Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06PARIS1588
2006-03-13 14:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:  

MARCH 4-6 CHIRAC VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA: FOCUS ON

Tags:  PREL SA LE SY IR IZ ECON FR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6896
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHFR #1588/01 0721437
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131437Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5122
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001588 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/06/2016
TAGS: PREL SA LE SY IR IZ ECON FR
SUBJECT: MARCH 4-6 CHIRAC VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA: FOCUS ON
SYRIA/LEBANON, REPLACING LAHOUD


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 001588

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/06/2016
TAGS: PREL SA LE SY IR IZ ECON FR
SUBJECT: MARCH 4-6 CHIRAC VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA: FOCUS ON
SYRIA/LEBANON, REPLACING LAHOUD


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).



1. (C) Summary: Syria/Lebanon were the primary topics of
President Chirac's March 4 and 5 meetings with Saudi King
Abdullah, with Iran, Hamas/PA, and Iraq discussed to a lesser
degree. Elysee contacts described the Saudi monarch as
bitter over rejection of the Saudi initiative on
Syria-Lebanon reconciliation, and reluctantly agreeing to a
joint Saudi-Egyptian approach to seek Syrian support for
replacement of Lebanese President Lahoud. Elysee contacts
noted King Abdullah's opposition to an Aoun presidency, his
support for an international tribunal, and his agreement to
participate in a future Core Group conference on Lebanon.
Elysee contacts described the Saudis as worried by Iran's
rising regional influence and popularity among the Muslim
masses, but at the same time, wanting the West to resolve the
Iran nuclear problem for them without destabilizing the
region. Elysee contacts also speculated that Saudi Arabia
would give money to a Hamas-led PA to counteract Iranian
influence, though King Abdullah did not say so specifically.
Elysee contacts described King Abdullah as extremely negative
on Iraq and preoccupied with the security of the Saudi-Iraqi
border and prospects for Saudi jihadists in Iraq returning
home to wreak havoc. Elysee contacts described Chirac as
seeking to encourage King Abdullah's reform efforts, most
notably in his speech to the Saudi consultative council; at
the same time, Elysee contacts described the King as speaking
in aphorisms and appearing somewhat out of touch with the
outside world. In a separate readout, MFA contacts described
Saudi FM Saud al-Faisal's meeting with French FM Douste-Blazy
as focused on Iran and Lebanon, with the Saudi FM reiterating
intent to continue direct dialogue with Iran and describing
Israel's nuclear program as detrimental to international
non-proliferation efforts. On the trade front, Elysee and
MFA contacts downplayed the lack of contracts concluded

during the Chirac visit, though the absence of such
commercial breakthroughs led many French media outlets to
conclude that the visit brought minimal results. End
summary.


2. (SBU) President Chirac completed his fourth official visit
to Saudi Arabia March 4-6, accompanied by four ministers
(Foreign Affairs, Defense, Economy, Foreign Trade) and some
15 top business executives, including CEO's of Total,
SOFRESA, SODEHXO, Dassault, Alstom, Accor, BNP Paribas,
Thales Vinci, and Veolia. Chirac met with Saudi King
Abdullah March 4 and 5, in discussions that were largely
one-on-one. He also became the first foreign leader to
address the Saudi Consultative Council March 5, during which
he stressed the GoF's desire for a strategic partnership with
Riyadh, called for Syria to "change its behavior" in Lebanon,
lauded Saudi King Abdullah's political and economic reforms,
and called for Saudi Arabia and France to unite to thwart a
"clash of ignorance disguised as a clash of civilizations."
The ministers accompanying Chirac also had bilateral meetings
with their Saudi counterparts, with the exception of Defense
Minister Alliot-Marie, whose counterpart, Prince Sultan Abd
al-Aziz Al Saud, was vacationing in Morocco at the time of
the visit -- a move which some French press outlets
interpreted as a rebuff of French efforts to revive a
long-stalled Rafale plane sale to Saudi Arabia (see para 14
for more on economic/commercial issues.) Poloff received a
readout on the Chirac-King Abdullah discussions from
Presidential Technical Advisor on the Middle East/Americas
Dominique Boche, and a separate briefing on discussions
between FM Douste-Blazy and FM Saud al-Faisal from MFA
DAS-equivalent for Iraq/Iran/Arabian Gulf Antoine Sivan.

CHIRAC SEEKS KING'S SUPPORT FOR REPLACING LAHOUD
-------------- ---


3. (C) Elysee advisor Boche described the Chirac-Abdullah
discussions as focused primarily on Syria/Lebanon, with
Chirac persuading a reluctant King Abdullah to take on a more
active Saudi role in efforts to replace President Lahoud.
Boche said King Abdullah, from the outset, expressed deep
bitterness over the failed Saudi initiative on
Syrian-Lebanese reconciliation. King Abdullah told Chirac
that Saudi Arabia had sought to "calm" the Lebanese situation
in the wake of the wave of assassinations and put ideas on
paper -- all of which were negotiable. After the brusque
Lebanese rejection of the Saudi initiative, the King
concluded, Saudi Arabia was not inclined to pursue further
initiatives unless the Lebanese were in general agreement
about the outlines first.


4. (C) Chirac, in response, told the King that the Saudi
initiative had been misunderstood, with then-Syrian FM Shara
distorting it to appear as his own plan. Chirac advised the

PARIS 00001588 002 OF 004


King that Lebanon "needed Saudi Arabia's wisdom" and that
Saudi Arabia had to mobilize anew on Lebanon's behalf.
Chirac described the internal situation in Lebanon, focusing
on President Lahoud's absolute blockage of all progress; the
French president concluded that it was in the interest of all
Lebanon's neighbors, Syria included, for Lahoud to be
replaced. He proposed that Saudi Arabia and Egypt should
seek to discuss with the Syrian leadership "ways to improve"
Syria's situation, while preserving Lebanese sovereignty,
namely by replacing Lahoud. Boche described King Abdullah as
initially reticent on a Lahoud departure, fearing instability
and resurgence of militia activity in Lebanon, as well as
worried that Lahoud's exit would open the door to a Michel
Aoun presidency. The King concluded that 18 months of a
weakened Lahoud was better than six years of an Aoun
presidency. Chirac, in turn, sought to convince the King
that the risk of sectarian confrontations in Lebanon was in
the past, pointing to the National Dialogue as a positive
example. Chirac also advised King Abdullah that there was no
chance of an Aoun presidency, as the Christian community was
not united behind him, with Maronite Patriarch Sfeir
continuing to oppose him as well.


5. (C) Over the course of Chirac's three days in Saudi
Arabia, Boche concluded, the Saudi monarch modified his
attitude and, in the end, agreed to a joint Saudi-Egyptian
approach to Bashar al-Asad on the Lahoud issue during the
March 28-29 Arab League summit. Boche commented that the
Saudis and Egyptians had to move fast and should approach the
SARG before the summit, conceding that such an approach did
not have great chances for success. He explained that the
upcoming report by UNIIIC Chief Brammertz was likely to
contain "nothing new," which in turn would embolden the SARG
and make it even less likely to make concessions. Bashar
al-Asad's recent speech touting Lahoud as Lebanon's best
president was further evidence, in Boche's view, that the
SARG was not ready to cut loose Lahoud. Asked what
incentives Syria might seek in exchange for supporting
Lahoud's removal and how this would not counteract
U.S.-French efforts to isolate Damascus, Boche observed that
this remained an unknown and the essential question.
Perhaps, he speculated, the very act of seeking Bashar's
support for Lahoud's removal would constitute a tacit message
that the international community was not seeking to remove
the Syrian president, which in itself was an incentive.

YES TO TRIBUNAL, CONFERENCE, SYRIAN REGIME STABILITY
-------------- --------------


6. (C) On other Syria/Lebanon-related points, Boche described
King Abdullah as supportive of an international tribunal to
try suspects in the Hariri assassination. The King also
confirmed his willingness to participate in an international
economic conference on Lebanon. On Syria, the King remained
fearful of a possible overthrow of the regime, viewing
potential successors, including a pro-Iranian regime or
radical Sunni Islamist government, as worse that the current
government. Boche concluded that King Abdullah appeared to
prefer a weak, but stable SARG under international pressure,
similar to the situation of Saddam Hussein in the post-Gulf
War period. Boche added that throughout Chirac's public
remarks in Saudi Arabia, he sought to emphasize French
support for "behavior change" vice "regime change" in Syria,
in an attempt to assuage Saudi public sensitivities.

FEAR OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND APPEAL IN MUSLIM WORLD
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Boche described the Saudi monarch as worried about the
Iranian nuclear threat as well as Iran's popular appeal in
the Muslim world, where public opinion saw a "double
standard" between treatment of Iran's nuclear program and
those of Israel, Pakistan and India. Boche added that the
Saudi government continued to fear a so-called "Shia arc"
from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, to Lebanon. He assessed
that the Saudi view overlooked the internal differences
between all four countries, with Syria not having any Shi'a
community to speak of, and Shi'a communities in Lebanon and
Iraq very distinct from Iranian counterparts. That said,
Boche assessed that the "Shi'a arc" perception in Saudi
Arabia continued to impel the Saudi government towards
seeking to "detach" Syria from Iran, a strategy which ignored
the long-standing strategic relations between the Iranian and
Syrian regimes which began under the late Hafiz al-Asad.
Boche concluded that the Saudi government wanted the West to
keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, without
confrontation or destabilizing the region.

PESSIMISM ON IRAQ, FEAR OF JIHADIST SPILLOVER
--------------


PARIS 00001588 003 OF 004



8. (C) Although Iraq was not a major topic of discussion,
Boche described the Saudi King as viewing the current
situation there as "catastrophic." He assessed that the
King's foremost worry, beyond fearing the breakup of the
country and rising Iranian influence, was the security of the
Saudi-Iraqi border, and the potential for Saudi jihadists in
Iraq to return home to wreak havoc.

RESPONDING TO A HAMAS-LED PA
--------------


9. (C) Boche noted that, like Iraq, the Israel-Palestinian
situation was not a major focus of the Chirac-Abdullah
discussions. On the French position, Boche downplayed
Chirac's public statements in Riyadh expressing opposition to
sanctions on a Hamas-led PA, emphasizing that Chirac's
remarks were in response to a question on sanctions, which,
at any rate, were not under consideration. As for the Saudi
position, Boche assessed that King Abdullah remained
mistrustful of Hamas and its links to the Muslim Brotherhood,
but at the same time feared a destabilization of the
situation in the Palestinian territories and growing Iranian
influence with Hamas. Boche concluded that Saudi Arabia
would give funding to a Hamas-led government, in order to
diminish potential Iranian influence, though he stressed that
King Abdullah did not say this during his discussion with
Chirac.

ENCOURAGING REFORMS, BUT QUESTIONING KING'S ISOLATION
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Another recurring theme of Chirac's visit, according
to Boche, was encouragement of reforms introduced by King
Abdullah, particularly on economic openness, privatization,
and political participation. This was why Chirac had sought
to address the consultative council, which, though unelected,
resembled a genuine assembly in many ways, with open
discourse and exchange of ideas. Offering personal
observations, Boche noted that a small minority of council
members stayed in their seats and did not applaud Chirac's
remarks, an indication, in his view, of the depth of
fundamentalism and hostility towards the West among some
majlis members.


11. (C) Commenting further on the atmospherics of the
Chirac-Abdullah discussions, Boche (strictly protect) noted
that the Saudi King "spoke in aphorisms," with it sometimes
being difficult to understand what he meant. Boche added
that upon entering the King's expansive palace, with
attending staffs and trappings of modernity, he was left
wondering what the King understood of the outside world, how
he received his information, and who filtered it. Boche
concluded that the Saudi leadership is "very far from us,"
and remains "oceans apart" from the West. Asked to explain
his view, given King Abdullah's modernizing reputation, Boche
cited the King's advanced age and the fact that Abdullah had
grown up during a period when there was no educational
opportunity in Saudi Arabia. Boche added, pessimistically,
that with the vast majority of the Saudi population under the
age of 25, and education still primarily focused on religious
instruction with little practical application, Saudi efforts
at "Saudization" and sweeping reforms had little hope for
success.

SAUD AL-FAISAL-DOUSTE BLAZY: IRAN, SYRIA/LEBANON
-------------- ---


12. (C) In a separate discussion, MFA DAS-equivalent for
Iraq/Iran/Arabian Gulf Affairs Antoine Sivan described Iran
as the main topic of a meeting between FM's Douste-Blazy and
Saud al-Faisal on the margins of the Chirac visit. Sivan
described both sides as agreeing that the international
community should keep an "outstretched hand" to Iran while
remaining firm on conditions. FM Saud, for his part,
cautioned against pursuing policies of confrontation or
sanctions on Iran, and affirmed his desire for Saudi Arabia
to develop a long-term regional partnership with Iran. What
worried Saudi Arabia, according to FM Saud, were the
fluctuations in Iranian policy due to its internal situation,
and the shifting bases of power within the Iranian regime.
Saud also stressed to Douste-Blazy that Saudi Arabia had
maintained a clear and frank dialogue with Tehran, and that
the Saudi government had a positive capacity to influence
Iran and would encourage the Iranians to assuage suspicions
on their nuclear program. Saud also emphasized support for a
WMD-free zone in the Middle East and concluded that it was
difficult to respond to Iranian arguments without drawing
parallels with Israel. Saud asserted that the international
community's acceptance of Israel's nuclear program had dealt
a "fatal blow" to global non-proliferation efforts, as the
majority of Muslims worldwide believed that Muslim nations

PARIS 00001588 004 OF 004


should be allowed to develop nuclear energy.


13. (C) On Lebanon, FM Saud expressed worry about the
situation on the ground and concluded that confessionalism
remained the essential problem. The Saudi FM also expressed
concern over the "alliance" between Michel Aoun and
Hizballah, which he cited as proof that ending Syrian
influence in Lebanon would not mean the end of Lebanon's
problems. Like King Abdullah, Saud expressed bitterness over
rejection of the Saudi initiative, which he blamed on certain
unnamed Lebanese leaders who saw their interests threatened.
Saudi Arabia continued to encourage Syria to take steps in
favor of Lebanese independence, but FM Saud stressed the need
to give Syria time to react and remained hopeful that Syria
would change its Lebanon policies, in the end. Douste-Blazy,
for his part, stressed the GoF's support for Lebanon's full
independence and sovereignty, and insistence that the Hariri
investigation proceed unimpeded, with perpetrators held
accountable. At the same time, the French FM emphasized that
the GoF was not pursuing "regime change" in Syria. Saud
al-Faisal expressed support for the French position,
especially on the Hariri investigation, and agreed with
Douste-Blazy on the need to replace President Lahoud. On
possible candidates, Sivan reported that Saud described
Michel Aoun an unacceptable option; on a more positive note,
Saud commended Nassib Lahoud for his honesty and integrity,
but assessed that he may lack the charisma and influence for
the presidency. Sivan concluded that, as in the case of
Iran, Saud al-Faisal exhibited "a certain reserve" on the
Lahoud issue, suggesting a preference for not moving too fast.

COMMENT: COMMERCIAL DISAPPOINTMENT?
--------------


14. (C) French press coverage of the Chirac visit focused on
the French president's personal rapport with King Abdullah
and the lack of commercial contracts concluded, with many
media outlets concluding that Chirac's visit had minimal
results, despite the two countries' converging views on
regional issues. One leftist daily quipped that the Saudis
viewed Chirac "like some old family friend that you always
like to have to dinner but whose advice and requests are not
heeded very closely." Despite Elysee public insistence in
advance that no deals would be concluded during the visit,
French media had previewed the trip as a last chance for the
GoF to conclude long-stalled security and defense contracts,
including a sale of some 48 Rafale planes dating back to the
1980's, and the 7 billion euro "Miksa" border surveillance
project, long sought by Thales. Our Elysee and MFA contacts
downplayed commercial aspects of Chirac's visit, with Boche
noting that concluding contracts was never the objective of
the visit and that the presence of so many French CEO's in
the delegation was a valuable "marketing exercise" for French
companies. Boche added that French companies had concluded
some 3.5 billion euros in contracts in Saudi Arabia in 2005,
making it France's second largest export market in the region
after Turkey. Sivan, in a less convincing rebuttal,
commented that regional issues remained at the forefront of
Chirac's agenda, and that contract discussions were not
appropriate for a state visit. Chirac, for his part,
declared in March 6 press remarks in Riyadh that the Saudi
government was reviewing French security and defense contract
proposals in detail, and that everything was occurring in "an
excellent climate," though no contracts had been concluded.
The conclusion one might draw from Chirac's visit is that his
tradition of cultivating highly personalized ties with Arab
leaders still has the potential to forge political
cooperation on regional issues of mutual concern, but is no
longer a magic key for French companies in a competitive
global marketplace. Some local Arab political observers,
though, speculate that some sales were likely agreed to
during the visit, but the Saudi government, averse to the
appearance of mixing business and politics, will let
announcements of new French contracts dribble out over time.
End comment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

Stapleton