGM commented that Syria's position has in fact not
improved. Opponents to the regime are now expressing
themselves, and the regime is clearly fearful for the future.
A potentially powerful point for the U.S. and France to
highlight with European governments is Syria's position as
Iran's ally -- given deep concern in Europe over the
radicalization of Iran's regime and policies. Arab
governments, on the other hand, are preoccupied by the
question of what happens if Asad goes. Chirac's recent
visit to Saudi Arabia (ref B) had made clear to him that King
Abdullah, while concerned about Syria, is troubled by
developments throughout the region -- in Morocco, Algeria,
Egypt and the Palestinian territories. They are seen as
being the direct result of elections and other democratizing
moves. With regard to the way ahead, UNSCRs 1559 and 1595
provide the vehicles for a common approach for keeping
pressure on Syria. MGM stated that the reaction in Lebanon
to Brammertz's quiet, focused approach is positive; the
Lebanese see him has a bulldog who has gotten hold of the
case and won't let go. He also commented that the Saudis are
now, for the first time, displaying an interest in an
international tribunal. Due to their increasing nervousness
over the stability of regimes, they see an international
tribunal as possibly providing a deterrent effect against
those who might be tempted to overturn them by assassination.
Responding to the Ambassador, MGM said he understood -- and
shared -- our continuing concerns about terrorist
infiltration into Iraq from Syria.

Iran
--------------

6. (C) Regarding Iran, MGM cited as a noteworthy
development the first internal expression of opposition to
Iran's nuclear policies -- by former President Khatami's
brother. MGM said he had concluded, based on his
conversation with NSA Hadley, that France and the U.S. were
in synch on the way ahead in New York. A clear, unanimous
message to Tehran from the international community is what is
needed. A PRST provides the vehicle. If unanimity in the
Council is not achievable, a UNSCR offers a fall-back. A
resolution would be far less desirable, however. Tehran
would view it as the product of a divided Council, and
conclude its approach had been vindicated. The question now
is what price would we be willing to pay for Council
unanimity. MGM said he had discussed this on March 22 with
Chirac, with FM Douste-Blazy present, and had offered two
ideas. First, while the PRST would contain explicit
reference to the BOG decision, the specific requirements it
sets out for Iran need not be repeated. Second, he had
proposed holding off invocation of Chapter VII at this stage,
but perhaps including a formulation making clear our resolve.
The referral from the IAEA to the UNSC already represents a
politically significant change, he had argued, and the PRST
registered the concern of the international community. It
need not, however, anticipate future UNSC action. The PRST,
unlike a UNSCR, is not after all a vehicle for action; it
therefore need not refer to Chapter VII. MGM noted that the
Chinese, interestingly, were not posing problems in New York.
Chinese positions were having the effect of forcing the
Russians to be more reasonable. MGM closed this segment by
stressing the importance of the U.S. and France staying in
lock step.

Iraq
--------------

7. (C) Responding to Ambassador Stapleton's query about
current French perspectives on Iraq, MGM said that the GOF
had attentively followed the President's latest public
statements on Iraq. While France was extremely concerned
about the situation, it would not -- given the sensitivity --
make any public statements. What is essential is greater
Arab support of a political process that peacefully sorts out
Kurdish, Sunni and Shi'a equities, and produces a government.
Again drawing on impressions drawn from Chirac's visit to
Saudi Arabia, referring to Chirac's meeting with King
Abdullah and his own with Prince Bandar, MGM said he had been
struck by the degree of Saudi preoccupation with Iranian
involvement in Iraq. The Saudis had cited Pasdaran "flooding
across the border" into Iraq, and were clearly fixated on
implications for Saudi stability, particularly with regard to
the Shi'a of the Northeast Province. France favors any
realistic Arab initiatives, including the Arab League's idea
of Iraq's neighbors assisting in the peaceful consolidation
of a united Iraq. MGM also noted that regional fears of
Iranian involvement in Iraq, and Iran's perceived ability to
cause mischief in the region, actually dampen any Arab
interest in criticizing Iran on the nuclear issue. MGM
offered a general caution with regard to dealing with Iran.
For our longer term interests, we must find a way not to
offend Iranian dignity, and avoid actions that have the
effect of radicalizing further the Muslim world, and the
Shi'a in particular. The latter point had been made to him
by Prime Minister Singh's diplomatic advisor, who pointed out
that India is home not only to the world's second largest
Muslim community, but also to the second largest number (22
million) of Shi'a.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton