Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS1719
2006-03-17 15:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
(C) FRENCH MFA ON POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS WITH
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHFR #1719 0761507 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 171507Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5312 INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001719
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/06/2016
TAGS: PREL LE SY EG KISL UNSC FR
SUBJECT: (C) FRENCH MFA ON POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS WITH
EGYPT: SYRIA STABILITY, UN ISSUES, CARTOONS
REF: PARIS 1700
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001719
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/06/2016
TAGS: PREL LE SY EG KISL UNSC FR
SUBJECT: (C) FRENCH MFA ON POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS WITH
EGYPT: SYRIA STABILITY, UN ISSUES, CARTOONS
REF: PARIS 1700
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) On the margins of a March 15 discussion on human
rights in Syria (reftel),MFA DAS-equivalent for Egypt/Levant
Herve Besancenot commented briefly on March 8-9 political
consultations in Cairo between France and Egypt, for which
the French delegation was led by MFA Political Director
Stanislas de Laboulaye. (Laboulaye was accompanied by
Besancenot, MFA A/S-equivalent for NEA Jean-Francois
Thibault, and MFA A/S-equivalent for International
Organizations/UN Sylvie Bermann.) Besancenot reported that
the discussions topics included Israeli/Palestinian issues,
Syria/Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Africa, UN issues, and the prophet
Mohammed cartoon controversy.
2. (C) Besancenot reported that he was most struck by a
private conversation on Syria which he had with an unnamed
senior MFA cabinet official whom he described as influential
and close to President Mubarak. According to Besancenot, the
Egyptian MFA official described the relationship between
President Mubarak and Bashar al-Asad as "broken," with the
Egyptian president viewing the Asad family as "finished" in
Syria. That said, the Egyptian MFA official described
Mubarak as very worried by the prospect of another
destabilization in the region after Iraq, and not seeing a
democratic alternative to the Syrian regime. What Mubarak
was waiting for, according to Besancenot's contact, was a
"palace coup" from within the Ba'ath party or Syrian army,
with "another strongman" taking over the country. The
general idea would be a change in leadership at the top,
removing the Asad family grip on power, without dismantling
the Ba'th party system. Besancenot cautioned that he did not
interpret his Cairo discussion to suggest that Egypt would
undermine the SARG; he concluded that the GOE would do
"nothing to help" and "nothing to destroy" the Asad regime.
Besancenot also commented that the Egyptian government lacked
an emotional attachment to the late Rafik Hariri, in contrast
to Saudi Arabia; his Egyptian MFA contact questioned the
international outcry over Hariri's assassination, noting that
it was not the first time an Arab politician had been
murdered.
3. (C) Besancenot suggested that the remaining GOF-GOE
discussions covered familiar ground, with both sides sticking
to established positions on most issues. One of the few
points of divergence was over French reluctance to endorse
Egypt's quest for a UNSC permanent seat, with the Egyptian
MFA IO Director offering a "Brezhnevian" defense of Egypt's
case. Besancenot commented that the GoF viewed Egypt as
lacking critical support within the UN Africa regional group,
and overestimating its popularity within the General Assembly
as a launching pad to a permanent seat.
4. (C) On the cartoon controversy, Besancenot noted that
Assistant Foreign Minister Wafa Basim told Laboulaye that the
crisis was not a passing "summer cloud," and had shown the
serious divergence between Europe's largely irreligious
culture and the Muslim world. Basim commented that even she
-- as a modern, moderate Muslim well-acquainted with the West
-- could not understand why European newspapers had sought to
strike at the heart of Muslim beliefs. Basim floated the
idea of forming an informal "crisis cell" to address possible
future eruptions, an idea politely dismissed by the French
side as too bureaucratic.
5. (C) Comment: We defer to Embassy Cairo on the accuracy of
Besancenot's assessment of the Egyptian position on Syria.
Besancenot, a former DCM at the French Embassy in Cairo, has
exhibited considerable sympathy for GOE positions, in
addition to claiming privileged access to Egyptian officials.
End comment.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/06/2016
TAGS: PREL LE SY EG KISL UNSC FR
SUBJECT: (C) FRENCH MFA ON POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS WITH
EGYPT: SYRIA STABILITY, UN ISSUES, CARTOONS
REF: PARIS 1700
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) On the margins of a March 15 discussion on human
rights in Syria (reftel),MFA DAS-equivalent for Egypt/Levant
Herve Besancenot commented briefly on March 8-9 political
consultations in Cairo between France and Egypt, for which
the French delegation was led by MFA Political Director
Stanislas de Laboulaye. (Laboulaye was accompanied by
Besancenot, MFA A/S-equivalent for NEA Jean-Francois
Thibault, and MFA A/S-equivalent for International
Organizations/UN Sylvie Bermann.) Besancenot reported that
the discussions topics included Israeli/Palestinian issues,
Syria/Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Africa, UN issues, and the prophet
Mohammed cartoon controversy.
2. (C) Besancenot reported that he was most struck by a
private conversation on Syria which he had with an unnamed
senior MFA cabinet official whom he described as influential
and close to President Mubarak. According to Besancenot, the
Egyptian MFA official described the relationship between
President Mubarak and Bashar al-Asad as "broken," with the
Egyptian president viewing the Asad family as "finished" in
Syria. That said, the Egyptian MFA official described
Mubarak as very worried by the prospect of another
destabilization in the region after Iraq, and not seeing a
democratic alternative to the Syrian regime. What Mubarak
was waiting for, according to Besancenot's contact, was a
"palace coup" from within the Ba'ath party or Syrian army,
with "another strongman" taking over the country. The
general idea would be a change in leadership at the top,
removing the Asad family grip on power, without dismantling
the Ba'th party system. Besancenot cautioned that he did not
interpret his Cairo discussion to suggest that Egypt would
undermine the SARG; he concluded that the GOE would do
"nothing to help" and "nothing to destroy" the Asad regime.
Besancenot also commented that the Egyptian government lacked
an emotional attachment to the late Rafik Hariri, in contrast
to Saudi Arabia; his Egyptian MFA contact questioned the
international outcry over Hariri's assassination, noting that
it was not the first time an Arab politician had been
murdered.
3. (C) Besancenot suggested that the remaining GOF-GOE
discussions covered familiar ground, with both sides sticking
to established positions on most issues. One of the few
points of divergence was over French reluctance to endorse
Egypt's quest for a UNSC permanent seat, with the Egyptian
MFA IO Director offering a "Brezhnevian" defense of Egypt's
case. Besancenot commented that the GoF viewed Egypt as
lacking critical support within the UN Africa regional group,
and overestimating its popularity within the General Assembly
as a launching pad to a permanent seat.
4. (C) On the cartoon controversy, Besancenot noted that
Assistant Foreign Minister Wafa Basim told Laboulaye that the
crisis was not a passing "summer cloud," and had shown the
serious divergence between Europe's largely irreligious
culture and the Muslim world. Basim commented that even she
-- as a modern, moderate Muslim well-acquainted with the West
-- could not understand why European newspapers had sought to
strike at the heart of Muslim beliefs. Basim floated the
idea of forming an informal "crisis cell" to address possible
future eruptions, an idea politely dismissed by the French
side as too bureaucratic.
5. (C) Comment: We defer to Embassy Cairo on the accuracy of
Besancenot's assessment of the Egyptian position on Syria.
Besancenot, a former DCM at the French Embassy in Cairo, has
exhibited considerable sympathy for GOE positions, in
addition to claiming privileged access to Egyptian officials.
End comment.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
Stapleton