MFA DAS DISCUSSES OFFENSIVE IN CHAD AND UPCOMING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001843

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016
TAGS: PREL PINS MOPS CD FR
SUBJECT: MFA DAS DISCUSSES OFFENSIVE IN CHAD AND UPCOMING
ELECTION

REF: A. NDJAMENA 431


B. YAMAMOTO/SEMINARA/KANEDA E-MAILS

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Bruce Turner, reasons 1.4 (b
/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA DAS-equivalent for West Africa Bruno
Foucher on March 21 discussed developments in Chad, notably
the GOC's offensive against rebel forces that began early on
March 21. Foucher said that, if successful, the offensive
could solidify Deby's regime and reduce Sudan's ability to
influence events in Chad. Foucher was not receptive to the
notion of postponing elections in Chad, stating that such a
postponement would not likely lead to a more stable and
improved situation in Chad, given the weakness of the
political opposition to Deby and the weakness of Chad's
political class in general. END SUMMARY.

OFFENSIVE AGAINST REBEL FORCES


2. (C) MFA DAS-equivalent for West Africa Bruno Foucher on
March 21 reviewed developments in Chad, beginning with the
military campaign launched against rebel forces earlier on
March 21. Foucher said he learned about the offensive when
he arrived at work on March 21 and said that it had
apparently been well-organized in secret prior to its
launching. He claimed no prior knowledge of the attack.


3. (C) Foucher was atypically upbeat as to the implications
of the offensive. The offensive seemed to be going well in
its early stages. A number of rebels had been killed.
Foucher said information he had received indicated that one
of the Erdimi brothers may have been either killed or
wounded. Foucher said that if Deby achieved a decisive
victory over the rebels, his ability to stabilize Chad and
substantially limit Sudan's influence in Chad would increase
significantly.


4. (C) The offensive was important in other respects,
Foucher noted. It indicated that Deby was willing to act
against those elements of his own Zaghawa clan in rebellion
against him, and thus act in the national, rather than clan,
interest. Displaying a clear willingness to act against the
Zaghawa rebels would itself strengthen Deby's hand against
Sudan and its support for Chad's rebels.


5. (C) Foucher did not believe the offensive was tied to
the March 14 attempted coup in Chad (ref A). The operation
would have taken time to plan and organize and was probably
in train before the coup attempt. Foucher again commented on
the secrecy with which it had been organized and implemented.
Although he did not think the operation was linked to the
coup attempt, its launching soon after the aborted coup would
probably be viewed as a sign of strength and decisiveness on
Deby's part.


6. (C) Foucher said that Sudan had two motives in trying to
destabilize Chad and replace the Deby regime with one more
amenable to Khartoum's policies. The first was that a
pro-Sudanese regime in Chad would allow Khartoum a freer hand
in dealing with Darfur. The second motive, Foucher observed,
was ideological in nature -- he said that one should not
underestimate the hopes of Islamists in Sudan who wanted to
extend Islam's reach from Sudan farther west and south. A
pro-Sudan regime in Chad would almost certainly be
pro-Islamist, he commented, and not the kind of Islam
favorably disposed to the West.


7. (C) Stabilizing northern Chad would allow Deby, in the
short-term, to resolve current problems with the World Bank
and place Chad's economy on a better footing, something the
country desperately needed, Foucher continued. In the
longer-term, acting against the northern rebels and acting
against members of his own clan could lead to expanding the
political dialogue in Chad and broadening Deby's base.


8. (C) Foucher said that France has been encouraging Deby
to reach out to opposition political groups (the "legal
opposition," Foucher commented). The problem, which affected
other issues related to Chad's political future, was that the
opposition did not consist of what we would consider coherent
political parties. Foucher said there were some 70
"political parties" in the south but that these were often
small groups or even individuals that did not resemble what
would pass for a political party in France or the U.S. There
was no "classe politique" deserving of the term in Chad,
Foucher stressed. Nonetheless, the GOF believed that Deby
had to make an effort to include the opposition in order to
increase his base and effectiveness. This might also have
the beneficial effect of reducing the possibility of more

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coup attempts. Foucher suggested that France and the U.S.
work together to convince Deby to adopt a more inclusive
policy regarding the opposition.

ELECTIONS IN CHAD


9. (C) Foucher said that he had received from France's
Washington Embassy a copy of the U.S. non-paper on the
postponement of the May 3 elections (ref B). He said he was
not receptive to the idea. Postponing elections would make
sense if we could be confident of a better outcome a year
from now, or whenever the elections might take place. He
referred again to the lack of a political culture in Chad and
the absence of any figure who might be a good successor to
Deby. There did not appear to be such a person, he said. It
would be better to hold the elections on May 3 as scheduled
and at the same time to make clear to Deby the need to hold
them in a proper manner. Assuming Deby won, France, the
U.S., and others could continue to encourage Deby to work
with all elements of Chadian society and thereby expand his
base and progressively increase Chad's stability. Postponing
elections and holding them a year from now, when
circumstances would not appear to be any better than they
were now, would not be a positive thing to do, he said.


10. (C) Foucher said that France was not now engaged in
contingency planning in the event of a complete collapse of
the Deby regime, either as a result of a successful coup or
some other unforeseen development.


11. (C) COMMENT: We were impressed by the degree to which
the new military campaign has given Foucher grounds to
believe that the Deby regime now has an opportunity to take a
decisive step in defeating the rebels and stabilizing the
country. It was equally clear that the French, if Foucher is
a representative example, continue to base much of their
thinking (and perhaps their hopes) on Deby's staying power.
END COMMENT.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
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