MEETING WITH GILCHRIST OLYMPIO: "I'M READY TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001919

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV PREF PINR TOGO'>TO FR
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH GILCHRIST OLYMPIO: "I'M READY TO
ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE, BUT THE LOME SIDE IS BLOCKING"

REF: A. LOME 332

B. GALINDO/DUNN/KANEDA E-MAILS

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Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reason
1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Gilchrist Olympio, Paris-based UFC chief
and opposition leader, told us March 23 that he was prepared
to engage in national dialogue with the Faure regime but
asserted that the regime was blocking the dialogue by not
agreeing on the naming of a mediator/facilitator of the
talks. The GOT had caused UN Special Advisor Brahimi, who
was ready to assume that role, to step away when the GOT
proposed that Brahimi accept a deputy for the talks nominated
by the GOT with, Olympio claimed, connections to the Faure
regime. Burkina Faso President Campaore went to Lome this
week to try to resolve this issue. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Per refs A and B, we called on Gilchrist Olympio on
March 23 and discussed for over an hour events in TOGO,
including the issue of a national dialogue. Isaac Tchiakpe,
the Counselor for Communication of Olympio's UFC (Union des
Force de Changement),also participated.

AFTER EYADEMA'S DEATH AND THROUGH 2005


3. (C) Olympio began by describing the meetings and
discussions that took place after former president Eyadema's
death early in 2005. He noted the manner in which Nigerian
President Obasanjo, in his role as AU Chairman, had gotten
involved in TOGO soon after Eyadema's death. Olympio
indicated that Obasanjo's early engagement was a mixed
blessing. On the one hand, the succession issue in TOGO
deserved the attention of a statesman of Obasanjo's stature.
On the other, however, the impression that Obasanjo was
taking control of the issue may have lulled observers into a
false sense of security, which contributed, in Olympio's
view, to the noticeable decrease in criticism by the
international community of the way that Faure succeeded his
father.


4. (C) Olympio discussed the meetings that took place
during 2005, some under the aegis of Obasanjo's leadership or
in conjunction with Sant'Egidio, and some which both Olympio
and Faure attended. At several points UN Secretary-General
Annan had also expressed his interest in TOGO and the efforts
to promote discussion between Faure and Olympio. Olympio
said he quickly concluded that Faure (whom he consistently
called "le garcon" or "le fils" during our meeting) had not
changed and would not change, although he was better at
projecting a positive image than his father had been. (NOTE:
Olympio's description of these different meetings and talks
was at times difficult to follow as he did not discuss them
in chronological order or provide much context. END NOTE.)


5. (C) The series of meetings in 2005 were not productive,
Olympio said, owing to an excessive focus on establishing
agendas and modalities. He blamed the Faure regime for the
lack of progress. At one point he said that Faure did not
want to talk because discussions might be the first step in a
long process that might eventually lead to the end of the
Gnassingbe dynasty. Olympio said that Faure would thus block
and impede where possible and at the same time do his utmost
to make it look like others, such as Olympio, were the
obstacles to progress and reconciliation.


6. (C) Even the temptation of making peace with the EU by
meeting its 22 conditions, and thereby allow EU assistance to
flow to TOGO, was not strong enough for Faure to change,
Olympio suggested. He and Tchiakpe noted the regime's many
criminal activities (e.g., drug and arms trafficking) that
would always supply sufficient income for the Faure regime to
meet at least its immediate needs, if not provide a life of
luxury for a chosen few.


7. (C) Olympio said that in the early days of the Faure
regime, when a slight possibility of change existed, he was
very concerned about the legal obstacles Eyadema had enacted
towards the end of his life, which Olympio believed were
designed to impede specifically Olympio's political
ambitions. These were laws on residency, one's ancestors,
financial situation, and the like that made it difficult for
Olympio to run for office in compliance with TOGOlese law.


8. (C) These issues became of lesser concern as time passed
and the likelihood of Olympio's running for office dimmed.
In later talks with Obasanjo, Campaore, and others, Olympio
said that the issues he was most concerned about, and which

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could form the main agenda topics in discussions with Faure,
were the TOGOlese army, political prisoners, TOGOlese
refugees, and an transparent electoral framework. These
subjects were passed to Faure but, Olympio said, there had
never been a clear response.

CURRENT STATE OF PLAY


9. (C) Tchiakpe said that Elysee Africa Advisor Michel de
Bonnecorse was responsible for bringing Burkina Faso
President Campaore into current efforts to promote dialogue,
and that Bonnecorse's efforts regarding Campaore began on
February 1, 2006. Olympio said that he had no objection to
Campaore's playing an oversight role in any talks between
Olympio and Faure, but he preferred having an on-site
mediator/facilitator who would attend and "referee" the talks
in a neutral manner. Olympio indicated that at some point UN
Secretary-General Annan suggested his Special Advisor,

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Lakhdar Brahimi, for this role. Olympio said that Brahimi,
with his vast experience and excellent reputation, was a
perfect choice. It would not be a bad idea, Olympio
continued, if the U.S. and EU sent observers to attend the
talks, if for no other reason than to counter whatever spin
the GOT might employ when providing press briefings on the
discussions.


10. (C) However, according to Olympio, Faure proceeded to
deliberately derail the process. He did so by proposing that
Brahimi take on as his deputy someone (whom Olympio did not
name or otherwise clearly identify) that Olympio considered
to be close to the Faure regime. According to Olympio,
Brahimi balked at this suggestion and said that when he
accepted an assignment, he carried out the work his way and
with a staff, if any, he chose. He then said he would not
serve so long as TOGO kept on the table the idea of Brahimi's
having to accept a deputy, especially one not of his choosing.


11. (C) Olympio said that it was thus Lome's fault that
there was no national dialogue. He said several times: "I
am ready to talk with them anytime -- tomorrow -- if only
they would agree to Brahimi (or someone of equal experience
and stature) as a mediator or facilitator, and cease making
their demands about a 'deputy.'" He cautioned: "Faure and
his people will always -- ALWAYS -- do whatever they think is
necessary to present themselves in a positive light and to
make it look like the opposition is stalling."


12. (C) Asked several times about his willingness to talk
and what might entice him to engage in dialogue, Olympio
said: "It's simple. All they have to do is agree on the
mediator issue. Then we can talk. Of course, they are
capable of coming up with other obstacles if we overcome this
one."


13. (C) Olympio said he traveled to Ouagadougou to discuss
all of these matters with Campaore, and they met for three
hours during the evening of March 17. Olympio said he
stressed the Brahimi problem and asked that Campaore, if he
were to meet with the other side, try to resolve this
problem. Olympio said that Campaore understood the issue and
that it was one of the main topics he intended to raise in
Lome during his visit there during the week of March 20.

VIEWS OF THE FRENCH


14. (C) Throughout the conversation, Olympio and Tchiakpe
expressed disappointment with France. First, the issue of
Eyadema's "friendship" with President Chirac was a very sore
point. They both commented on France's tendency to seek
stability in its former colonies. If a "strong man" was the
best way of achieving stability, France had no qualms about
supporting the "strong man." It had done so in TOGO for
decades. There was a hint of sadness in Olympio's voice when
he continued, "and they are doing the same thing now with the
boy." He expressed bitterness at what he termed France's
perfunctory condemnation of Faure's accession to power and
its quick return to "business as usual."


15. (C) NOTE: We discussed TOGO and Olympio very briefly
in a March 21 meeting on Chad with MFA DAS-equivalent for
West Africa Bruno Foucher, commenting, without being more
specific, that there was a perception that Olympio was not
doing enough to engage in national dialogue with the GOT,
thus impeding progress on the EU's 22 conditions. Foucher
responded curtly, saying that the GOF had very little to do
with Olympio directly. Echoing earlier comments, Foucher
said that Olympio really needed to do his part to get the
national dialogue going. END NOTE.

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U.S. AND TOGO


16. (C) Olympio offered brief comments when asked what the
U.S. might do regarding TOGO. He said the U.S. should
increase its attention. He noted that "you are very involved
in Cote d'Ivoire in the IWG. Perhaps you could play a
stronger leadership role in TOGO." He also said that the
U.S. should remain vigilant in terms of Faure's constant
efforts to present himself as reasonable and the opposition
as disorganized, unfocused, and ineffective. He noted that
U.S. pressure could often be a powerful force for change, and
that pressure was something the Faure regime understood.


17. (C) COMMENT: Olympio was an engaging interlocutor,
quick to identify the thrust and implication of our
questions. His discourse, however, was at times difficult to
follow because of its lack of precision and chronology and
his tendency to speak elliptically. There was a slight air
of fatigue and resignation as well, which seemed a product of
having seen Eyadema's passing without, so far, being able to
profit from it. He was careful at all times to blame the
Faure regime for the failure to engage in national dialogue.


18. (C) COMMENT CONT'D: It was also evident that Olympio
considers himself the only true opposition figure of
importance, and he was not shy about name dropping or
suggesting that someone like Obasanjo views him as an equal.
In his few references to other opposition elements, he tended
to dismiss them as inconsequential, not in a mean-spirited
manner but rather, in his view, as a matter of fact. END
COMMENT.





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